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preface
New Perspectives  
on Regulation
New research in the social sciences has yielded insights with important (but, as 
yet, largely unrecognized) implications for the government’s role in the economy. 
This new research holds the promise of enabling creative solutions to pressing 
problems. As the financial crisis unfolds and the global recession continues, the 
need to share these ideas beyond academia to inform policymaking and public 
debate has grown ever more urgent. 
To this end, in the fall of 2008 the Tobin Project approached leading scholars 
in the social sciences with an unusual request: we asked them to think about 
the topic of economic regulation and share key insights from their fields in a 
manner that would be accessible to both policymakers and the public. Because 
we were concerned that a conventional literature survey might obscure as much 
as it revealed, we asked instead that the writers provide a broad sketch of the 
most promising research in their fields pertaining to regulation; that they identify 
guiding principles for policymakers wherever possible; that they animate these 
principles with concrete policy proposals; and, in general, that they keep academic 
language and footnotes to a minimum.
As if this weren’t a tall enough order, we asked these scholars for one more 
thing: because the need for informed debate on our nation’s problems is so great 
and the prospect of important new government action imminent, we asked that 
they prepare this new kind of essay on a compressed timeline measured in weeks 
rather than the many months or even years that traditional academic writing 
usually requires.
Fortunately, a group of leading scholars took up this challenge. This book 
is the product of their efforts, for which we are enormously grateful. In seven 
chapters, they condense lessons of a broad and varied swath of research and share 
insights for how we might address the financial crisis, ensure more enduring 
prosperity, and improve our regulatory institutions. 
New Perspectives on Regulation is aimed primarily at citizens and public ser-
vants, including our leaders in Washington, who are grappling with a crisis that 
conventional approaches didn’t predict and don’t yet seem able to solve. But the 
breadth and accessibility of the work should also make it an excellent starting 
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point for both students and scholars desiring a survey of the state of the art in 
the social sciences, particularly as it relates to public policy. 
As an experiment in reconnecting academia to our broader democracy, New 
Perspectives on Regulation is one piece of the mission that the Tobin Project’s 
affiliated scholars have undertaken: to invigorate public policy debate by rededi-
cating their academic work to the pursuit of solutions to society’s great problems. 
Mitchell Weiss
Executive Director 
The Tobin Project
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Introduction
David Moss and John Cisternino
Regulation is suddenly back in fashion. After more than thirty years of dereg-
ulation being all the rage, the financial crisis of 2007 to 2009 has dramatically 
changed attitudes about the proper role of government. The market fundamen-
talism that drove far-reaching deregulation now looks more like a passing fad 
than the classic staple of political economy it was advertised to be.
At the same time, current thinking about regulation may not be as fresh 
as its promoters imagine, based to a large extent on ideas that were in vogue 
back in the 1960s. Market failure theory was then in its heyday. Every college 
student taking Econ 101 learned that although rational individuals typically 
maxi mized the welfare of the whole society simply by pursuing their own self-
interest, Adam Smith’s invisible hand occasionally (and sometimes spectacularly) 
broke down. A factory, for example, might spew too much smoke into the air 
if its owners did not have to bear the costs of the resulting pollution. Concern 
about “negative externalities” of this sort became a powerful justification and 
driver of environmental regulation. And this was just one piece of a larger whole, 
since market failure theory was used to justify a wide range of government 
interventions, from antitrust law to social insurance.
Market failure theory encompasses a powerful set of ideas, and it will inevi-
tably remain a pillar of any modern approach to regulation. But it should not be 
the only—nor perhaps even the principal—intellectual foundation for a new era 
of regulatory engagement. Since the 1960s, influential new research on govern-
ment failure has helped to drive the movement for deregulation and privatization. 
Yet even as the study of government failure was flourishing, some very different 
ideas were sprouting in the social sciences with profound implications for our 
understanding of human behavior and the role of government. Some of these 
ideas, particularly from the field of behavioral economics, have begun to nudge 
their way into discussions of regulatory purpose, design, and implementation. 
Yet even here, the process is far from complete; and many other exciting new 
lines of research—on everything from social cooperation to co-regulation—
have hardly been incorporated at all.
Now that many lawmakers and their constituents have apparently concluded 
that the earlier focus on government failure went too far, it is imperative that 
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they be able to draw on the very latest academic work in thinking anew about 
the role of government. This, at root, is the purpose of this book: to make the 
newest and most important research accessible to a broad audience, expanding 
our conception of both the possibilities and the potential pitfalls of economic 
regulation at a time of great turmoil in the global economy.
The seven chapters that follow offer seven different perspectives on the subject:
•	Market	failure	perspective.	Joseph Stiglitz gets things started in chapter 1 
with a new look at market failure, which he suggests may be far more 
extensive—and more damaging—than generally believed.
•	 Behavioral	perspective. In chapter 2, Eldar Shafir, Sendhil Mullainathan, 
and Michael Barr move beyond market failure, showing how a better 
under standing of the limits of individual rationality can inform better reg u-
lation—to protect consumers (against “teaser rates” in subprime mortgages, 
for example) and to ensure that markets reward producers who make us 
better off rather than exploit our limitations.
•	Cooperative	perspective.	In chapter 3, Yochai Benkler suggests that 
self-interest is only a relatively small part of what drives human behavior, 
and he explores how successful experiments in social cooperation (in the 
collective production of Wikipedia, for example) can serve as a guide for 
the structuring and regulation of economic activity.
•	 Risk	management	perspective.	Tom Baker and David Moss highlight the 
government’s critical role as a risk manager in chapter 4; they reveal this 
as one of government’s most important and successful functions (in poli-
cies ranging from Social Security to the FDIC) and, importantly, lay out 
the basic dos and don’ts of public risk management.
•	 Experimental	perspective.	Michael Greenstone argues in chapter 5 
that we can dramatically strengthen regulation of all kinds by building 
experimentation into the process of policymaking, developing a culture of 
testing (modeled after medical drug and device testing) that privileges 
empirical evidence over theory in the making of regulatory policy.
•	 Co-regulation	perspective. In chapter 6, Ed Balleisen and Marc Eisner 
take up the fascinating (and highly controversial) subject of co-regulation, 
drawing on a growing international literature to show how best to harness 
private industry in regulating itself and, at the same time, providing a clear 
set of criteria for when government-monitored self-regulation is most likely 
to succeed or fail.
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•	 International	Perspective. Finally, in chapter 7, Rawi Abdelal and John 
Ruggie adopt an international perspective, demonstrating the importance 
of seeing regulation as part of a larger societal bargain, in which citizens 
accept the risks and impositions of globalization in return for a degree of 
social security and a sense of shared values at home.
Although regulation is now back in fashion (at least for the time being), the 
success or failure of regulatory reform will ultimately be decided by substance 
rather than style. Policymakers must have access to the very best ideas; and they 
could soon find themselves on the defensive if they have to rely exclusively 
on the same ones that their predecessors depended on thirty or more years ago. 
Fortunately, in the intervening years, scholars have developed new ways of 
thinking about regulation—new perspectives that we hope will make a positive 
difference, helping to strengthen policymaking at this critical moment in the 
life of the nation.
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chapter 1
Regulation and Failure
Joseph Stiglitz
Only under certain ideal circumstances may individuals, acting on their own, 
obtain “pareto efficient” outcomes, that is, situations in which no one can be 
made better off without making another worse off. These individuals involved 
must be rational and well informed, and must operate in competitive market-
places that encompass a full range of insurance and credit markets. In the absence 
of these ideal circumstances, there exist government interventions that can 
potentially increase societal efficiency and/or equity.
Some of the major elements of these interventions are by now well accepted: 
antitrust laws, to prevent the creation of monopoly power and/or its abuse; con-
sumer protection legislation, designed especially to address potential problems 
of exploitation arising from information asymmetries; and regulations to ensure 
the safety and soundness of the banking system, which are made necessary by 
systemic externalities (spillover effects of economic transactions affecting many 
people who were not parties to the transactions) that can arise when a “systemi-
cally” important institution fails, or is allowed to fail.
The current economic crisis has highlighted the need for government inter-
vention in the event of the failure of a systemically important institution. But 
the need for massive intervention implies, in turn, the need to take actions to 
prevent the occurrence of such failures in the first place. Sometimes the damage 
done by actions that have adverse effects on others can be compensated for after 
the fact, but in the cases at hand, this is in general not possible. Policy interven-
tions should be designed to make less likely the occurrence of actions that 
generate significant negative spillovers, or externalities.
But these are not the only reasons for government intervention. Markets 
fail to produce efficient outcomes for a variety of other reasons that economists 
have explored over the last twenty-five years. Markets are plagued by problems 
of information asymmetries, and there are incentives for market participants 
both to exploit and to increase these information asymmetries. For a variety of 
reasons key markets (such as those for insurance against some of the important 
risks that individuals and firms face) are missing. (Risk management is the 
principal subject of chapter 4 of this volume.)
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Even when markets are efficient, they may fail to produce socially desirable 
outcomes. The wealthy and powerful may “exploit” others in an “efficient” way: 
the gains to one are offset by the losses to others, and in traditional economic 
parlance, so long as that is the case, markets are efficient. No one can be made 
better off without making someone else worse off. But such outcomes are socially 
unjust, and unacceptable. Governments impose regulations to prevent such 
exploitation and to pursue a number of other social goals.
These interventions take a variety of forms. Some are more intrusive than 
others. Some are more robust than others; that is, they can withstand attempts 
at circumvention. In recent decades, policy has focused on the design of pack-
ages of intervention that are robust, recognizing that the costs of the failure of 
intervention are typically on an order of magnitude greater than the costs of the 
interventions themselves. In financial markets, interventions include: (a) dis-
closure of information; (b) restrictions on incentive schemes (including conflicts 
of interest); (c) restrictions on ownership; (d) restrictions on particular behaviors; 
and (e) taxes designed to induce appropriate behaviors.
In addition, there are interventions to ensure competition. One of the big 
failures that the recent global financial crisis has exposed is that we allowed 
financial institutions to grow “too big to fail.” Not only may such large institu-
tions be able to exploit market power, but they also pose systemic risk to the 
economy and have perverse incentives that encourage such behavior. Institutions 
that grow too big to fail inevitably know that if they undertake high-risk activi-
ties and fail, government will pick up the pieces, but if they succeed, they walk 
away with the gains.
While regulation has typically focused on preventing “harmful” behaviors, 
there are some regulations that encourage “constructive” behaviors. These include 
CRA (Community Redevelopment Act) lending requirements, designed to 
ensure that there is a certain flow of credit to underserved communities.
Some interventions combine traditional equity concerns with market 
failures: governments may encourage private provision of retirement insurance 
(recognizing the social consequences of old-age poverty), but also recognize the 
abuses that may arise, unless there are restrictions to ensure that ordinary work-
ers are treated symmetrically with management. Again, this crisis has exposed a 
regulatory failure: regulators failed to prevent the exploitation of poor and 
poorly educated borrowers by lenders. These people were not able to ascertain 
well the risks associated with various lending provisions, such as variable-rate 
mortgages with negative amortization, in a period in which interest rates were 
at a historically low level. The lenders should, of course, have been able to do a 
better job of risk assessment, but because of another set of market failures, they 
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did not. The result is a massive social and economic disaster: people are losing 
their homes and their life savings, and our economy is facing a meltdown.
By its nature, a regulation restricts an individual or firm from doing what it 
otherwise would have done. Those whose behavior is so restricted may complain 
about, say, their loss of profits and potential adverse effects on innovation. But 
the purpose of government intervention is to address potential consequences that 
go beyond the parties directly involved, in situations in which private profit is 
not a good measure of social impact. Appropriate regulation may even advance 
welfare-enhancing innovations.
In short, regulation is necessary because social and private costs and bene-
fits, and hence incentives, are misaligned. Such misalignment leads to problems 
not only in the short run but also in the long run. Incentives to innovate are 
distorted. America’s financial system has been highly innovative, but to a great 
degree innovation has recently been directed at circumventing laws and regula-
tions designed to ensure the efficiency, equity, and stability of the financial sector. 
Brokerages, banks, and insurance companies, among others, have been engaged, 
in effect, in accounting, tax, and regulatory arbitrage. But our financial system 
did not innovate in truly important ways that would have enabled Americans 
to better manage the risks they face—failing even to help manage the relatively 
simple risk of financing most people’s most important asset, their home.
The design of regulatory structures and systems has to take into account: 
(a) asymmetries of information, since the regulator is often at an informational 
disadvantage relative to the regulated; (b) moral hazard, since there are often 
problems in ensuring that a regulator’s behavior is consistent with social welfare 
(for example, that he/she is not beholden to those whom he/she is supposed to 
be regulating); and (c) human fallibility, since mistakes are inevitable, and we 
need to minimize the costs of such mistakes. Well-designed regulations take into 
account the limitations of implementation and enforcement. While no regula-
tory system is perfect, economies with well-designed regulations can perform 
far better than those with inadequate regulation. Regulations can both enhance 
markets and protect those who might otherwise suffer in unregulated markets.  
Adam Smith and the Theory of Market Failures
No idea has had greater impact on policy than Adam Smith’s notion that profit-
maximizing firms interacting with rational consumers in competitive markets 
are led, as if by an “invisible hand,” to society’s general well-being. Smith was 
far more aware of the limitations of the market than his latter-day followers. 
Today, we realize that the reason that the invisible hand often seems invisible is 
that it is not there. Instead, we see a host of pervasive market failures, circum-
stances in which markets produce too much of some things (such as pollution) 
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and too little of others (such as innovation). Whenever there are important 
imperfections and asymmetries of information (that is, situations in which one 
party knows something different from what others know), markets are not in 
general efficient. But such problems mean that markets are almost never fully 
efficient. The relatively recent recognition by economists of this phenomenon 
has had a profound effect in changing presumptions (Greenwald and Stiglitz 
1986).1 Previously the presumption that markets were efficient was widespread, 
with the corollary that only under exceptional circumstances (such as monopoly 
and massive pollution) were there failures that warranted intervention. Now, 
among mainstream economists, there is no presumption that markets are effi-
cient. Government interventions thus necessarily need to focus on areas where 
market failures are most pronounced, such as in the health and finance sectors. 
In my remarks here, I focus on finance, because this area illustrates most of the 
key issues and is the subject of crucial current policy discussions.
The most obvious aspect of market failure in finance is associated with sys-
temic externalities: as noted above, these are failures in the financial sector that 
have systemic effects. Those outside the financial sector today are suffering as a 
result of the mistakes made by those working in the sector. In making their 
decisions (for example, about lending practices), they did not take into account 
the systemic consequences of their actions. They never asked, If our loans go 
bad, what would happen to the entire economy? They looked only to their own 
balance sheets.
But looking deeper into the financial sector, we see a further set of problems: 
the incentives of those making the lending decisions were not aligned even 
with their shareholders’ interests. The bonus system in place allowed them to 
reap large rewards when things went well while allowing them to evade the 
consequences when things went badly. These incentive structures encouraged 
shortsighted and excessively risky behavior. The banks’ shareholders have not 
even been served well. This highlights another market failure: the separation of 
ownership and control, emphasized by Adolphe Berle and Gardiner Means, 
whose conclusions I have worked to set on more rigorous information-theoretic 
foundations (Stiglitz 1985). Such problems of corporate governance came to 
the fore in the aftermath of the Enron scandal, but the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002 did not fully address the problem, since it left in place stock options, which 
not only provide asymmetric incentives but also provide incentives for bad 
accounting, allowing executives to increase their pay by providing information 
to shareholders that leads to higher share prices. Such market manipulation 
encourages the kind of off–balance-sheet behavior that played a major role in 
fomenting the current crisis.
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Much of the proposed financial market regulatory reform focuses on 
precisely these problems: we need better corporate governance, to reduce the 
likelihood of these perverse incentives; and in the case of banks, where perverse 
incentives lead to drastic systemic consequences, with great costs to the econ-
omy and to taxpayers, we need direct restrictions on the form of compensation 
offered to executives. Compensation should be based on long-term performance, 
with far fewer asymmetries in the treatment of gains and losses. Stock options 
in particular need to be restricted. At the very least, shareholders should be 
aware of the consequences of offering stock options as part of executive pay 
packages in terms of share dilution. Banks that use stock options (or which 
otherwise maintain incentive structures encouraging excessively risky behavior) 
need to be subject to tighter supervision.
Because banks (or bank officials) do not always have any incentive for 
transparency—indeed, there may even be incentives for a lack of transparency 
(Edlin and Stiglitz 1995)—we need strong regulations concerning transparency 
and accounting, including regulation of the practice of marking assets to mar-
ket. Without adequate regulations, it is possible to obtain only a very inaccurate 
picture of the liquidity and solvency of banks. Moreover, a lack of regulation 
also gives rise to perverse incentives that encourage banks to realize the gains 
in assets that have gone up in value and leave on their books those that have 
decreased in value. Worse still, knowing that they can thereby give a biased 
view of their position, banks then have an incentive to engage in excessive risk 
taking. The current crisis has exposed some of the problems that arise from 
inappropriate use of mark-to-market accounting by regulators, but that should 
not undermine efforts to enhance market transparency through mark-to-
market accounting. What the system needs is a change in the use to which this 
information is put, and the elimination of incentives to obfuscate the informa-
tion provided.
Managers often have an incentive to obfuscate, and standard transparency 
regulations by themselves may not go far enough. The problem with many 
derivatives was that they were so complex that even if all the information about 
them had been disclosed, most market participants would not have been able to 
assess their real value. Exchange-traded derivatives would have provided most 
of the risk management services needed, but in a more transparent way, with 
more competitive pricing. We will need to develop regulations restricting or 
inhibiting the use of over-the-counter derivatives, at least for banks and other 
systemically important institutions.
Because taxpayer money is at risk when a bank fails, excessively risky 
behavior needs to be directly circumscribed. Thus, we need much tighter 
restrictions on leverage. Ideally, these restrictions should be countercyclical, to 
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discourage excessive lending in booms and to encourage more lending in reces-
sions. (Such interventions illustrate another important class of “externalities,” 
those associated with macroeconomic behavior.) Typically, the quality of bank 
lending goes down when banks expand lending rapidly, and this factor should 
be reflected in bank regulation and supervision.
Some have suggested that depositors should play a bigger role in bank 
supervision. Providing deposit insurance gives rise to “moral hazard,” removing 
the incentive to supervise. But the current crisis should make clear how impos-
sible it would be for any ordinary depositor to really monitor what is going 
on in a given bank. In this case, monitoring is a public good—something that 
everyone in society would benefit from—and should be provided publicly.  
Market and Individual Irrationality
Much of modern economic theory has been predicated on the assumption of 
rational individuals and profit-maximizing firms interacting in competitive 
markets. Government policy has been directed at ensuring that markets are com-
petitive—even Adam Smith recognized that there were strong incentives on the 
part of firms to engage in anticompetitive behavior. It is often easier to increase 
profits by restricting competition than by coming up with a better product.
By the same token, modern discussions of corporate governance have high-
lighted the ways in which modern corporations are often not well described by 
the standard “Marshallian” theory of profit- (or stock market value-) maximizing 
firms. The separation of ownership and control has meant that decisions are 
often made by managers, whose interests are not necessarily well aligned with 
other stakeholders, including shareholders. (Moreover, modern economic theory 
reveals that, given imperfect and asymmetric information and imperfect risk mar-
kets, even shareholder-value maximization—and especially shortsighted share-
holder value maximization—may not be in society’s interest (Stiglitz 2008).
I have discussed above the regulatory implications of both of these market 
imperfections. The assumption that individuals necessarily make rational eco-
nomic decisions, however, has gone largely unassailed until recently. It is not, 
of course, that anyone really believes that individuals are always fully rational. 
But economic theorists have worried that without the assumption of full 
rationality, economists would be unable to say anything meaningful about 
individual behavior. But recent research has made it clear that individuals often 
act systematically in a way markedly different from that predicted by models 
of rationality. (Daniel Kahnemann received the Nobel Memorial Prize in eco-
nomics in 2002 for his work, much of it in collaboration with the late Amos 
Tversky, in analyzing these irrationalities. This work has grown into a major 
subfield, called behavioral economics. For a fuller treatment of these issues, see 
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chapter 2 of this volume.) The failure of people to act rationally is especially 
important in risk assessment—which is, of course, central to financial markets. 
An analysis of what went wrong in the financial markets to cause the current 
crisis shows a host of “irrationalities,” behaviors that are hard to reconcile with 
any model of rational individuals and firms. Indeed, anyone looking at the 
history of bubbles, manias, and panics would find it hard to reconcile such 
behaviors with rationality (Kindleberger 2005). Alan Greenspan had called 
attention to these irrationalities in his famous “irrational exuberance” speech of 
December 1996, but in spite of an awareness of such irrationality, he continued 
to believe that market participants were sufficiently rational that they would 
not undertake undue risk. It was this belief that led to the widespread confi-
dence that self-regulation would work. As Greenspan admitted in his recent 
Congressional testimony (Greenspan 2008) in the aftermath of the meltdown, 
the crisis shattered this belief. Self-regulation was based on a flawed confidence 
in rationality. (For new ideas on co-regulation, see chapter 6 of this volume.)
If this “flawed” rationality had affected only the parties directly involved in 
a given transaction, its effects would have been limited. But flawed rationality 
affected the entire economy. Thus, as Greenspan finally admitted, it is not enough 
to rely on rational behavior to ensure that individuals and firms undertake 
“prudent” risks.
But there was another flaw in Greenspan’s analysis: even if each individual 
or firm were rational, that would not ensure systemic stability. There are exter-
nalities. This is critical to understanding the appropriate role of government in 
regulation. Earlier approaches focused on, for instance, protecting individual 
investors from abusive practices, or ensuring the safety and soundness of 
particular institutions. More recent discussions have focused on ensuring that 
“systemically significant institutions” are well regulated. However, what we have 
seen is a systemic failure, and such systemic failures can also arise from the 
correlated behavior of a large number of institutions, none of which is itself 
systemically significant. They can arise whether market participants are rational 
or not. But pervasive and persistent irrationalities—including flawed risk per-
ceptions—may make such systemic failures more likely and provide a strong 
rationale for comprehensive government regulation of financial markets.  
Regulatory Failure
So far, I have discussed a number of market failures within the financial sector 
that could be addressed by appropriate regulation. It is clear that our regulatory 
structure failed. Evidently, there was market failure, but there was also govern-
ment failure. The primary reason for the government failure was the belief that 
markets do not fail, that unfettered markets would lead to efficient outcomes, 
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and that government intervention would simply gum up the works. Regulators 
who did not believe in regulation were appointed, with the inevitable outcome 
that they did not do a very good job of regulating.
There is now a widespread consensus on the need for regulation, but that 
still leaves open the question: even if we have good regulations, how do we 
ensure that they will be enforced? How do we prevent regulatory failure?
There is no easy answer, but the approach that the Unites States has by and 
large taken is I think correct: multiple oversight, a broad system of checks and 
balances. The costs of duplication are far less than the costs of mistakes. The 
attorney general of New York has partially filled in for the deficiencies in the 
Securities and Exchange Commission. Tort law provides incentives for firms 
not to engage in egregious behavior.2 There may have been abuses in class-
action suits; but now, we may have excessively weakened this important part of 
our economy’s incentive system.
Another part of the answer is to ensure that the voice of those whose 
interests are likely to be hurt by failure are well represented in the regulatory 
structures. Too often, the regulatory system gets captured by those that are sup-
posed to be regulated. They are, after all, the “experts” who understand the sys-
tem. The risk is especially severe in a political system such as ours, which is 
highly dependent on campaign contributions. But capture also occurs in a more 
subtle way: through the promulgation of ideas. When AT&T was threatened 
with a breakup under antitrust laws, its supporters objected that what mattered 
was not the actual level of competition in the telecommunications marketplace, 
but only potential competition. Similarly, the financial sector in recent years 
actively promoted the idea that markets could be self-regulating.
The current system has made regulatory capture too easy. The voices of 
those who have benefited from lax regulation are strong; the perspectives of the 
investment community have been well represented. Among those whose per-
spectives need to be better represented are the laborers whose jobs would be 
lost by macro-mismanagement, and the pension holders whose pension funds 
would be eviscerated by excessive risk taking.
One of the arguments for a financial products safety commission, which 
would assess the efficacy and risks of new products and ascertain appropriate 
usage, is that it would have a clear mandate, and be staffed by people whose 
only concern would be protecting the safety and efficacy of the products being 
sold. It would be focused on the interests of the ordinary consumer and inves-
tors, not the interests of the financial institutions selling the products.
Reducing the risk of regulatory capture must, of course, play an important 
role in the design of financial services regulations. Simple and transparent 
regulatory systems with limited regulatory discretion may be more immune to 
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regulatory capture. There is a cost, for example, in the reduced scope for tailor-
ing regulation to the circumstances at hand. But in many circumstances, that 
cost is far less than the benefit that arises from regulatory certainty. 
Broader Social Objectives
So far, I have focused mostly on the single objective of ensuring the safety 
and soundness of the financial system (which entails more than just the safety 
and soundness of individual banks). But there are several other social and eco-
nomic objectives of financial sector regulation.
As I noted in the introduction, one of the problems that has become mani-
fest in this crisis is that financial institutions have grown too big to fail. Such 
large institutions not only represent a threat to competition—and without 
competition, markets are not efficient—but, again, they also create perverse 
incentives. As I noted in the opening of this essay, institutions that grow too 
big to fail have an incentive to undertake excessive risk, since their directors 
know that if the risks pay off, they get to keep the proceeds, but if they fail, 
taxpayers will pick up the pieces. Elsewhere, I have referred to this new form 
of “socialism” as “socialism American style”—privatizing gains but socializing 
losses. Regulators have a responsibility to ensure that institutions do not grow 
too big to fail (and in many cases, too big to be managed). There is little con-
vincing evidence that there are substantial economies of scale sufficient to offset 
the adverse incentives to which such gigantism gives rise.
As we noted, an awareness of the risks of regulatory failure, including those 
resulting from regulatory capture, should play an important role in regulatory 
design. For instance, the costs of allowing financial institutions to grow too big 
are now apparent; the benefits of size—the economies of scale and scope—are 
questionable. But long experience should have taught us that financial institu-
tions will try to use their political influence to weaken constraints on their size 
and reach, and in some cases they will succeed. If for one reason or another 
governments are unable to restrict the size of these institutions and prevent the 
development of too-big-to-fail institutions, regulators need to exercise intensive 
scrutiny, including restrictions on incentive structures that give rise to excessive 
risk taking and on the excessively risky practices themselves. To be sure, financial 
institutions will try to weaken such regulations, but by having a system with 
multiple checks—regulations of both products and institutions, at both the state 
and federal levels—we make regulatory circumvention and erosion of regulatory 
controls more difficult. There is a cost, as always, but it should be evident that 
the costs of insufficient oversight are far greater.
Financial markets also fail to make access to credit available to certain under-
served groups. This may be because of discrimination. But, more generally, social 
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returns to lending may not accord with private returns. Society may have an 
interest in ensuring inclusive growth and more broadly pursuing objectives of 
social justice, and there may be a variety of instruments with which it can 
and should do this (see for example chapter 7 of this volume, on “embedded lib-
eralism.”) The old “neoclassical” model (the same model in which Adam Smith’s 
invisible hand worked) argued that distributional goals should be achieved 
solely through “lump sum” (that is, nondistortionary) tax redistributions. No 
government does this, and for good reason: the information that would be 
required to implement such a scheme makes it totally unrealistic. All redistrib-
utive schemes thus have, at the same time, allocative effects, and, in general, it 
is optimal to use a variety of instruments—including interventions such as the 
Community Reinvestment Act, which directs banks to allocate a certain fraction 
of the lending capacity to serve underserved communities. 
Other Issues in Regulatory Design
There are many complex institutional issues that the market-failure approach to 
regulation raises, especially concerning the optimal form of government inter-
vention, given the limitations of government, including government’s often 
disadvantageous position relative to those that it is supposed to regulate (for 
example, public sector pay is lower than salaries in the private sector; there 
are information asymmetries, etc). In this short essay, I can only address a few 
of these.
First, the task of regulators is different from the task of those who create 
risky financial products, just as the skills (and pay) of those who test drugs are 
different from those who create them. The regulators’ task is in some ways sim-
pler: to ascertain safety and effectiveness. So too in financial-market regulation. 
The enforcement of simple regulatory restrictions (such as those on leverage 
and “speed bumps”) requires different skills than the design of new regulations. 
To be sure, regulators have to be aware of the strong incentives for regulatory 
arbitrage and evasion and attempt to guard against these risks.
That is one of the reasons that much of regulation should focus on simple 
regulations, such as strict limits on leverage. Off–balance-sheet activities and 
tailor-made products should be looked at askance, if not simply forbidden, at 
least for commercial banks.
There is, here, an important tension between the concern, discussed earlier, 
in trying to prevent regulatory capture and the need to prevent innovative regu-
latory arbitrage. We argued earlier that concerns about regulatory capture suggest 
limited discretion. But innovative strategies of regulatory evasion require regu-
lators to ascertain whether there is, for instance, “hidden leverage.” New York’s 
Martin Act (aimed at combating financial fraud) has been used effectively to 
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curb certain “creative” abusive practices, but only because New York has had 
a series of attorneys generals who have been committed to using the law. 
They have focused on stopping the abusive practices rather than punishing the 
guilty parties.
The incentive for regulatory arbitrage also explains why regulation has to 
be comprehensive: if there is a highly regulated banking system, there will be 
incentives to move banklike activities into a shadow banking system, with 
equally disturbing systemic risks.
The strong incentives for regulatory evasion and arbitrage, combined 
with the inherently disadvantageous position of regulators, also explains why 
regulation has to focus both on products and institutions and on the overall 
economic/financial system. Awareness of the strong incentives for regulatory 
evasion and arbitrage, together with awareness of the asymmetries in costs and 
benefits (the costs of failures being borne by society, the benefits accruing to 
a few private parties), suggest that regulators should be both proactive and cau-
tious. Complex products that seemingly serve no good risk-mitigation function 
should perhaps be banned, or at least restricted in usage, say to small hedge 
funds that are not highly leveraged. The costs of delay in introducing such 
products into the market would be relatively low—certainly much lower than 
the costs of the current crisis.
Some have focused on the fact that even with the best of regulators and 
regulations, there will be regulatory evasion. But this is not an argument against 
good regulations. To paraphrase the argument put forward by Paul Volcker in 
the midst of the East Asia crisis of 1997, even a leaky umbrella provides some 
protection in the midst of a thunderstorm. In arguing for restrictions on capital 
flows, I have used another analogy: a dam is not intended to stop the flow of 
water from the mountain to the sea, but even an imperfect dam may help 
protect people from a flood.  
Concluding Comments
Markets are at the center of every successful economy. But unfettered markets 
often do not serve society well. Over the past two hundred years, economic 
theory and historical experience has shown that financial markets often fail to 
perform their essential functions of managing risk and allocating capital well, 
with disastrous social and economic consequences. While we have taken great 
pride in the success of our financial sector, a good financial sector would not 
only have performed these tasks better than ours has recently, but it also would 
have done so at much lower costs. Finance is a means to an end, not an end in 
itself. A good financial sector would have used few of society’s resources; in a 
competitive financial sector, profits would have been low. Our financial sector 
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was large, and it garnered a third of corporate profits. Some of the profits were 
based on exploitation of the poor; some were based on noncompetitive prac-
tices in credit card lending. It is hard to escape the conclusion that the sector 
did not serve our society well; and now, the costs that it has inflicted on the 
global economy are enormous. It is not just the trillions of dollars of taxpayer 
money that have been put at risk. The shortfall in production between the 
economy’s potential and actual output will, cumulatively, also amount to tril-
lions of dollars. Even a rich society can ill afford such waste.
That there is a need for better regulation now appears to be self-evident. 
But there will be those who will push for cosmetic reforms, not the deep 
reforms that are required.
In this paper, I have tried to outline the market-failure approach to reform, 
with especial application to the financial sector. This approach provides clear 
guidelines for the range and scope of requisite regulation and, together with the 
theory of government and regulatory failure, also provides guidelines for the 
design of a new regulatory system, one that will not only make such failures less 
likely in the future, but that will help ensure that the financial sector performs 
the vital role that it needs to perform in a dynamic modern economy. 
Notes
1 Throughout this book, short-form citations are given in the run of text wherever 
possible. Full references may be found in the list of references at the end of each essay.
2 I am taking an expansive view of “regulation” in this paper. Regulation is any inter-
vention in the market that changes behavior from what it otherwise would have been. 
Thus taxation should be viewed as part of the regulatory system, but so too should 
tort law. Tort law is directed at correcting one important set of externalities, those that 
arise when the actions of one individual “hurt” another. By forcing the individual who 
imposes the damage to compensate the injured party, tort law brings incentives better 
into alignment. It partially corrects the externality. But tort law has several limitations. 
First, it corrects the damage ex post, and in some cases, that may be too late. Indeed, it 
may be impossible to recover adequate compensation. Second, when many individuals 
are injured—that is, when the costs are diffuse—it is difficult for them to act together 
to secure appropriate compensation. Class-action suits are an imperfect attempt to 
address this problem. Finally, the legal system is very costly. In the current context, we 
can see these limitations very clearly. It would be difficult, if not impossible, for the 
millions of Americans—and those around the world—who have been injured by the 
actions of the financial system to receive adequate compensation for what they have 
suffered. The companies that have inflicted the damage are, in many cases, bankrupt. 
Each would claim that the global consequences are largely the result of the actions 
of others.
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chapter 2
The Case for Behaviorally 
Informed Regulation
Michael S. Barr, Sendhil Mullainathan, Eldar Shafir
Policymakers approach human behavior largely through the perspective of the 
“rational agent” model, which relies on normative, a priori analyses of the making 
of rational decisions. This perspective is promoted in the social sciences and in 
professional schools, and has come to dominate much of the formulation and 
conduct of policy. An alternative view, developed mostly through empirical 
behavioral research, provides a substantially different perspective on individual 
behavior and its policy implications. Behavior, according to the empirical per-
spective, is the outcome of perceptions, impulses, and other processes that char-
acterize the impressive machinery that we carry behind the eyes and between the 
ears. These proclivities, research has shown, intrude upon and shape behavior, 
often quite independently of deliberative intent, and in contrast with normative 
ideals that people endorse upon reflection. The results are systematic behaviors that 
are unforeseen and misunderstood by classical policy thinking. A more nuanced 
behavioral perspective, such research suggests, can yield deeper understanding 
and improved regulatory insight. 
For example, while the causes of the recent mortgage crisis are myriad, a 
central problem was that many borrowers took out loans that they did not 
understand and could not afford. Their behavior is inconsistent with a model 
of rational agents with perfect information and perfect foresight, and good reg-
ulation ought to take their rather common behavior into account. As discussed 
below, an opt-out home mortgage plan, such as one that provides a standard 
fixed-rate loan with straightforward terms, could be a start. A person could 
then choose to opt out in favor of another mortgage plan, but only after being 
shown comprehensible disclosures about the risks involved. Lenders will have 
an incentive to make such disclosures properly because they will bear greater 
liability or other costs in the case of default among those who have opted out. 
In what follows, we outline the main tenets of the behavioral perspective, 
we provide some examples of relevant policy applications, and we discuss the 
implications of this analysis for the conduct of policy, particularly in the context 
of a market economy.
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I. Human Behavior
In contrast with the rational agents of the classical theory, who make well 
informed, carefully considered, and fully controlled choices, behavioral research 
has shown that the availability of data does not always lead to effective commu-
nication and knowledge; understanding and intention do not necessarily lead to 
a desired action; and purportedly inconsequential contextual nuances can shape 
behavior and alter choices, often in ways that people themselves agree diminish 
their well-being in unintended ways.
I.1 Context
Human behavior turns out to be heavily context dependent, a function of both 
the person and the situation. One of the major lessons of modern psychological 
research is the impressive power that the situation exerts, along with a persistent 
tendency among people to underestimate that power relative to the presumed 
influence of intention, education, or personality traits. Various studies have 
documented the stunning capacity of situational factors to influence behaviors 
that are typically seen to reflect deep-seated personal predispositions. In his now-
classic obedience studies, for example, Milgram (1974) showed how decidedly 
mild situational pressures sufficed to generate persistent willingness on the part 
of regular people to administer what they believed to be grave levels of electric 
shock to innocent subjects. Along similar lines, Darley and Batson (1973) 
recruited seminary students to deliver a practice sermon on the parable of the 
Good Samaritan. While half the seminarians were told they had plenty of time, 
others were led to believe they were running late. On their way to give the talk, 
all participants passed an ostensibly injured man slumped and groaning in a 
doorway. Whereas the majority of those with time to spare stopped to help, 
a mere 10 percent of those who were running late stopped, the remaining 90 
percent stepping over the victim and rushing along. In contrast with these par-
ticipants’ ethical training and scholarship, the contextual nuance of a minor time 
constraint proved decisive in the decision not to stop and help a suffering man. 
As we analyze further below, the heavier-than-anticipated impact of context on 
behavior increases the importance and responsibility of effective regulation.
I.2 Decisional Conflict
On a less dramatic note, but of substantial policy relevance, are findings 
regarding the contextual impact of decisional conflict. People’s preferences are 
typically constructed, not merely revealed, during the decision-making process 
(Lichtenstein and Slovic 2006), and the construction of preferences can be heavily 
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influenced by the nature and the context of decision, which can have nontrivial 
regulatory implications, particularly as regards the proliferation of alternatives.
The classical view of decision making does not anticipate nor does it con-
sider the implications of decisional conflict. Each option according to this view 
is assigned a subjective value, or “utility,” and the person then proceeds to choose 
the option assigned the highest utility. A direct consequence of this account is 
that offering more alternatives is a good thing, since the more options there are, 
the more likely the consumer is to find one that proves attractive.
In contrast, since preferences tend to be constructed in the context of a 
decision, choices often prove difficult to make. People often search for a com-
pelling rationale for choosing one option over another, and whereas sometimes 
a compelling reason can be articulated, at other times no easy rationale presents 
itself, rendering the conflict between options hard to resolve. Such conflict can 
lead people to postpone the decision or to select a “default” option, and can gen-
erate preference patterns that are fundamentally different from those predicted 
by accounts based on value maximization. In particular, the addition of options 
can complicate (and, thus, “worsen”) the decision outcome while the normative 
assumption is that added options only make things better.
Decisional conflict, for example, has been shown to yield a greater tendency 
to search for alternatives when better options are available but the decision 
is difficult than when relatively inferior options are available and the decision is 
easy, even when expectations are otherwise the same (Tversky and Shafir 1992). 
More generally, as choices become difficult, consumers naturally tend to defer 
decisions, often indefinitely (Iyengar and Lepper 2000; Shafir, Simonson, and 
Tversky 1993; Tversky and Shafir 1992). In one study, expert physicians had to 
decide about medication for a patient with osteoarthritis. These physicians were 
more likely to decline prescribing a new medication when they had to choose 
between two new medications than when only one new medication was avail-
able (Redelmeier and Shafir 1995); the difficulty of choosing between the two 
medications presumably led some physicians to recommend not starting either 
one. A similar pattern was documented with shoppers in an upscale grocery 
store, where tasting booths offered the opportunity to taste six different jams in 
one condition, or any of twenty-four jams in the second. Of those who stopped 
to taste, 30 percent proceeded to purchase a jam from the six-jams selection, 
whereas only 3 percent purchased a jam from the twenty-four–jam selection 
(Iyengar and Lepper 2000).
Bertrand, Karlan, Mullainathan, Shafir, and Zinman (2008) conducted a field 
experiment with a local lender in South Africa to assess the relative importance 
of various subtle psychological manipulations in the decision to take up a loan 
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offer. Clients were sent letters offering large short-term loans at randomly 
assigned interest rates. In addition, several psychological features on the offer 
letter were also independently randomized, one of which was the number of 
sample loans shown: the offer letters displayed either one example of a loan size 
and term, along with respective monthly repayments, or it displayed four such 
examples. In contrast with standard economic prediction and in line with conflict-
based predictions, higher take-up was observed under the one-example descrip-
tion than under the multiple-example version. The magnitude of this effect was 
large: the simple (one-example) description of the offer had the same positive 
effect on take-up as dropping the monthly interest on these loans by more than 
two percentage points. In a related finding, Iyengar, Jiang, and Huberman (2004) 
show that employees’ participation in 401(k) plans drops as the number of fund 
options proposed by their employer increases.
Adherence to the default or status quo has also been observed in naturally 
occurring “experiments.” One concerning insurance decisions occurred when 
New Jersey and Pennsylvania both introduced the option of a limited right to 
sue, entitling automobile drivers to lower insurance rates. The two states dif-
fered in their default option: New Jersey motorists needed to acquire the full right 
to sue (transaction costs were minimal: a signature), whereas in Pennsylvania, 
the full right to sue was the default, which could then be forfeited in favor of 
the limited alternative. Whereas only about 20 percent of New Jersey drivers 
chose to acquire the full right to sue, approximately 75 percent of Pennsylvania 
drivers chose to retain it ( Johnson et al 1993). A second naturally occurring 
“experiment” was recently observed in Europeans’ decisions about being potential 
organ donors ( Johnson and Goldstein 2003). In some European nations drivers 
are, by default, organ donors unless they elect not to be, whereas in other European 
nations they are, by default, not donors unless they choose to be. Observed rates 
of organ donors are almost 98 percent in the former nations and about 15 percent 
in the latter—a remarkable difference, given the low transaction costs and the 
significance of the decision.
These and other studies show that minor contextual changes can alter what 
consumers choose in ways that are unlikely to relate to their ultimate utility. It 
suggests that a proliferation of alternatives, which is where consumer markets 
are typically headed, needs to be addressed and handled with care, rather than 
be seen as an obvious advantage. It also suggests that the determination of a 
default outcome, for example, rather than being conceived as a mere formality 
that can be effortlessly circumvented, needs to be chosen thoughtfully, since it 
acquires a privileged status. In effect, when multiple options or the status quo are 
inappropriately handled (intentionally or not) this can decrease social welfare.
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I.3 Mental Accounting 
In their intuitive mental accounting schemes, people compartmentalize wealth 
and spending into distinct budget categories, such as savings, rent, and enter-
tainment, and into separate mental accounts, such as current income, assets, and 
future income (Thaler 1985; 1992). Contrary to standard assumptions of fungi-
bility, people exhibit different degrees of willingness to spend from their various 
accounts, which yields consumption patterns that are overly dependent on current 
income and sensitive to labels so that, for example, people save and borrow 
(often at a higher interest rate) at the same time (Ausubel 1991).
An understanding of such proclivities may help design instruments that 
bring about more desirable outcomes. For example, given that people are sus-
ceptible to faulty planning, distraction, and procrastination, studies have shown 
that saving works best as a default. Participation in 401(k) plans is significantly 
higher when employers offer automatic enrollment (Madrian and Shea 2001), 
and because participants tend to retain the default contribution rates, savings 
can be increased if they agree to increased default deductions following future 
raises (Benartzi and Thaler 2004).
I.4 Construal
A simple but fundamental tension between classical economic analyses and 
modern behavioral research is captured by the role of psychological “construal.” 
Agents in classical economic analyses are presumed to choose among objective 
options in the world. People, however, do not typically contemplate objective 
circumstances; rather, stimuli are mentally construed, interpreted, represented, 
and then acted upon. Behavior is directed not toward actual states of the world, 
but toward our mental representation of those states, and mental representa-
tions do not bear a one-to-one relationship to the thing they represent, nor 
do they necessarily constitute faithful renditions of actual circumstances. As a 
result, many well-intentioned policy interventions can fail, or succeed, because 
of the way in which they are construed by the targeted group. For example, 
people who are rewarded for a behavior they find interesting and enjoyable can 
come to attribute their interest in the behavior to the reward and, consequently, 
come to view the behavior as less attractive (Lepper, Greene, and Nisbett 1973). 
In one classic study, for example, children who were offered a “good player 
award” to play with magic markers—which they had previously done with great 
relish in the absence of extrinsic rewards—subsequently showed little interest 
in the markers when these were introduced as an unawarded classroom activity 
(in contrast with children who had not received an award and showed no 
decrease in interest.) Similarly, decisions can be changed when preceded by a 
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related act that leads to differential construal of one’s preferences. Several “foot-
in-the-door” and “lowball” techniques are based on the premise that initial 
compliance with a small request leads people to be then more likely to comply 
with a larger one. In this vein, Freedman and Fraser (1966) have shown that 
subjects are more likely to put up a large Drive Carefully sign on their lawn 
if they have already complied with a request to put up a smaller one or to sign a 
petition regarding careful driving, even when the requests were made by differ-
ent people. Similarly, Cialdini, Cacioppo, Bassett, and Miller’s (1978) subjects 
were more likely to go pick up United Way posters if they had initially agreed 
to display them, as compared to a group that had not first considered the more 
modest request.
Other behavioral factors can influence the outcomes of decisions in ways 
that standard analysis is likely to miss; however, a full summary is beyond our 
present purview. To list just a few, people often are not very good at predicting 
their future tastes or at learning from past experience (Kahneman 1994), and 
their choices can be influenced by anticipated regret (Bell 1982), by costs 
already incurred (Arkes and Blumer 1985; Gourville and Soman 1998), by overly 
optimistic planning (Buehler, Griffin, and Ross 1994) and by the effects of 
temporal separation, where high discount rates for future as compared to present 
outcomes can yield dynamically inconsistent preferences (Loewenstein and 
Elster 1992; Loewenstein and Thaler 1992). Contrary to standard assumptions, 
the psychological carriers of value are gains and losses, rather than anticipated 
final states of wealth, and attitudes toward risk tend to shift from risk aversion 
in the face of gains to risk seeking for losses (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). 
Also, people are loss averse (the loss associated with giving up a good is sub-
stantially greater than the utility associated with obtaining it (Tversky and 
Kahneman 1991). This, in turn, leads to a general reluctance to depart from 
the status quo, because what needs to be renounced is valued more highly than 
the anticipated benefits (Knetsch 1989; Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988).
I.5 Knowledge and Attention
Standard theory assumes that consumers are attentive and knowledgeable, and 
typically able to avail themselves of important information. In contrast, there 
appears to be a rampant ignorance of options, program rules, benefits, and 
opportunities, and not only among the poor or the uneducated. Surveys show that 
fewer than one-fifth of investors (in stocks, bonds, funds, or other securities) 
can be considered “financially literate” (Alexander, Jones, and Nigro 1998), and 
similar findings describe the understanding shown by participants in pension 
plans—meaning, mostly, 401(k)s (Schultz 1995). Indeed, even older beneficiaries 
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often do not know what kind of pension they are set to receive, or what mix of 
stocks and bonds they are invested in.
The amount of information people attend to is limited, and cognitive load 
has been shown to affect performance in everyday tasks. To the extent that con-
sumers find themselves in challenging situations that are unfamiliar, distracting, 
or tense, all of which consume cognitive resources, fewer resources will be avail-
able to process the information that is relevant to the decision at hand. This, in 
turn, can make decision making even more dependent on situational cues and 
immaterial considerations. Furthermore, this is likely to be even more true for 
“low literate” participants, whose even more limited knowledge and understanding 
can lead them to experience difficulties with effort-versus-accuracy tradeoffs, to 
rely excessively on peripheral cues in product advertising and packaging, and 
even to withdraw systematically from market interactions (Adkins and Ozanne 
2005, and references therein.) In summary, for participants with limited cog-
nitive resources, whose decisions are heavily dependent on perceived norms, 
automatic defaults, and other minor contextual nuances, regulation merits even 
greater attention.
I.6 Context and Institutions
The substantial influence of context on behavior naturally implies that institu-
tions will come to play a central role in shaping how people think and what they 
do. Among other things:
Institutions Shape Defaults
Institutions normally define defaults. Moreover, it is well established that defaults 
can have a profound influence on the outcomes of individual choices. Data 
available on decisions ranging from retirement savings and portfolio choices to 
the decision to be a willing organ donor illustrate the substantial increase in 
market share of default options ( Johnson and Goldstein 2003; Johnson et al 
1993). Although the default in an abstract sense appears to be merely one among 
a number of alternatives, in reality defaults benefit not only from confusion, 
procrastination, forgetting, and other sources of inaction, but they may also 
be perceived as the most popular option (this often becomes a self-fulfilling 
prophesy), or the option implicitly recommended.
Institutions Shape Behavior
Many low-income families are, in fact, savers, whether or not they resort to 
banks (Berry 2004). Without the help of a financial institution, however, their 
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savings are at risk (including theft, impulse spending, and the needs of house-
hold members), savings will grow more slowly, and may not be readily available 
to support access to reasonably priced credit in times of need. Institutions 
provide safety and control. In circumstances of momentary need, temptation, 
distraction, or limited self-control, those savers who are unbanked are likely 
to find it all the more difficult to succeed on the path to long-term prosperity. 
A recent survey conducted by the American Payroll Association shows that 
“American employees are gaining confidence in direct deposit as a reliable 
method of payment that gives them greater control over their finances, and that 
employers are recognizing direct deposit as a low-cost employee benefit that can 
also save payroll processing time and money.”1 The employers of the poor, in 
contrast, often neither require nor propose electronic salary payments. Instead, 
they prefer not to offer direct deposit to hourly, nonexempt employees, tem-
porary or seasonal employees, part-timers, union employees, and employees in 
remote locations—all categories that correlate with being low paid. The most 
frequently stated reasons for not offering direct deposit to these employees 
include lack of processing time to meet standard industry (“Automatic Clearing 
House”) requirements, high turnover, and union contract restrictions. All this 
creates a missed opportunity to offer favorable defaults to needy individuals, 
whose de facto default consists of going after hours to cash their check for 
a hefty fee.
Institutions Provide Implicit Planning
As it turns out, a variety of institutions provide implicit planning, often in ways 
that address potential behavioral weaknesses. Credit card companies send cus-
tomers timely reminders of due payments, and clients can elect to have their 
utility bills automatically charged, allowing them to avoid late fees if occasion-
ally they do not get around to paying in time. The low-income buyer, on the 
other hand, without the credit card, the automatic billing, or the Web-based 
reminders, risks missed payments, late fees, disconnected utilities (followed by 
high reconnection charges), etc. Interestingly, context can also be detrimental 
by providing debt too easily. Temporal discounting in general and present bias 
in particular can be exploited to make cash now more attractive than future 
costs appear menacing.
A behavioral analysis yields new appreciation for the impact and responsi-
bility of financial institutions, which should be considered not merely from a 
financial cost-saving point of view, but, instead, should be understood to affect 
people’s lives, by easing their planning, facilitating their intended actions, or 
enabling their resistance to temptation.
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II. Interaction with Markets
The perspective outlined above, and the regulation it triggers, need to be 
embedded in the logic of markets. A framework is required that takes into 
account firm incentives and responses to behaviorally motivated regulation. This 
perspective produces two dimensions to consider. First, the psychological biases 
of individuals can either help or hurt the firms they interact with; hence firms’ 
and public-minded regulators’ interests are sometimes misaligned and some-
times not. Consider a consumer who does not understand the profound effects 
of the compounding of interest. Such a bias would lead the individual both to 
undersave, and to overborrow. Society would prefer that the individual did 
not have such a bias in both contexts. Firms, however, would prefer that the 
individual not have the bias to undersave, so that funds intended for investment 
and fee generation would not diminish (abstracting from fee structures), but, at 
least over the short term, firms would be perfectly content to see the same indi-
vidual overborrow (abstracting from collection costs). Because people are fallible 
and easily misled, transparency does not always pay off and firms sometimes 
have strong incentives to exacerbate psychological biases by hiding borrowing 
costs. Regulation in this case faces a much more difficult challenge than in 
the savings situation. The market response to individual failure can profoundly 
affect regulation. In attempting to boost participation in 401(k) retirement 
plans, the regulator faces at worst indifferent and at best positively inclined 
employers seeking to boost employee retention and to comply with federal 
pension rules.2 In forcing disclosure of hidden prices of credit, by contrast, the 
regulator often faces noncooperative firms, whose interests are to find ways to 
work around or undo interventions.
A second implication of our equilibrium model of firms in particular markets 
interacting with individuals with specific psychologies is that the mode of 
regulation chosen should take account of this interaction. We might think of 
the regulator as holding two different levers, which we describe as changing 
the rules and changing the scoring.3 When forcing disclosure of the APR, for 
example, the regulator effectively changes the “rules” of the game: what a firm 
must say. A stronger form of rule change is product regulation: changing what 
a firm must do. Behavioral rule changes, such as creating a favored starting 
position or default, falls between these two types. When changing liability or 
providing tax incentives, by contrast, the regulator changes the way the game is 
“scored.” Typically, changing the rules of the game (without changing the scor-
ing, as through liability changes) maintains the firms’ original incentives to help 
or hurt consumer bias, channeling the incentive into different behaviors by firms 
or individuals, while changing the scoring of the game can alter those incentives.
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This perspective highlights the care that must be taken when transferring, 
for example, the insights of defaults in 401(k) participation to other domains. 
According to the present analysis, changing the rules on retirement saving (by 
introducing defaults) works well because employers’ incentives align (or do not 
misalign) with regulatory efforts to guide individual choice. In other words, 
under current conditions, employers are either unaffected or may even be hurt 
by individuals’ propensity to undersave in 401(k) plans.4 They thus will not 
oppose an attempt to fix that problem. In other applications, where firms’ 
incentives misalign with regulatory intent, changing the rules alone may not 
work well since firms may have the ability to work creatively around those rule 
changes. Interestingly, such circumstances may lead to regulations (“changing 
the scoring”) which, though deeply motivated by behavioral insights, are not 
themselves particularly psychological in nature. That is, given market responses, 
psychological rules such as defaults or framing may be too weak, and changes 
in liability rules or other measures may be necessary, as we explain below.
This distinction in market responses to individual psychology is central to 
our framework and is illustrated in table 1. In some cases, the market is either 
neutral or wants to overcome consumer fallibility. In other cases, the market 
would like to exploit or exaggerate consumer fallibility. Thus, when consumers 
misunderstand compounding of interest in the context of saving, banks have 
incentives to reduce this misunderstanding so that they can increase their depos-
its. When consumers misunderstand compounding in the context of borrowing, 
lenders have little incentive to remove this misunderstanding, as it can only 
Table 1. The Firm and the Individual
Behavioral 
Fallibility
Market neutral and/or wants to 
overcome consumer fallibility
Market exploits  
consumer fallibility
Consumers  
misunderstand 
compounding
Consumers misunderstand  
compounding in savings
• Banks would like to reduce this 
to increase savings base
Consumers misunderstand 
compounding in borrowing
• Banks would like to exploit 
this to increase borrowing
Consumers 
procrastinate
Consumers procrastinate in  
signing up for EITC
• Tax filing companies would like 
to reduce this so as to increase 
number of customers
Consumers procrastinate in 
returning rebates
• Retailers would like to exploit 
this to increase revenues
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decrease the debts they are able to issue.5 When consumers procrastinate in 
signing up for the EITC (and hence in filing for taxes) private tax preparation 
firms have incentives to discourage such procrastination so as to increase their 
customer base. When consumers procrastinate in returning rebates (but make 
retail purchases as if they are going to get a rebate), retailers benefit. Note the 
parallelism in these examples: firm incentives to alleviate or exploit a bias are 
not an intrinsic feature of the bias itself. Instead, they are a function of how the 
bias plays itself out in the particular market structure.
In the consumer credit market, we worry that many interactions between 
individuals and firms are of the kind in which firms seek to exploit rather than 
alleviate bias. If true, this raises the concern of overextrapolating from the 
401(k) defaults example to credit products. To the extent that 401(k) defaults 
work because optimal behavior is largely aligned with market incentives, other 
areas, such as credit markets, might be more difficult to regulate with mere 
defaults. Furthermore, if the credit market is dominated by “low-road” firms 
offering opaque products that “prey” on human weakness, it is more likely that 
regulators of such a market will be captured because “high-road” interests are 
too weak to push back against low-road players; that market forces will defeat 
positive defaults sets; and that low-road players will continue to dominate. 
Many observers, for example, believe that the credit card markets are, in fact, 
currently dominated by such low-road firms (see, for example, Mann 2007; 
Bar-Gill 2004) and that formerly high-road players have come to adopt the sharp 
practices of their low-road competitors. If government policymakers want to 
attempt to use defaults in such contexts, they might need to deploy “stickier” 
defaults or more aggressive policy options.
In our approach to the issue of regulatory choice the regulator can either 
change the rules of the game or change the scoring of the game. Setting a 
default is an example of changing the rules of the game, as is disclosure regula-
tion. Specifically, the rules of the game are changed when there is an attempt to 
change the nature of the interactions between individuals and firms, as when 
the regulation attempts to affect what can be said, offered, or done. Changing 
the scoring of the game, by contrast, changes the payoffs a firm will receive for 
particular outcomes. This may be done without a particular rule about how the 
outcome is to be achieved. For example, pension regulation that penalizes firms 
whose 401(k) plan enrollment is top-heavy with highly paid executives is an 
example of how scoring gives firms incentives to enroll low-income individuals 
without setting particular rules on how this is done. Changing rules and changing 
scoring often accompany each other, but they are conceptually distinct.
The discussion below illustrates how policies in the top right corner of table 
2 face a particular challenge. Changing the rules of the game alone will be 
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difficult when firms are highly motivated to find workarounds. As such, when 
we suggest opt-out policies in mortgages below, the challenge will be to find 
ways to make these starting positions “sticky” so that firms do not simply undo 
their default nature. In our judgment, both achieving a good default and figur-
ing out how to make it work requires separating low-road from high-road firms 
and making it profitable for high-road firms to offer the default product 
(for a related concept, see Kennedy 2005). For that to work, the default must be 
sufficiently attractive to consumers, sufficiently profitable for high-road firms to 
succeed in offering it, and penalties associated with deviations from the default 
must be sufficiently costly so as to make the default “stick” even in the face of 
market pressures from low-road firms. It may be that in some credit markets, 
low-road firms have become so dominant that sticky defaults will be ineffectual. 
Moreover, achieving such a default is likely more costly than making defaults 
work when market incentives align, not least because the costs associated with 
the stickiness of the default involve greater deadweight losses given that there 
will be higher costs to opt out for those for whom deviating from the default 
is optimal. These losses would need to be weighed against the losses from the 
current system, as well as against losses from alternative approaches, such as 
disclosure or product regulation. Nonetheless, given the considerations above, 
it seems worth exploring whether such sticky defaults can help to transform 
consumer financial markets. 
Table 2. Behaviorally Informed Regulation
Market neutral and/or wants to 
overcome consumer fallibility
Market exploits  
consumer fallibility
Rules Public education on saving
Direct deposit/auto-save
Licensing
Sticky defaults (opt-out  
mortgage or credit card)
Information de-biasing on debt  
(full information disclosure,  
payoff time for credit cards)
Scoring Tax incentives for  
savings vehicles
IRS Direct Deposit Accounts
Ex post liability standard for  
truth in lending
Broker fiduciary duty and/or  
changing compensation  
(Yield Spread Premiums)
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The lessons of a more nuanced behavioral perspective are twofold. On the 
one hand, people’s behavior is idiosyncratic, context dependent, and nuanced 
in ways that render simple normative assumptions misleading and, in general, 
complicate policy design. On the other hand, because behavior follows its own 
rules, policymakers have an added responsibility to concern themselves with 
appropriate context and detail, and a reason to hope that attention will lead to 
improved outcomes.
As noted above, because of likely market responses to psychological factors 
in different contexts, regulation may need to take a variety of forms, including 
some that while informed by psychology are not designed to affect behavioral 
change, but rather to alter the structure of the market in which relevant choices 
are made. In what follows, we consider behaviorally informed regulation in the 
context of mortgage, credit card, and banking markets, with specific proposals 
that fall into each bin. Given the complexities involved, our purpose is not to 
champion the specific policies below. Rather, we illustrate how a behaviorally 
informed regulatory analysis may lead to a deeper understanding of the costs 
and benefits, and to potentially improved designs, of specific policies.
III. Behaviorally Informed Policies 
III.1 Behaviorally Informed Home Mortgage Regulation
Full Information Disclosure to De-bias Borrowers
With the advent of nationwide credit reporting systems and the refinement of 
credit scoring and modeling, creditors and brokers themselves, including not 
just their credit scores, but their likely performance regarding a particular set of 
loan products. Creditors will know whether borrowers could qualify for better, 
cheaper loans, as well as how likely it is that borrowers will meet their obliga-
tions under an existing mortgage, or become delinquent, refinance, default, 
or go into foreclosure. Yet lenders are not required to reveal this information 
to borrowers. At the same time, the lack of disclosure of such information is 
likely exacerbated by consumer beliefs. Consumers likely have false background 
assumptions regarding what brokers and creditors reveal to them about their 
borrowing status. What if consumers believe the following?
Creditors reveal all information about me and the loan products I am qualified 
to receive. Brokers work for me in finding me the best loan for my purposes, and 
lenders offer me the best loans for which I qualify. I must be qualified for the loan 
I have been offered, or the lender would not have validated the choice by offering 
me the loan. Because I am qualified for the loan that must mean that the lender 
thinks that I can repay the loan. Why else would they lend me the money? Moreover, 
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the government tightly regulates home mortgages; they make the lender give me all 
these legal forms. Surely the government must regulate all aspects of this transaction.
In reality, the government does not regulate as borrowers believe, and lenders 
do not necessarily behave as borrowers hope. Instead, information is hidden 
from borrowers, information that would improve market competition and out-
comes. Given consumers’ probably false background assumptions and the reality 
of asymmetric information favoring lenders and brokers, we suggest that creditors 
be required to reveal useful information to borrowers at the time of a mortgage 
loan offer, including disclosure of borrowers’ credit scores, and borrowers’ quali-
fications for all of lenders’ mortgage products. Brokers could even be required 
to reveal the wholesale rate sheet pricing—the rates at which lenders would be 
willing to lend to each type of borrower. Such an approach corresponds to the 
use of de-biasing information, in the top right of table 2.
The goal of these disclosures would be to put pressure on creditors and bro-
kers to be honest in their dealings with applicants. The additional information 
might improve comparison shopping and perhaps outcomes. Of course, revealing 
such information would also reduce broker and creditor profit margins. But if 
the classic market competition story relies on full information, and assumes 
rational behavior based on understanding, we can view this proposal as simply 
attempting to remove market frictions from information failures, and move the 
market competition model more toward its ideal. By reducing information 
asymmetry, full information disclosure would help to de-bias consumers and 
lead to better competitive outcomes.
Ex Post Standards-based Truth in Lending
Optimal disclosure will not simply occur in all markets through competition 
alone. Competition under a range of plausible scenarios will not necessarily 
generate psychologically informative and actionable disclosure, as the current 
crisis in the subprime mortgage sector suggests may have occurred. If competi-
tion does not produce informative disclosure, disclosure regulation might be 
necessary. But simply because disclosure regulation is needed does not mean it 
will work. Regulating disclosure appropriately is difficult and requires substantial 
sophistication by regulators, including psychological insight.
A behavioral perspective could focus on improving disclosures themselves. 
The goal of disclosure should be to improve the quality of information about 
contract terms in meaningful ways. That would suggest, for example, that simply 
adding information is unlikely to work. Disclosure policies are effective to the 
extent that they present a frame—a way of perceiving the disclosure—that is 
both well understood and conveys salient information that helps the decision 
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maker act optimally. It is possible, for example, that information about the failure 
frequency of particular products might help (for example, Two out of ten bor-
rowers who take this kind of loan default), but proper framing can be difficult to 
achieve and to maintain consistently, given that it may vary across situations. 
Moreover, the attempt to improve decision quality through an improvement in 
consumers’ understanding, which is presumed to change consumers’ intentions 
to act, and finally their actual actions, is fraught with difficulty. There is often a 
gap between understanding and intention, and particularly between intention 
and action.
Furthermore, even if meaningful disclosure rules can be created, sellers can 
undermine whatever before-the-fact or ex ante disclosure rule is established, 
in some contexts simply by “complying” with it: Here’s the disclosure form I’m 
supposed to give you, just sign here. For example, with rules-based ex ante disclo-
sure requirements for credit, such as the Truth in Lending Act of 1968 (TILA), 
the rule is set up first, and the firm (the discloser) moves last. While an ex ante 
rule provides certainty to creditors, whatever gave the discloser incentives to 
confuse consumers remains in the face of the regulation. While disclosers may 
officially comply with a given rule, they will nonetheless remain susceptible to 
market pressure to find other means to avoid the salutary effects on consumer 
decisions that the disclosure is intended to achieve.
In light of the difficulties of addressing such issues ex ante, we propose that 
policymakers consider shifting away from sole reliance on a rules-based, ex ante 
regulatory structure for disclosure embodied in TILA and toward integration 
of an ex post, standards-based disclosure requirement as well. Rather than a 
rule, we would deploy a standard, and rather than an ex ante decision about 
content, we would permit the standard to be enforced after loans are made. 
In essence, courts or expert agencies would determine whether the disclosure 
would, under common understanding, have effectively communicated the key 
terms of the mortgage to the typical borrower. This approach could be similar 
to ex post determinations of reasonableness of disclaimers of warranties in sales 
contracts under UCC 2-316 (see White and Summers 1995). This type of policy 
intervention would correspond to a change in “scoring,” in the lower right of 
table 2.
In our judgment, an ex post version of truth in lending based on a reason-
able-person standard to complement the fixed disclosure rule under TILA 
might permit innovation—both in products themselves and in strategies of 
disclosure—while minimizing rule evasion. An ex post standard with sufficient 
teeth could change the incentives of firms to confuse and would be more 
difficult to evade. Under the current approach, creditors can easily “evade” TILA, 
by simultaneously complying with its actual terms and making the required 
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disclosures regarding the terms effectively useless in the context of the borrowing 
decisions of consumers with limited attention and understanding. TILA, for 
example, does not block a creditor from introducing a more salient term (Lower 
monthly cost!) to compete with the APR for borrowers’ attention. Under an ex 
post standards approach, by contrast, lenders could not plead compliance with 
TILA as a defense. Rather, the question would be one of objective reasonable-
ness: whether the lender meaningfully conveyed the information required for 
a typical consumer to make a reasonable judgment about the loan. Standards 
would also lower the cost of specification ex ante. Clarity of contract is hard 
to specify ex ante but easier to verify ex post. Over time, through agency action, 
guidance, model disclosures, “no action” letters, and court decisions, the param-
eters of the reasonableness standard would become known and predictable.
While TILA has significant shortcomings, we do not propose abandoning 
it. Rather, TILA would remain (with whatever useful modifications to it might 
be gleaned from our increased understanding of consumers’ emotions, thought 
processes, and behaviors). Quite recently, for example, the Federal Reserve Board 
unveiled major and useful changes to its disclosure rules, based in part on 
consumer research.6 TILA would still be important in permitting comparison-
shopping among mortgage products, one of its two central goals. However, 
some of the burden of TILA’s second goal, to induce firms to reveal information 
that would promote better consumer understanding, would be shifted to the ex 
post standard.
Of course, there would be significant costs to such an approach, especially 
at first. Litigation or regulatory enforcement would impose direct costs and 
the uncertainty surrounding enforcement of the standard ex post might deter 
innovation in the development of mortgage products. The additional costs of 
compliance with a disclosure standard might reduce lenders’ willingness to 
develop new mortgage products designed to reach lower-income or minority 
borrowers who might not be served by the firms’ plain-vanilla products. The 
lack of clear rules might also increase consumer confusion regarding how to 
compare innovative mortgage products to each other, even while it increases 
consumer understanding of the particular mortgage products being offered. 
Even if we couple the advantages of TILA for mortgage comparisons with the 
advantages of an ex post standard for disclosure in promoting clarity, the net 
result may simply be greater confusion with respect to cross-loan comparisons. 
That is, if consumer confusion results mostly from firm obfuscation, then 
our proposal will likely help a good deal. By contrast, if consumer confusion in 
this context results mostly from market complexity in product innovation, then 
the proposal is unlikely to make a major difference, and other approaches 
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focused on loan comparisons might be warranted (see, for example, Thaler and 
Sunstein 2008).
Despite the shortcomings of an ex post standard for truth in lending, we 
believe that such an approach is worth pursuing. To limit the costs associated 
with our approach, the ex post determination of reasonableness could be signif-
icantly confined. For example, if courts are to be involved in enforcement, the 
ex post standard for reasonableness of disclosure might be limited to providing 
a (partial) defense to payment in foreclosure or bankruptcy, rather than being 
open to broader enforcement through affirmative suit. Alternatively, rather than 
court enforcement, the ex post standard might be enforced by the bank regula-
tors or another expert consumer agency,7 through supervision and enforcement 
actions. The ex post exposure might be significantly reduced through ex ante 
steps. For example, regulators might develop safe harbors for reasonable disclo-
sures, issue model disclosures, use “no action” letters to provide certainty to 
lenders, and the like. Moreover, firms might be tasked with conducting regular 
surveys of borrowers or conducting experimental design research to validate 
their disclosures, with positive results from the research providing rebuttable 
presumptions of reasonableness, or even safe harbors from challenge. The key is 
to give the standard sufficient teeth without deterring innovation. The precise 
contours of enforcement and liability are not essential to the concept, and 
weighing the costs and benefits of such penalties is beyond the scope of what 
we hope to do in introducing the idea here. Further work will be required to 
detail the design for implementation.
“Sticky” Opt-Out Mortgage Regulation
While the causes of the mortgage crisis are myriad, a central problem was that 
many borrowers took out loans that they did not understand and could not 
afford. Brokers and lenders offered loans that looked much less expensive than 
they really were, because of low initial monthly payments and costly hidden 
features. Families commonly make mistakes in taking out home mortgages 
because they are misled by broker sales tactics, misunderstand the complicated 
terms and financial tradeoffs in mortgages, wrongly forecast their own behavior 
and misperceive their risks of borrowing. How many homeowners really under-
stand how the teaser rate, introductory rate, and reset rate relate to the London 
interbank offered rate plus some specified margin, or can judge whether the 
prepayment penalty will offset the gains from the teaser rate?
Improved disclosures might help. Altering the rules of the game of disclosure, 
and altering the “scoring” for seeking to evade proper disclosure, may be suffi-
cient to reduce the worst outcomes. However, if market pressures and consumer 
confusion are sufficiently strong, such disclosure may not be enough. If market 
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complexity is sufficiently disruptive to consumer choice, product regulation 
might prove most appropriate. For example, by barring prepayment penalties, 
we could reduce lock-in to bad mortgages; by barring short-term ARMs and 
balloon payments, we could reduce refinance pressure; in both cases, more of the 
cost of the loan would be pushed into interest rates and competition could focus 
on a consistently stated price in the form of the APR. Price competition would 
benefit consumers, who would be more likely to understand the terms on which 
lenders were competing. Product regulation would also reduce cognitive and 
emotional pressures related to potentially bad decision making by reducing the 
number of choices and eliminating loan features that put pressure on borrowers 
to refinance on bad terms. However, product regulation may stifle beneficial 
innovation and there is always the possibility that government may simply get 
it wrong.
For that reason, we propose a new form of regulation. We propose that a 
default be established with increased liability exposure for deviations that harm 
consumers. For lack of a better term, we call this a sticky opt-out mortgage sys-
tem. As with opt-out regulation generally, a sticky opt-out system would fall, 
in terms of stringency, somewhere between product regulation and disclosure; 
however, for reasons we explain below, market forces would likely swamp a pure 
opt-out regime—that’s where the need for stickiness comes in. This approach 
corresponds to a combination of changing the rules of the game, in the top 
right of table 2, and changing liability rules, at the bottom right of that table.
The proposal is grounded in our equilibrium model of firm incentives and 
individual psychology. Borrowers may be unable to distinguish among complex 
loan products and act optimally based on such an understanding (see, for exam-
ple, Ausubel 1991). We thus deploy an opt-out strategy to make it easier for 
borrowers to choose a standard product, and harder for borrowers to choose a 
product that they are less likely to understand. At the same time, lenders may 
seek to extract surplus from borrowers because of asymmetric information 
about future income or default probabilities (see Musto 2007), and, in the short 
term, lenders and brokers may benefit from selling borrowers loans they cannot 
afford. Thus, a pure default would be undermined by firms, and regulation needs 
to take account of this market pressure by pushing back.
In our model, lenders would be required to offer eligible borrowers a standard 
mortgage (or set of mortgages), such as a fixed-rate, self-amortizing thirty-year 
mortgage loan, according to reasonable underwriting standards. The precise 
contours of the standard set of mortgages would be set by regulation. Lenders 
would be free to charge whatever interest rate they wanted on the loan, and, 
subject to the constraints outlined below, could offer whatever other loan prod-
ucts they wanted outside of the standard package. Borrowers, however, would 
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get the standard mortgage offered, unless they chose to opt out in favor of a 
nonstandard option offered by the lender, after honest and comprehensible dis-
closures from brokers or lenders about the terms and risks of the alternative 
mortgages. An opt-out mortgage system would mean that borrowers would be 
more likely to get straightforward loans they could understand.
But for the reasons cited above, a plain-vanilla opt-out policy is likely to be 
inadequate. Unlike the savings context, where market incentives align well with 
policies to overcome behavioral biases, in the context of credit markets, firms 
often have an incentive to hide the true costs of borrowing. Given the strong 
market pressures to deviate from the default offer, we would need to require 
more than a simple opt-out to make the default sticky enough to make a differ-
ence in outcomes. Deviation from the offer would require heightened disclosures 
and additional legal exposure for lenders in order to make the default sticky. 
Under our plan, lenders would have stronger incentives to provide meaningful 
disclosures to those whom they convince to opt out, because they would face 
increased regulatory scrutiny, or increased costs if the loans did not work out. 
Future work will need to explore in greater detail the enforcement mecha-
nism. For example, under one potential approach to making the opt-out sticky, 
if default occurs when a borrower opts out, the borrower could raise the lack of 
reasonable disclosure as a defense to bankruptcy or foreclosure. Using an objec-
tive reasonableness standard akin to that used for warranty analysis under the 
Uniform Commercial Code, if the court determined that the disclosure would 
not effectively communicate the key terms and risks of the mortgage to the 
typical borrower, the court could modify or rescind the loan contract.8 Another 
alternative would be to have the banking agencies (or another expert consumer 
agency) enforce the requirement on a supervisory basis, rather than relying 
on the courts. The agency would be responsible for supervising the nature of 
disclosures according to a reasonableness standard, and would impose a fine on 
the lender and order corrective actions if the disclosures were found to be 
unreasonable. The precise nature of the stickiness required and the tradeoffs 
involved in imposing these costs on lenders would need to be explored in greater 
detail, but in principle, a sticky opt-out policy could effectively leverage the 
behavioral insight that defaults matter with the industrial-organizational insight 
that certain market incentives work against a pure opt-out policy.
An opt-out mortgage system with stickiness might provide several benefits 
over current market outcomes. Under the plan, a plain-vanilla set of default mort-
gages would be easier to compare across mortgage offers. Information would be 
more efficiently transmitted across the market. Consumers would be likely to 
understand the key terms and features of such standard products better than 
they would alternative mortgage products. Price competition would more likely 
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become salient once features are standardized. In behavioral terms, when alter-
native products are introduced, consumers would be made aware that such 
alternatives represent deviations from the default, helping to anchor consumers 
in the terms of the default product and providing some basic expectations for 
what ought to enter into their choices. Framing the mortgage choice as one 
between accepting a standard mortgage offer and needing affirmatively to choose 
a nonstandard product should improve consumer decision making. Creditors 
will be required to make heightened disclosures about the risks of the alternative 
loan products for the borrower, subject to legal sanction in the event of failure 
to reasonably disclose such risks; the legal sanctions should deter creditors from 
making highly unreasonable alternative offers with hidden and complicated 
terms. Consumers may be less likely to make significant mistakes. In contrast 
to a pure product regulation approach, the sticky default approach would allow 
lenders to continue to develop new kinds of mortgages, but only when they can 
adequately explain key terms and risks to borrowers.
Moreover, requiring a default to be offered, accompanied by required height-
ened disclosures and increased legal exposure for deviations, may help to make 
high-road lending more profitable than low-road lending—at least if deviations 
resulting in harm are appropriately penalized. If offering an opt-out mortgage 
product helps to split the market between high- and low-road firms, and rewards 
the former, the market may shift (back) toward firms that offer home mortgage 
products that better serve borrowers. For this to work effectively, the default—
and the efforts to make the default sticky—would need to enable the consumer 
easily to distinguish the typical “good” loan, benefiting both lender and bor-
rower, and which would be offered as the default, from a wide range of “bad” 
loans: for example, those that benefit the lender with higher rates and fees 
but harm the borrower; those that benefit the borrower but harm the lender; 
and those that harm the borrower and lender but benefit third parties, such 
as brokers.
There will be costs associated with requiring an opt-out home mortgage. 
For example, the sticky defaults may not be sticky enough to alter outcomes, 
given market pressures. The default could be undermined, as well, through the 
firm’s incentive structures for loan officers and brokers, which could provide 
greater rewards for nonstandard loans. Implementation of the measure may be 
costly and the disclosure requirement and uncertainty regarding enforcement of 
the standard might reduce overall access to home mortgage lending. There may 
be too many cases in which alternative products are optimal, so that the default 
product is in essence “incorrect,” and comes to be seen as such. The default would 
then matter less over time, and forcing firms and consumers to go through the 
process of deviating from it would become increasingly just another burden 
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(like existing disclosure paperwork) along the road to getting a home mortgage 
loan. Low-income, minority, or first-time homeowners who have benefited from 
more flexible underwriting and more innovative mortgage developments might 
see their access reduced if the standard set of mortgages does not include prod-
ucts suitable to their needs.
We could improve these outcomes in a variety of ways. For example, the 
opt-out regulation could require that the standard set of mortgages include a 
thirty-year fixed mortgage, a five- or seven-year adjustable-rate mortgage, and 
straightforward mortgages designed to meet the particular needs of first-time, 
minority, or low-income homeowners. We might develop “smart defaults,” based 
on key borrower characteristics, such as income and age. With a handful of key 
facts, an optimal default might be offered to an individual borrower. The optimal 
default would consist of a mortgage or set of mortgages that most closely align 
with the set of mortgages that the typical borrower with that income, age, and 
education would prefer. For example, a borrower with rising income prospects 
might appropriately be offered a five-year adjustable-rate mortgage. Smart 
defaults might reduce error costs associated with the proposal and increase the 
range of mortgages that can be developed to meet the needs of a broad range of 
borrowers, including lower-income or first-time homeowners; however, smart 
defaults may add to consumer confusion. Even if the consumer (with the par-
ticular characteristics encompassed by the smart default) only faces one default 
product, spillover from too many options across the market may make decision 
making more difficult. Moreover, it may be difficult to design smart defaults 
consistent with fair lending rules.
Another approach to improve the standard mortgage choice set and to reduce 
enforcement costs over time would be to build in banking agency supervision 
as well as periodic required reviews of the defaults, with consumer experimental 
design or survey research to test both the products and the disclosures, so that 
the disclosures and the default products stay current with updated knowledge 
of outcomes in the home mortgage market. Indeed, lenders might be required 
to conduct such research and to disclose the results to regulators and the public 
upon developing a new product and its related disclosures. In addition, regula-
tors might use the results of the research to provide safe harbors for disclosures 
that are shown to be reasonable ex ante through these methods. Regulators 
could also issue “no-action” letters regarding disclosures that are deemed to be 
reasonable through such research. The appropriate federal and state supervisory 
agencies could be required to conduct ongoing supervision and testing of com-
pliance with the opt-out regulations and disclosure requirements. The federal 
and state banking agencies could easily adapt to this additional role with respect 
to depositories, while the FTC, a new expert consumer finance agency, or state 
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agencies would need to be provided with the authority and resources to conduct 
ongoing supervisory and testing functions for nondepositories, instead of relying 
solely on enforcement actions. Through these no-action letters, safe harbors, 
supervision, and other regulatory guidance, the regulators can develop a body of 
law that would increase compliance across the diverse financial sectors involved 
in mortgage lending, while reducing the uncertainty facing lenders from the new 
opt-out requirement, and providing greater freedom for financial innovation.
Restructure the Relationship Between Brokers and Borrowers
An alternative approach to addressing the problem of market incentives to 
exploit behavioral biases would be to focus directly on restructuring brokers’ duties 
to borrowers and reforming compensation schemes that provide incentives to 
brokers to mislead borrowers. Mortgage brokers have dominated the subprime 
market. Brokers generally have been compensated with “yield spread premiums” 
(YSPs) for getting borrowers to pay higher rates than those for which the 
borrower would qualify. Such YSPs have been used widely.9 In loans with yield 
spread premiums, unlike other loans, there is wide dispersion in prices paid to 
mortgage brokers. As Howell Jackson has shown, within the group of borrowers 
paying yield spread premiums, African Americans paid $474 more for their 
loans, and Hispanics $590 more, than white borrowers; thus, even if minority 
and white borrowers could qualify for the same rate, in practice minority bor-
rowers are likely to pay much more.10 
Brokers cannot be monitored sufficiently by borrowers (see Jackson and 
Burlingame 2007), and it is dubious that additional disclosures would help bor-
rowers be better monitors (see, for example FTC 2007), in part because brokers’ 
disclosures of potential conflicts of interest may paradoxically increase consumer 
trust (Cain et al 2005). Thus, if the broker is required to tell the borrower that 
the broker works for himself, not in the interest of the borrower, the borrower’s 
trust in the broker may increase—after all, the broker is being honest! Moreover, 
evidence from the subprime mortgage crisis suggests that while in theory 
creditors and investors have some incentives to monitor brokers, they do not do 
so effectively.
It is possible to undertake an array of structural changes regarding the broker-
borrower relationship. For example, we could alter the incentives of creditors 
and investors to monitor mortgage brokers by changing liability rules to make 
it clear that broker misconduct can be attributed to lenders and creditors in 
suits by borrowers (see Engel and McCoy 2007). We could directly regulate 
mortgage brokers through licensing and registration requirements (as is done 
elsewhere; for example, in the U.K.); recent U.S. legislation now mandates 
licensing and reporting requirements for brokers. In addition, the ex post 
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disclosure standard we suggest might have a salutary effect by making it more 
costly for lenders when brokers evade disclosure duties; this may lead to better 
monitoring of brokers.
We also believe it is worth considering fundamentally altering the duties of 
brokers by treating mortgage brokers as fiduciaries to borrowers, and subjecting 
them to requirements similar to those that govern investment advisors under 
the Investment Advisors Act. This would, of course, require vast changes to the 
brokerage market, including to the ways in which mortgage brokers are com-
pensated, and by whom. We would need to shift from a lender-compensation 
system to a borrower-compensation system, and we would need a regulatory 
system and resources to police the fiduciary duty. An interim step with much 
lower costs, and potentially significant benefits, would be to ban yield spread 
premiums. Banning YSPs could reduce some broker abuses by eliminating a 
strong incentive for brokers to seek out higher-cost loans for customers. In fact, 
quite recently a number of lenders have moved away from YSPs to fixed fees 
with some funds held back until the loan has performed well for a period of 
time, precisely because of broker conflicts of interest in seeking higher YSPs 
rather than sound loans. Banning YSPs now would reinforce these high-road 
practices and protect against a renewed and profitable low-road push for using 
YSPs to increase market share once stability is restored to mortgage markets. 
Banning YSPs would constitute a form of scoring change, corresponding to 
regulation in the bottom right of table 2, because it affects the payoff brokers 
receive for pursuing different mortgage outcomes.
III.2 Behaviorally Informed Credit Card Regulation
Using Framing and Salience in Disclosures  
to Encourage Good Credit Card Behavior
Credit card companies have fine-tuned product offerings and disclosures in a 
manner that appears to be systematically designed to prey on common psycho-
logical biases—biases that limit consumer ability to make rational choices 
regarding credit card borrowing.11 Behavioral economics suggests that consumers 
underestimate how much they will borrow and overestimate their ability to pay 
their bills in a timely manner.12 Credit card companies can then price their 
credit cards and compete on the basis of these fundamental human failings.13 
Nearly 60 percent of credit card holders do not pay their bills in full every 
month (Bucks et al 2006). Moreover, excessive credit card debt can lead to 
personal financial ruin. Credit card debt is a good predictor of bankruptcy.14 
Ronald Mann has argued that credit card companies seek to keep consumers 
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in a “sweat box” of distressed credit card debt, paying high fees for as long as 
possible before finally succumbing to bankruptcy.15 
The 2005 bankruptcy legislation16 focused on the need for improved bor-
rower responsibility but paid insufficient attention to creditor responsibility for 
borrowing patterns. Credit card companies provide complex disclosures regarding 
teaser rates, introductory terms, variable rate cards, penalties, and a host of other 
matters. Both the terms themselves and the disclosures are confusing to con-
sumers.17 Credit card companies are not competing, it appears, to offer the most 
transparent pricing.
Going forward, regulatory and legislative steps could help prod the credit 
card industry into better practices. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
intervened to require national banks to engage in better credit card practices 
and to provide greater transparency on minimum payments,18 and the Federal 
Reserve recently released proposed changes to its regulations under TILA, in 
part in the wake of TILA amendments contained in the bankruptcy legisla-
tion.19 Under the proposals, for example, creditors would need to disclose that 
paying only the minimum balance would lengthen the payoff time and interest 
paid on the credit card; describe a hypothetical example of a payoff period 
paying only the minimum balance; and provide a toll-free number for the con-
sumer to obtain an estimate of actual payoff time.20 Although the very length 
and complexity of the board’s proposal hints at the difficulty of the task of using 
complex disclosure to alter consumer understanding and behavior, such improved 
disclosures might nevertheless help.
But we could do much better. Congress could require that minimum pay-
ment terms be accompanied by clear statements regarding how long it would 
take, and how much interest would be paid, if the customer’s actual balance 
were paid off only in minimum payments, and card companies could be required 
to state the monthly payment amount that would be required to pay the cus-
tomer’s actual balance in full over some reasonable period of time, as deter-
mined by regulation. These tailored disclosures use framing and salience to help 
consumers, whose intuitions regarding compounding and timing are weak, to 
make better-informed payment choices based on their specific circumstances. 
Such an approach would correspond to changing the rules in order to de-bias 
consumers with behaviorally informed information disclosure, in the top right 
of table 2. Although credit card companies have opposed such ideas in the past, 
disclosures based on the customer’s actual balances are not overly burdensome.
Disclosures regarding the expected time to pay off actual credit card 
balances are designed to provide a salient frame intended to facilitate more 
optimal behavior. But such disclosures may not be strong enough to matter. The 
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disclosures are geared toward influencing borrowers’ intention to alter their 
behavior; however, even if the disclosure succeeds in shaping intention, we know 
that there is often a large gap between intention and action (Buehler et al 2002; 
Koehler and Poon 2005). In fact, borrowers would need to change behavior in 
the face of strong inertia and marketing by credit card companies propelling them 
to make no more than minimum payments. More generally, once such disclo-
sure requirement were enacted, market players opposed to them would promptly 
attempt to undermine them with countervailing marketing and other policies.
An Opt-Out Payment Plan for Credit Cards
A more promising approach, geared more directly toward shaping behavior 
rather than influencing intentions, would be to develop an “opt-out payment 
plan” for credit cards, under which consumers would be required automatically 
to make the payment necessary to pay off their existing balance over a relatively 
short period of time unless the customer affirmatively opted out of such a pay-
ment plan and chose an alterative payment plan with a longer (or shorter) 
payment term.21 Such an approach corresponds to changing the rules through 
opt-out policies, as in the top right of table 2. Given what we know about 
default rules and framing, such a payment plan may be followed by many con-
sumers. The payment plan would create expectations about consumer conduct 
and in any event inertia would cause many households simply to follow the 
plan. Increasing such behavior would mean lower rates of interest and fees paid, 
and lower incidence of financial failure. In any event, confronting an optimal 
payment plan may force cardholders to confront the reality of their borrowing, 
and this may help to alter their borrowing behavior, or their payoff plans. 
Moreover, credit card industry players would find it difficult to argue publicly 
against reasonable opt-out payment plans and, in the face of such plans, to con-
tinue using a pricing model based on borrowers going into financial distress.
Of course, an opt-out payment plan will impose costs. Some consumers 
who, in the absence of the opt-out payment plan, would have paid off their 
credit cards much faster than the plan provides, might now follow the slower 
payment plan offered as the default, thus incurring higher costs from interest and 
fees, and possibly even facing a higher chance of financial failure. Alternatively, 
some consumers might follow the opt-out payment plan when it is unaffordable 
for them, consequently reducing necessary current consumption such as medical 
care or sufficient food, or incurring other costly forms of debt. While there are 
undoubtedly problems with such an approach, public debate over the proposal 
would at least have the virtue of engaging all relevant players in an important 
conversation about fundamental changes in market practice.
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Regulate Late Fees
A narrower intervention based on behavioral insights about credit card customers 
would seek to change the behavior of credit card firms rather than consumers. 
One problem with the pricing of credit cards is that credit card firms can charge 
late and overlimit fees with relative impunity because consumers typically do 
not believe ex ante that they will pay such fees. In principle, firms need to charge 
late and overlimit fees to the extent that they wish to provide incentives to cus-
tomers not to pay late or go over their credit card limits. In practice, given the 
fees they charge, credit card firms are perfectly content to let consumers pay 
late and go over their card limits, in order to obtain fee revenue from them.
We would change the scoring of the game (corresponding to a regulatory 
choice in the bottom right of table 2). Under our proposal, firms could deter 
consumers from paying late or going over their credit card limits with whatever 
fees they deemed appropriate, but the bulk of such fees would be placed in a 
public trust to be used for financial education and assistance to troubled bor-
rowers. Firms would retain a fixed percentage of the fees to pay for their actual 
costs incurred from late payments or overlimit charges, or for any increased 
risks of default that such behavior presages. The benefit of such an approach is 
that it permits firms to deter “bad conduct” by consumers, but prevents firms 
from taking advantage of the psychological insight that consumers predictably 
misforecast their own behavior with respect to paying late and borrowing over 
their limit. Firm incentives to overcharge for late payments and overlimit bor-
rowing would be removed, while firms would retain incentives appropriately to 
deter these consumer failures.
As with our other proposals, there would be costs as well: in particular, the 
reduced revenue stream to lenders from these fees would mean that other rates 
and fees would be adjusted to compensate, and there is little reason to believe 
that the adjustments would be in consumers’ favor. Moreover, taxing late and 
overlimit fees in this manner might be seen as a significant interference with 
contractual relationships beyond the form and content of disclosures required 
under TILA for credit card agreements.
Opt-Out Credit Card
As a last option to consider in the credit card market, we might think about 
a regulation requiring firms to offer a standard opt-out credit card. Elizabeth 
Warren (2007) has argued that private sector firms should offer “clean” credit 
cards with straightforward terms and honest pricing. We agree with her that 
this would be a significant achievement and would set an important example 
for others. Looking at the structure of the market, we might wonder whether 
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such a high-road firm offering a clean credit card could win market share and 
remain profitable. Given predictable consumer biases, such firms will have a hard 
time competing with low-road players offering less transparent and seemingly 
“better” offers. We thus wonder whether regulation might be designed to 
reward high-road credit card firms while penalizing low-road firms offering 
products designed to take advantage of consumer failings.
Warren’s innovative suggestion in this regard is for the creation of a con-
sumer financial safety commission that could review credit card offers.22  Perhaps 
an entity such as this could specify terms and conditions that are “safe” and 
qualify for being offered as a standard credit card. As with the home mortgage 
idea discussed earlier, consumers would be offered credit cards that meet the 
definition of “safe.” They could opt for another kind of credit card, but only 
after meaningful disclosure. And credit card firms would face increased liability 
risk if the disclosure were found to have been unreasonable. As with our earlier 
concept, the precise details of liability determination and consequences would 
need to be carefully calibrated. In essence, the proposal would permit firms to 
continue to innovate in credit card practices, but with strong pressure to adopt 
straightforward practices and with the risk of increased consequences to firms 
when consumers opt out and wind up in trouble. This type of sticky opt-out 
provision, as with our proposal for an opt-out home mortgage, would corre-
spond to changing both the rules and the scoring of the game on the right side 
of table 2. 
III.3 Increasing Saving Among LMI Households
Savings is an area ripe for further behavioral attention. So far, much of behavior-
ally informed saving policy has focused on using defaults to improve retirement 
saving. For many low- and moderate-income households, however, there is a 
much greater need to focus on basic banking services and short-term savings 
options, services which, for this population, may require a different mix of gov-
ernmental responses than those envisioned in the context of retirement savings 
for middle- and upper-income households.
Many low- and moderate-income (LMI) individuals lack access to the sort 
of financial services that middle-income families take for granted, such as 
checking accounts or easily utilized savings opportunities. High-cost financial 
services, barriers to savings, lack of insurance, and credit constraints increase 
the economic challenges faced by LMI families. In the short run, it is often 
hard for these families to deal with fluctuations in income that occur because 
of job changes, instability in hours worked, medical illnesses or emergencies, 
changes in family composition, or myriad other factors that can cause abrupt 
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changes in economic inflows and outflows. At low income levels, small income 
fluctuations may create serious problems in paying rent, utilities, or other bills. 
Moreover, the high costs and low utility of the financial transaction services 
used by many low-income households extract a daily toll on take-home pay. 
Limited access to mainstream financial services reduces ready opportunities to 
save and thus limit families’ ability to build assets and to save for the future.
In theory, opt-out policies ought to work well here, as in the retirement 
world, in encouraging saving by such households. However, while in general 
the market pulls in the same direction as policy for saving, market forces 
weaken or break down entirely with respect to encouraging saving for low-
income households. This is simply because the administrative costs of collecting 
small-value deposits are high in relation to banks’ potential earnings on the 
relatively small amounts saved, unless the bank can charge high fees; with suf-
ficiently high fees, however, it is not clear that having a bank account makes 
economic sense for LMI households. Indeed, the current structure of bank 
accounts is one of the primary reasons why LMI households do not have them.
With respect to transaction accounts, high minimum-balance requirements, 
high fees for overdraft protection or bounced checks, and delays in check clear-
ance dissuade LMI households from opening or retaining bank accounts. 
Moreover, banks use the private ChexSystems to screen out households who 
have had difficulty with accounts in the past. Behaviorally insightful tweaks are 
unlikely to suffice in this context; rather, we need to devise methods to change 
the nature of the products being offered and, with them, the behavior of the 
consumers who open and maintain the accounts.
In this area, we need to figure out how to increase scale and offset costs for 
the private sector, in addition to increasing saving by low- and moderate-income 
families. As explained more fully below, we propose two options: a new tax credit 
to financial institutions for offering safe and affordable bank accounts, and a 
proposal under which the IRS would direct deposit tax refunds into “opt-out” 
bank accounts automatically set up through private sector financial institutions 
at tax time. Both proposals are designed to induce the private sector to change 
their account offerings by offering tax subsidies or government bundling to 
reach scale, as well as to alter consumer behavior through the structure of the 
accounts offered. The proposals pertain to changing the rules and the scoring 
on the left hand side of table 2, where markets may prove neutral to, or even 
positively inclined toward, the potential overcoming of consumer fallibility. In 
particular, the tax credit and government backing change the scoring to firms 
for offering such products, while the opt-out nature of the proposal changes the 
starting rules.
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Tax Credit to Financial Institutions for  
Offering Safe and Affordable Bank Accounts
To overcome the problem of the high fixed costs of offering sensible transaction 
accounts to low-income individuals with low savings levels, Congress could 
enact a pay-for-performance tax credit for financial institutions that offer safe 
and affordable bank accounts to LMI households (see Barr 2004, 2007). With 
such a tax credit, financial institutions would be entitled to claim tax credits 
for a fixed amount per account opened by LMI households. The bank accounts 
eligible for the tax credit could be structured and priced by the private sector, 
but according to essential terms required by regulation. For example, costly and 
inefficient checking accounts with high risk of overdraft or costly hidden 
features would be eschewed in favor of low-cost, low-risk accounts with only 
debit-card access. In particular, bank accounts would be debit-card based, with no 
check-writing capability, no overdrafts permitted, and no ChexSystems rejections 
for past account failures, in the absence of fraud or other meaningful abuse.
The power of the tax credit initiative could be significantly increased if it 
were coupled with a series of behaviorally informed efforts to improve take-up 
of the accounts and savings outcomes for account holders. For example, banks 
could reach out to employers to encourage direct deposit and automatic savings 
plans to set up default rules that would increase savings outcomes. With an 
automatic savings plan, accounts could be structured so that holders could des-
ignate a portion of their paycheck to be deposited into a savings “pocket”; the 
savings feature would rely on the precommitment device of automatic savings, 
and funds would be somewhat more difficult to access than those in the regular 
bank account, in order to make the commitment more likely to stick. To provide 
necessary access to emergency funds in a more cost effective manner than 
usually available to LMI households, the bank account could also include a six-
month consumer loan with direct deposit and direct debit, using relationship 
banking and automated payment systems to provide an alternative to costly pay-
day loans. With direct deposit of income and direct debit of interest and prin-
cipal due, the loan should be relatively costless to service and relatively low-risk 
for the bank. With a longer payment period than usual for payday lending, the 
loan should be more manageable for consumers living paycheck to paycheck, 
and would likely lead to less repeated borrowing undertaken to stay current on 
past payday loans. Moreover, the loan repayment features could also include a 
provision that consumers “pay themselves first,” by including a savings deposit 
to their account with every payment. Such a precommitment device could over-
come the tendency to procrastinate in savings and reduce the likelihood of 
needing future emergency borrowing. All these efforts could increase take-up 
of the banking product and lead to improved savings outcomes.
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An Opt-Out Bank Account for Tax Refunds
Congress could also enact a new, opt-out “tax refund account” plan to encourage 
savings and expanded access to banking services, while reducing reliance on 
costly refund loans (see Barr 2007). Under the plan, unbanked low-income 
households who file their tax returns would have their tax refunds directly 
deposited into a new account. Banks agreeing to offer safe and affordable bank 
accounts would register with the IRS to offer the accounts, and a fiscal agent 
for the IRS would draw from a roster of banks offering these services in the 
taxpayer’s geographic area in assigning the new accounts. On receiving the 
account number from its fiscal agent, the IRS would directly deposit EITC 
(and other tax refunds) into those accounts. Taxpayers could choose to opt out 
of the system if they did not want to directly deposit their refund, but we would 
expect the accounts to be widely accepted since they would significantly reduce 
the costs for taxpayers of receiving their tax refunds. Once the tax refund 
account is set up through the IRS mechanism at tax time, households would 
receive their tax refund in the account, weeks earlier than if they had to wait for 
a paper check. Moreover, once it is established, the account could continue to 
be used long past tax time. Households could also use the account just like any 
other bank account—to receive their income, to save, to pay bills, and the like.
By using an opt-out strategy and reaching households at tax time, this 
approach could help to overcome consumer biases to procrastinate in setting 
up accounts. By reducing the time it takes to receive a refund, setting up such 
accounts could help to reduce the incentives to take out costly refund loans, incen-
tives that are magnified by temporal myopia and widespread misunderstanding 
of the costs of credit. This system could dramatically, efficiently, and quickly 
reach millions of LMI households and bring them into the banking system. A 
complementary approach (Koide 2007) would reach sufficient scale by using 
prepaid debit cards and pooled accounts offered by a single vendor chosen by 
the IRS, rather than individual bank accounts offered by a large number of 
financial institutions. In this manner, the private sector vendor would be assured 
a large scale of operations. In either event, opt-out strategies and government 
incentives would be coupled to reach low-income households with essential 
banking services.
IV. Concluding Remarks
We propose a different approach to regulation. Whereas the classical perspective 
assumes that people generally know what is important and knowable, plan with 
insight and patience, and carry out their plans with wisdom and self-control, 
the central gist of the behavioral perspective is that people often fail to know 
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and understand things that matter; that they misperceive, misallocate, and fail 
to carry out their intended plans; and that the context in which people function 
has great impact on their behavior, and, consequently, merits careful attention 
and constructive work. In our framework, successful regulation requires integrat-
ing this richer view of human behavior with our understanding of markets. Firms 
will operate on the contour defined by this psychology and will respond strate-
gically to regulations. As we describe above, because firms have a great deal of 
latitude in issue framing, product design, and so on, they have the capacity to 
affect behavior and circumvent or pervert regulatory constraints. Ironically, firms’ 
capacity to do so is enhanced by their interaction with “behavioral” consumers 
(as opposed to the hypothetically rational actors of neoclassical economic theory), 
since so many of the things a regulator would find very hard to control (for exam-
ple, frames, design, complexity, etc.) can greatly influence consumers’ behavior. 
The challenge of behaviorally informed regulation, therefore, is to be well designed 
and insightful both about human behavior and about the behaviors that firms 
are likely to exhibit in response to both consumer behavior and regulation.
With that in mind, we have outlined ten ideas: (1) full information disclo-
sure to de-bias home mortgage borrowers; (2) a new standard for truth in lending; 
(3) a “sticky” opt-out home mortgage system; (4) restructuring the relationship 
between brokers and borrowers; (5) using framing and salience to improve credit 
card disclosures; (6) an opt-out payment plan for credit cards; (7) an opt-out credit 
card; (8) regulating of credit card late fees; (9) a tax credit for banks offering safe 
and affordable accounts; and (10) an opt-out bank account for tax refunds. These 
examples, we hope, will serve to encourage more behaviorally informed regula-
tion in years to come.
Notes
1 For more details, see: http://legacy.americanpayroll.org/pdfs/paycard/DDsurv_
results0212.pdf.
2 We recognize that there are significant compliance issues regarding pensions and 
retirement plans, disclosure failures, fee churning and complicated and costly fee 
structures, conflicts of interest in plan management, as well as problems with encour-
aging employers to sign up low-wage workers for retirement plans. We do not mean 
to suggest that these failings are trivial—far from it. We only mean to suggest that, 
as a comparative matter, market incentives to overcome psychological biases in order to 
encourage saving are more aligned with optimal social policy than market incentives 
to exacerbate psychological biases that encourage borrowing.
3 We use this bimodal framework of regulatory choice to simplify the exploration of 
how our model of individual psychology and firm incentives affects regulation. We 
acknowledge that the regulatory choice matrix is more complex (see Barr 2005).
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4 This is largely because of the existing regulatory framework: pension regulation gives 
employers incentives to enroll lower-income individuals in 401(k) programs. Absent 
this, it is likely that firms would be happy to discourage enrollment since they often 
must pay the match for these individuals. This point is interesting because it suggests 
that even defaults in savings only work because some other regulation “changed the 
scoring” of the game.
5 This example abstracts from collection costs (which would reduce firms’ incentives to 
hide borrowing costs) and instead focuses on the short-term behavior generally exhib-
ited by firms, as in the recent home mortgage crisis.
6 See Federal Reserve Board, Final Rule Amending Regulation Z, 12 CFR part 226 
( July 14, 2008); Summary of Findings: Consumer Testing of Mortgage Broker 
Disclosures, submitted to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, July 
10, 2008; Federal Reserve Board, Proposed Rule Amending Regulation Z, 12 CFR 
part 226 ( June 14, 2007), Federal Register 72, no. 114: 32948; Design and Testing of 
Effective Truth in Lending Disclosures, Submitted to the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, May 16, 2007.
7 Elizabeth Warren, for example, has proposed a new Financial Product Safety Com-
mission. See Warren 2007.
8 A more aggressive approach would be to permit class-action litigation on an affirmative 
basis. In this paper, we are not yet able to balance the costs of class-action litigation 
against the benefits of stronger enforcement.
9 See Jackson and Burlingame 2007, p. 127. While in principle yield-spread premiums 
could permit lenders legitimately to pass on the cost of a mortgage broker fee to a 
cash-strapped borrower in the form of a higher interest rate rather than in the form 
of a cash payment, the evidence suggests that yield-spread premiums are in fact used 
to compensate brokers for getting borrowers to accept higher interest rates, prepay-
ment penalties, and other loan terms.
10 Ibid.: 125; see also Guttentag 2000.
11 See generally Bar-Gill 2004: 1373.
12 Ibid.: 1395–96.
13 Ibid.: 1394–95.
14 Mann 2006: 60–69.
15 Mann 2007: 375.
16 See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub L. no. 
109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 101 et seq [2005]). 
17 See, for example U.S. General Accounting Office, “Credit Cards: Increased Complexity 
in Rates and Fees Heightens the Need for More Effective Disclosures to Consumers,” 
Report 06-929, 2006.
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18 See, for example, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, OCC Bull. 2003-1, 
“Credit Card Lending: Account Management and Loss Allowance Guidance” (2003); 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, OCC Advisory Letter 2004-4, “Secured 
Credit Cards” (2004), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/advisory/2004-4.doc; 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, OCC Advisory Letter 2004-10, “Credit Card 
Practices” (2004), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/advisory/2004-10.doc.
19 See press release, Federal Reserve Board, Proposed Amendments to Regulation Z, 
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/BoardDocs/Press/bcreg/2007/20070523/
default.htm (May 23, 2007). 
20 Federal Reserve Board, Proposed Rule, 12 C.F.R. 226, proposed §.7(b)(12), imple-
menting 15 U.S.C. §1637(b)(11).
21 Barr (2007). For a related proposal, see Gordon and Douglas 2005 (arguing for an 
opt-out direct-debit arrangement for credit cards.
22 Ibid.
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chapter 3
From Greenspan’s Despair to 
Obama’s Hope: The Scientific 
Bases of Cooperation as 
Principles of Regulation
Yochai Benkler
“Those of us who have looked to the self-interest of lending institutions to protect 
shareholders’ equity (myself especially) are in a state of shocked disbelief. ”
—Written testimony of Dr. Alan Greenspan,
 Committee of Government Oversight and Reform, October 23, 2008
Henry Waxman: In other words you found that your view of the world, your 
ideology was not right. It was not working.
Alan Greenspan: Precisely, no I, that’s precisely the reason I was shocked because 
I’ve been going for forty years or more with very considerable evidence that it was 
working exceptionally well.
—Committee of Government Oversight and Reform hearing,  
 October 23, 2008
“We have never been just a collection of individuals. . . . ”
—Victory speech of President Barack Obama, November 4, 2008
Morning, November 4, 2008. We’re standing in line, my two sons, my wife, 
and I; waiting to volunteer at the Obama campaign headquarters in Raleigh, 
North Carolina; waiting to be told how to be useful in this battleground state. 
We have come down from Cambridge, Massachusetts for the last few days of the 
campaign, and have met many people. This morning the campaign headquarters 
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is brimming with people, black and white, young and old. A well-turned-out 
middle-class white woman with a lilting Southern accent is sitting at a phone-
bank table next to a young African American student in his early twenties; both 
are calling people to say, Go vote! Voting, the standard rational-actor model 
would normally say, is irrational. Volunteering: inexplicable. My nine-year-old, 
on the phone, suddenly lights up—“Yes,” he says, “of course I’m real!” The person 
on the other end of the line is clearly warming to the young voice full of 
seriousness, and they take obvious pleasure from talking to each other, if only 
for a few seconds: “I voted,” the person seems to say, as Ari smiles broadly and 
replies, “That’s wonderful!” A human connection. 
The campaign of candidate Obama—and, if he can convert it into a 
well-designed, thoughtful practice of governance, the presidency of President 
Obama—must give us the answer to the questions that all of us looking at the 
enormous challenges of tomorrow, and specifically at the global economic crisis, 
must face: How do we think about practical governance now that the model 
of well-designed incentives for selfish beings has collapsed around us? How do 
we convert what has inspired millions in the Obama campaign into a practical 
replacement for the economic model that Alan Greenspan says he has been 
relying on for forty years, and which has now failed him in the fall of 2008?
The answer is that we already have the building blocks of a new approach to 
organizing production and consumption, to organizing governance and practical 
problem solving in both the public and private arenas. It is this approach that is 
responsible for developing the free and open-source software that runs the vast 
majority of Web sites and Internet functions we use every day. It is the approach 
that allowed Toyota to build better and more productive relations with the 
very same employees and suppliers that General Motors had alienated. It is the 
approach that has led contemporary evolutionary biology to see cooperation, 
rather than competition alone, as a fundamental force of evolution. It is the 
approach that has motivated the rapid spread of community-policing initiatives 
in the majority of police departments around the country. In none of these cases 
is the alternative to the self-interest model that animated Greenspan’s ideology 
a starry-eyed reliance on hope, or a generalized belief in human benevolence. 
Rather, in every case, a carefully designed or organically grown system structures 
and gives form to a set of basic assumptions very different from Greenspan’s: the 
assumption that a majority of us care not only about ourselves, but also about 
others with whom we interact and the groups we see ourselves as belonging to; 
that we care not only about what is in it for us in a given situation (although we 
care about that too), but also about what is the right and fair thing to do; and 
that most of us care about the social context we live in, and respond to our 
understanding of a social situation as social beings, and not merely as a 
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collection of individuals, relentlessly driven to maximize our own returns and 
to coordinate for our common good only when the incentives are set just right 
to lead us by the nose to that result.
During the week or so after Alan Greenspan’s testimony before Congress, 
we saw several editorials and comments about behavioral economics, or what 
some have derisively derided as merely “the economics of stupid people.” Behav-
ioral economics mainly studies how people fail to think rationally or to act upon 
what would theoretically be in their rational self-interest, supposedly because 
human beings pervasively lack self-discipline. Nonetheless, the discipline’s lit-
erature would tend to lead policymakers to consider themselves to be somehow 
immune to this human failing. Rather, legislators, for example, who are influ-
enced by behavioral economics, may flatter themselves that they alone can think 
clearly, and could set up systems that manipulate the population into doing 
what their leaders, from an Archimedean standpoint outside the psychological 
universe of cognitive biases, know is the right outcome for everyone.
However, the key to constructing future regulatory systems does not lie in 
perfecting the economic theory of how stupid people behave. Nor does it lie 
in attentive examination of how people make systematic errors in perception and 
judgment, or experience periodic failures of will. At least, we cannot rely on such 
studies alone, although they are important. The term in Greenspan’s statement 
that we need to focus on is self-interest. If self-interest were the universal moti-
vator, there would be no Wikipedia, no Linux or Apache, or any of the free 
software applications that run the Internet that we all depend on. If self-interest 
were the universal motivator, millions of volunteers would not have gone out 
canvassing for their candidates, nor would they be out in more normal times, 
serving meals to the homeless, or cleaning up their city parks. If self-interest 
led to success in business, then it would be Toyota asking for a government 
handout to help keep it afloat, not General Motors—because it was GM that 
perfected a production model based on self-interest, as shown in its conflict-
ridden negotiations with its unionized employees, in the aggressively competi-
tive bidding that the company has encouraged among its suppliers, and in 
its incentive compensation schemes for managers that should (according to 
agency theory, at least) have led to the best management decisions, but plainly 
did not. By contrast, it was Toyota that took the management-science world by 
surprise a quarter of a century ago by building a system based on trust, team-
work, and commitment to a set of shared values, instead of trying to perfectly 
align the self-interest, and only the self-interest, of workers, managers, suppliers, 
and distributors.
A growing body of work, in disciplines as wide ranging as experimental 
economics and psychology, human evolutionary biology and neuroscience, and 
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political science, organizational sociology, and management theory, has given us 
a basis for rejecting, not rationality, but selfishness, as the prime, universal 
motive of human action. What we find instead, in thousands of experiments 
and real-world studies, is what we all actually already know from our day-to-day 
lives: people are not universally selfish. Some are, to be sure. But many, a majority, 
are not. Many of us care about what happens to others, about doing what is right 
and fair and appropriate. We care about being trustworthy, and are affected by 
the social dynamics of the situations in which we find ourselves. The challenge 
we face is to take what we know from everyday life and from the fact of suc-
cessful cooperation all around us, combine this knowledge with what are learn-
ing at the cutting edge of the social and human sciences, and develop a new 
model of human action and motivation that will allow us to design cooperative 
human systems—like Wikipedia and Linux, like Toyota or the community 
policing movement. 
What are the tools that will make up this new approach to cooperative 
human-systems design? First, a tremendous amount of work is being done in the 
experimental study of human behavior, mostly in economics and psychology. 
In these studies, total strangers are brought into laboratory environments where 
they sit in front of computers and interact with other people, who they typi-
cally have never seen, do not see during the experiment, and will never see after 
the experiment is done. In many of these experiments, people interact with one 
another in ways that have real economic consequences for them, gaining or 
losing from a few dollars to (in one experiment) as much as three months’ salary. 
Because the setups are so spare, people are expected to conform as closely as 
anyone ever would to the predictions of the standard economic models in which 
Greenspan put such faith. One fact stands out from these studies, above all else: 
in no human society examined under controlled conditions have the majority of people 
consistently behaved like selfish rational actors. This has been proved true in hundreds 
of experiments, in more than two dozen countries. 
These experiments allow researchers to be very precise in their assumptions 
about human cooperation, in what they alter under experimental conditions 
about the nature of social relationships, and in determining what their results 
might imply. Such experiments gain precision from their reductiveness. Thus 
a long-term relationship between people might be represented in an experiment 
by having a pair of people, who are represented to each other only by onscreen 
icons, repeatedly play a game, ten or even forty times. Participants might be 
allowed, at most, to spend five minutes face-to-face during a break before going 
back to sit in front of their computer screens. 
Such artificial restrictions create, at most, thin representations of what human 
relations really are. For this reason, it has been important to enrich experimental 
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studies with real-world observation, which has been undertaken in many different 
disciplines. Political scientists might look at the Chicago policing and educa-
tional systems reforms of the 1990s and 2000s, or they might look at cooperative 
irrigation systems around the world. Organizational sociologists and manage-
ment scientists might study the corporate cultures and strategies of different 
companies to get rich case-based insights into what has worked in the real world. 
More recently, the Internet has provided us with a breathtaking range of coop-
erative activities available for study, many of which have generated rich archives, 
reveal clear paths of relations, and have created a virtual treasure trove of practices 
allowing us to study what makes cooperation succeed—or fail. Together, these 
sources of insight, combined with experimental and theoretical work in game 
theory and evolutionary dynamics that allows us to place our observations in 
context, are providing us with a powerful set of tools with which to build new 
systems for human cooperation, systems built on more than a simple mixture 
of Hobbes’s Leviathan—with the strict control hierarchies that his thinking 
implies—and Adam Smith’s invisible hand, with its relentlessly individual 
incentives-driven focus.
What are the elements of cooperative human-systems design? A useful way 
of organizing the conclusions of the thousands of articles in many disciplines 
looking at this question, like the wise men examining an elephant, is to group 
their findings into core “levers” that encourage cooperation. The literature strongly 
suggests that attention to each of these levers in the design of human systems will 
improve the likelihood that a cooperative dynamic will arise and self-stabilize.
Communication
Communication plays a critical role in fostering cooperation. In dozens of 
experiments, allowing participants to communicate with one another predictably 
and reliably has led to higher levels of cooperation (Sally 1995). In observa-
tional studies too, stabilizing and routinizing communication appears to be a 
crucial part of the new managerial processes.1 Focusing on cooperation in the 
study of human relations is anchored in the tradition of dialogic theories of the 
self: the idea that the self comes to know its interests, desires, and meaning 
through communication with others, rather than through solipsistic or egocentric 
engagement with the self alone. Communication is therefore both a dynamic in 
its own right, through which people come to see their own goals, preferences, 
and policies in conversation with others with whom they interact, and a mecha-
nism for achieving the cooperation dynamic in that good communication 
facilitates most of the other design levers. The effect of communication is a very 
robust finding in these literatures, and an obvious target for design interventions. 
It has a large effect in experimental work, and its routinization is one of the 
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core design principles of the organizational shift to collaborative models. In 
regulatory policy this means, most radically, that the term communications in 
a government agency should not be a euphemism for propaganda or marketing, 
but must instead stand for an genuine effort to engage stakeholders and, equally, 
all citizens, in a conversation about what needs to be done, how, and why.
Situational Framing
We cannot help but think of relations within frames of reference, and these 
frames in turn shape the remainder of any decision-making process. In sociology, 
Erving Goffman called this aspect of social interactions “frame analysis” (Goffman 
1974). In psychology, it is often called “situational construal” or simply “framing.” 
The baseline phenomenon is the same: we cannot avoid interpreting a situation 
in which we find ourselves in social and cultural terms. By virtue of the act of 
interpretation we already at least partly determine the nature of the interaction 
and our likely behavior in it. This aspect of the interaction is like a lens through 
which we observe reality; there is no unmediated mechanism giving access to 
any situation.
One particularly evocative experiment studied whether framing a task by tell-
ing the subjects they were playing “the community game” as opposed to telling 
them that they were playing “the Wall Street game” would make a difference 
(Liberman et al 2004). What the study found was that, with identical payoff 
structures, when subjects were told they were playing “the community game,” 
about 70 percent opened by cooperating and sustained cooperation for the 
duration of the experiment, while when subjects were told that they were play-
ing “the Wall Street game,” 33 percent opened cooperatively, and the rest 
“defected” (abandoned cooperative behavior temporarily) and continued to defect 
throughout the game. The frame in this case may have defined for the test sub-
jects “the right thing to do,” or it may have altered their predictions about what 
the other subjects would do, so as to make cooperation or defection appear to 
be a better strategy. In any case, the frame clearly had a real effect on behavior 
of otherwise similar populations encountering otherwise identical payoffs.
Expanded Utility: Empathy and Solidarity
One of the most important ways in which we deviate from pursuing pure self-
interest is by caring about others, and caring about the welfare of groups when 
membership in those groups constitutes at least part of our identity. These emo-
tions are, respectively, empathy and solidarity. One clear experimental finding is 
that a process of “humanization”—using mechanisms to assure that participants 
know and recognize the humanity of their counterparts—improves the number of 
cooperators and the degree of “generosity” they are willing to show others (Bohnet 
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and Frey 1999). Neurological studies support the proposition that agents’ brains 
respond differently to cooperation with humans than to “cooperation” (that is, 
playing strategies that in game theory count as cooperative) with computers 
(Rilling et al 2002, 2004). 
But generally treating other people as human beings worthy of our concern 
is only one of two signals we give that we consider another worthy of our coop-
eration or, at least, consider them highly likely to reciprocate. The other major 
signal we offer to trigger recognition in others that we consider them close to 
ourselves is the expression of group solidarity. There has been substantial research 
in social psychology that supports the finding that people increase the degree 
to which they cooperate with strangers whom they perceive to be part of even 
very weakly defined solidarity groups. Experimental subjects have long shown 
greater generosity to and cooperation with others who merely claimed to share 
their preferences, for example, for paintings by Klee over paintings by Kandinsky 
(Tajfel and Turner 1979; Yamagishi 1999). Several researchers continue to deter-
mine just how minimal the feeling of solidarity must be to trigger cooperation, 
and to what degree this feeling functions mainly as a heuristic for reciprocity 
as opposed to an essential constituent of identity with a group (Yamagishi and 
Mifune 2008). 
The role of symbolically marked groups in fostering cooperation is an 
important field of study in human evolutionary biology, especially in anthro-
pological research on the co-evolution of genes and culture (Boyd 1986, 2004). 
Moreover, the importance of “affiliation-based trust,” in organizational sociology 
(Zucker 1986) is consistent with the key role of homophily in the formation of 
social networks (McPherson et al 2001), and similar concepts play significant 
roles in organizational psychology (Haslam 2004). The basic intuition is that 
either (a) the more people have a sense of being part of a team, or a clan, the 
more they are willing to sacrifice their own good for the group; or (b) the 
clearer the “groupness” of the group is to all its members, the more likely that 
cooperative action by any member will be reciprocated. 
Both empathy and solidarity, and their encouragement through face-to-face 
meetings or detailed descriptions of the background of participants together 
constitute, then, another important mechanism for the design of human sys-
tems. The modern nation-state has a particularly powerful but also ambiguous 
relationship to group solidarity. At one level, it represents perhaps the most 
powerful instance of invented solidarity in history, and has proven capable of 
leading people to great sacrifice. On the other hand, it has also provided the 
excuse for some of humanity’s worst atrocities. As government in particular 
aims to harness cooperative dynamics, its agencies must be extremely careful in 
how they deploy appeals to solidarity.
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Normativity: Fairness, Rights, and Norm Compliance
In his now classic article “Rational Fools,” Amartya Sen emphasizes the impor-
tance of what he called “commitment” to human motivation, and the failure 
of economics, by and large, to account for the possibility that people act out 
of commitment (Sen 1977). Commitment should cover at least two distinct 
concerns: what is fair and what is right. And, indeed, a consistent finding of the 
experimental literature is that fairness is endogenous to the cooperative dynamic. 
Experimental mechanisms whose designs are based on a selfish-rational-actor 
model put fairness of outcomes aside, focusing on whether individuals are made 
better or worse off by a given interaction as a way of predicting their behavior. 
Likewise, fairness is usually separated in policy analysis from efficiency, and left 
to be addressed after the desired level of activity has been induced through 
egocentrically defined incentives. A consistent finding of the experimental 
literature is that this approach fails to consider that people care about the fair 
distribution of outcomes, the perceived fairness of the intentions of others, and 
the fairness of the overall process (Fehr and Schmidt 2003). There is mounting 
evidence in cognitive psychology and neuroscience supporting the contention 
that we have both emotional and subconscious cognitive capacity to do what we 
understand to be moral (Hauser 2006). Government policy that aims to harness 
cooperative social dynamics must include, as an integral part of the legislative 
process, public debate about why any new policies are right and fair, and law-
makers must understand that only regulations that those affected believe to be 
right and fair will be successful.
In addition to seeking to do what is right and fair, we also tend to do what 
we regard as normal; that is, we conform to social norms (Ellickson 1991; 
McAdams 1997). Much research into the phenomenon of social conformity 
has dealt with long-standing, usually tightly knit communities that rely upon 
many of the “design levers” I describe here. When thinking of design for such 
recently invented systems as a collaborative wiki, a musician’s Web site that seeks 
voluntary donations, or a process aimed at engaging citizens in supporting a 
public good (such as recycling or making their homes more energy efficient), 
social norms must play a different role. At a minimum, they refer not to long-
standing internalized norms, but to instances of more or less clearly specified 
behavioral expectations about what counts as “cooperative” in a given system. 
Once participants know what counts as cooperation and what counts as failure 
to cooperate, they can adjust their own actions, as well as judge the actions of 
others. These expectations function as Schelling coordination norms—arbitrary 
coordination points that allow people to coordinate their actions without exces-
sive negotiation, such as driving on the left or right, or meeting by the clock 
in Grand Central Station. Though they lack substantive content, these norms 
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provide focal points for coordinating behavior. Beyond that, they can be explicitly 
stated expectations about behavior, like those that anchored Wikipedia in 
its early days and made it unique among cooperative models in being purely 
norms based. There is evidence that norms that are self-consciously chosen by a 
group enjoy high adherence with minimal enforcement requirements (Ostrom 
et al 1994). Where these norms evoke background norms that are already cul-
turally ingrained, they may enjoy the status of those already internalized norms, 
or the norms may themselves be the object of enforcement through another 
design lever, punishment.
Trust and Authenticity 
Trust is the subject of its own immense literature, and the term has been used 
in many different ways. Often, it has been used to characterize the success of 
a system that removes the possibility of defection or human error. When used 
thus, trust is not a design lever at all, but rather a description of the outcome of 
a system, which signifies confidence it its performance. Trust as a design lever 
should be viewed as a belief that people in a given relationship have about how 
others in the system will behave when those others may choose to act in ways 
harmful or helpful to those who trust them (in the absence of genuine choice, 
the concept of trust has no meaning). It is precisely because trust here refers to 
an empirical belief people have about the state of the social system within which 
they act that we treat it as distinct from normativity. Trust as I use the term 
here is not the same as trustworthiness. Rather, a system of trust is a system in 
which people can reasonably hold the belief that some substantial number of 
others will not take advantage of them whenever they can. A system designed 
to foster trust in this sense will usually be improved by breaking down coopera-
tive actions into observable steps, so that participants can reduce their vulnera-
bility to one another while observing the proclivities of others to cooperate or 
defect. A requirement for the creation of trust is that the person constructing the 
cooperative system act authentically and be seen as acting authentically. Empty 
promises of community and cooperation may trick others for a short time, but 
not over the long term. Thus, for example, a government agency that aims to 
harness cooperation among the citizens with whom it interacts will need to make 
its commitments to a cooperative dynamic credible, behave in ways that exhibit 
trustworthiness, and express by its actions trust in citizens.
Transparency and Reputation
Another important design element, the transparency of a system, bears power-
fully on the issues of both trust and punishment. Critically, many of the other 
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design features I have discussed depend on participants’ knowing who has done 
what, to and with whom, to what effect, by which mechanism. Recognition of 
this dependence lies behind the argument that biologists Nowak and Sigmund 
make about the evolutionary impact of moral accounting (though they do not 
call it that): such accounting, they suggest, was necessary to sustain indirect reci-
procity among our forbears, which in turn may have been the driving force 
behind the evolution of human intelligence (Nowak and Sigmund 2005). 
Whether or not they are correct about human evolution, studies in experimental 
economics typically show that reputation-rich games lead to cooperation more 
quickly and robustly than anonymous games (Fehr and Gächter 2000). Similarly, 
reputation systems play a significant role in social-software platforms, ranging 
from commercial systems such as eBay and Amazon (Resnick and Zeckhauser 
2002) to the wide range of commons-based peer-production projects that rely 
upon the Internet’s resources for observing online behavior, building enduring 
reputations, and influencing opinion.2 For a government agency, this implies 
that its internal deliberations and its interactions with interested parties must 
all be made much more transparent than they typically have been.
Autonomy/Efficacy
There is a significant psychological literature suggesting that people need a 
personal sense of competence or efficacy in their actions, and pursue activities 
that satisfy that need (Ryan and Deci 2000). For example, among Toyota’s most 
important reforms of the company’s production system was decreasing the num-
ber of process engineers and according greater autonomy to teams of employees 
on the production line (Adler et al 1999). The need for autonomy and personal 
efficacy moreover plays an important role in limiting the efficacy of reward and 
punishment as complementary, as opposed to competing, means for assuring 
cooperation. People must not only be assured of their personal autonomy, but 
the value of their contributions must be recognize before their peers; otherwise, 
people’s incentive to contribute as much as they can is reduced.
Fostering a successful culture of personal autonomy as Toyota has done in 
the context of government regulation intended to standardize behavior across 
different contexts is far from trivial. It would require, particularly at the federal 
level, determining regulatory contexts in which regulators may set relatively broad 
targets for performance and optimal behavior, and certain excluded categories 
of intervention, while allowing groups of citizens, (initially municipalities, but 
in the longer run civil-society organizations and organizations that rely on both 
public and private funding), to exhibit their competence and to receive author-
ity and funding to achieve a given government goal in a particular context.
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Calculation: Punishment, Reward, Crowding Out, and Cost
The design levers discussed above all operate at the level of intrinsic motivations. 
That is, they all work to induce participants to want to cooperate for reasons 
that are internal to their own psychological and social needs and desires, rather 
than in response to external rewards or constraints. However, because both the 
observational and experimental literature suggest that people vary immensely 
in their motivations, and that many will inevitably be selfish, stable cooperation 
systems require some element of external compulsion to keep those who are 
not driven to cooperate by intrinsic motivations in line. Otherwise cooperation 
tends to unravel, since the presence of selfish actors may undermine efficacy, 
fairness, solidarity, or any of the other mechanisms that sustain cooperation 
even in the presence of defectors.
Mechanisms for disciplining and punishing defectors are therefore impor-
tant in the design of cooperation platforms. The experimental literature finds 
that (a) with the right design, reciprocators will usually be willing to incur the 
cost of punishing defectors in order to keep them in line, without intervention 
from an external body, such as the state or management, but (b) that punish-
ment can backfire if it is not properly designed (Bowles and Gintis 2002; Fehr 
and Gächter 2002); Fehr and Rockenbach 2002; Falk 2005). It is important 
to understand that introducing the idea of punishment does not collapse our 
analysis back to selfish rationality. Punishment is neither necessary to explain 
cooperation (we see cooperation without it, most importantly in the “second-
order public-goods problem” created by the need to impose costly punishment 
on defectors) nor sufficient (we see instances in which punishment reduces 
cooperation, probably through “crowding out”). Indeed, punishment can impose 
such great costs on groups that it ceases to be worthwhile (Dreber et al 2008). 
Moreover, the degree to which its effects are beneficial or detrimental varies 
among cultures (Hermann et al 2008). Yet punishment is one design lever 
available to systems designers for improving compliance by selfish actors 
with the cooperative behavior of the other agents in the system. While punish-
ment has been studied much more extensively, reward systems have a similar 
structure—participants pay a cost to keep others, who are more self-interested, 
in line with the common good. In an analytical sense, rewards are merely negative 
punishments, but rewards have the added benefit of not triggering spirals of 
negative retaliation.
Considering the ambiguous effects of punishment brings to the fore one more 
design constraint that has particular importance when government is involved: 
the phenomenon of crowding out. Crowding out can occur within or among 
systems. Intrasystem crowding out refers to situations in which the use of one 
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design lever would reduce the efficacy of another. For example, the introduction 
of punishment may, under certain circumstances, crowd out trust, and thereby 
undermine, rather than improve, cooperation (Yamagishi 1986). From the psy-
chological literature, we know that rewards too can trigger the crowding-out 
effect, but not as powerfully, and that they may be susceptible to framing that 
will induce people to treat them as noncontrolling (Ryan and Deci 2000). 
Intersystem crowding out may occur when the designer tries to mix and match 
elements from cooperative systems with elements from other systems, such as 
market mechanisms. There is a large literature on crowding out caused by the 
introduction of money into otherwise cooperation-based interactions (Frey and 
Jege 2008; Bowles and Gintis 2001). For regulatory systems, crowding out 
presents a particularly vexing problem, because the body that aims to introduce 
and foster cooperation is of necessity a body that possesses enormous power, 
and is typically seen as able to bring coercive power to bear in a relationship. 
State-based cooperation systems always necessarily involve the risk of some 
intersystem crowding out; if the state is involved, then citizens may feel that 
they do not need to contribute, because the state “will take care of it all.” On the 
other hand, the state can structure its role in the cooperative systems it builds 
as a potentially neutral third-party referee that may moderate the negative 
effects of punishment where it is needed. This does indeed seem to be precisely 
the role that impartial justice is supposed to introduce into societies that other-
wise might remain plagued by vendetta-like forms of private mutual monitoring, 
discipline, and punishment.
In addition to punishment and reward, which operate primarily on individuals 
who otherwise might not cooperate because of their intrinsic drives, it is important 
to remember that the claims of prosocial motivations do not exclude consider-
ations of personal costs and benefits. The essential conclusion of the literature 
on cooperation is not that large numbers of us are altruists regardless of cost. 
Rather, it is that large numbers of us have prosocial motivations—regard for 
others because of our empathy and solidarity, or regard for the normative impli-
cations of what we do, in addition to our other cost-benefit considerations. It is 
not surprising, therefore, that the cost of cooperation affects its levels and the 
number of people who cooperate. In experiments, subjects will cooperate more 
when the cost of doing so is lower, such as when the opportunity cost of coop-
erating in a prisoner’s dilemma is lower because of the payoff structure (Camerer 
and Fehr 2004). In real life we see peer production online improved when a 
task has been chunked into sufficiently small modules to make the cost of indi-
vidual contribution correspondingly small (Benkler 2002).
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Social Dynamics
An increasing amount of work being is done today on social networks’ effects 
on behavior. It turns out that, for example, our own obesity is affected by whether 
our friends and relatives have recently become obese (Christakis and Fowler 
2007). While the mechanism is not entirely clear, it appears that there is at 
least some role played by benchmarking and imitation: that is, we judge our 
own behavior and outcomes by comparing ourselves to others in our social 
neighborhood (Hanaki et al 2007). Allowing participants to observe each other 
(transparency) and to form and break attachments selectively with people who 
are more or less cooperative, so as to increase the number of interactions they have 
with cooperators as opposed to defectors, is therefore also a valuable feature in 
human systems design: in this way, groups of cooperators may stabilize and 
provide mutual support.
One important aspect of social dynamics is leadership. An emphasis on 
leadership does not emerge from experimental research, which does not exam-
ine the phenomenon, but from organizational sociology, where it is a consistent 
feature (Maccoby and Heckscher 2007). Leadership is emphasized in the study 
of open-source software (Weber 2005), and repeatedly crops up in field studies 
of online cooperation as well. It is important to recognize, however, that leader-
ship does not necessarily imply hierarchy. Rather, what we see in observational 
research is that people contribute to a given system at many levels. Thus systems 
need to be designed to accommodate and recognize people’s varying patterns 
of contribution, especially by offering them a voice in the collective governance 
of the enterprise, or through symbolic means of expressing honor and respect. 
Moreover, for at least some people, it is precisely the desire to seek positions of 
power, of leadership, that drives generous, prosocial behavior. The role of gift 
giving as a modality of asserting dominance, so-called agonistic giving, is widely 
recognized in the anthropology of the gift,3 and in fundraising situations in 
which public exhibition of gifts is a form of asserting status; we also see it in 
some, but by no means all, online cooperation sites. 
The following, then, is a summary of the discussion above as a list of design 
levers, or design considerations: 
•	Communication
•	Situational	framing
•	Expanding	the	utility	function:	
 – Empathy
 – Solidarity
76 Benkler
•	Normativity
 – Fairness
 – Moral commitment
 – Norm compliance or conformism
•	Trust
 – Trust and authenticity
 – Transparency and reputation
•	Autonomy/efficacy
•	Calculation
 – Punishment and reward
 – Crowding out
 – Cost
•	Social	dynamics
 – Social network effects
 – Leadership and asymmetry
No list of fifteen potential design levers can hope to provide the deterministic 
outcomes implied by simpler models of human motivation and system inter-
vention. For regulators who seek the comfort of a If you do X, you will increase 
rewards through action I, and therefore increase the likelihood of outcome O type of 
analysis, the work on cooperation will appear too early in its development to 
provide guidance. However, regulators who understand that human motivation 
and social, psychological, and cultural interactions are extremely complex phe-
nomena, which cannot be reduced to a simple If you do X then Y will follow 
without enormous loss of information, may be more patient as we try to work 
out how the design levers nonetheless provide substantial advantages over a mere 
recognition of the complexity of human action.
Below I will suggest at least an initial set of principles of regulation that 
would take advantage of the insights of the literature on cooperation, even if we 
cannot yet provide a deterministic analysis of the desired structure of cooperation-
eliciting regulations.
Principles
The design levers provide a framework for thinking about how most effectively 
to structure cooperative models of solving problems that are the subject of reg-
ulation or characterize the regulatory process. To conclude this chapter, I offer 
five principles of regulation through which regulators may implement the lessons 
of cooperative dynamics.
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1. Develop a capacity for relying on social mechanisms equivalent to the focus 
in the past quarter century on market mechanisms
One of the dogmas in regulation from the past quarter century has been that 
government agencies should seek market-based mechanisms to achieve goals 
previously fulfilled by government. The cooperation literature argues instead for 
a new focus on cooperative solutions to the problem of providing public goods. 
This does not mean that cooperative mechanisms will always be best; it does sug-
gest that they are available and sustainable, and that they have different benefits 
and potential pitfalls from those of either market mechanisms or government-
provided services, and should be considered in any given context for their 
feasibility and relative desirability.
Take for example the peer-to-patent system. Developed by Beth Noveck 
in collaboration with IBM and the Patents and Trademark Office (PTO), this 
program attempts to resolve the relative lack of expertise in the patent office in 
software by opening up software patent applications to a process of peer review. 
The model relies upon the culture of substantial contribution to the public good 
that has grown up among software developers, owing to the rise of free and 
open-source software. Noveck’s system invites patent applicants to submit their 
applications to an expedited review process through which the members of the 
open community of software developers can look at the application, research 
potential reasons to preclude patentability, and submit their observations to the 
patent examiner appointed by the PTO. The point here is not to displace the 
PTO, but to harness the knowledge of the community and to take advantage of 
the general willingness to contribute among developers, who are motivated to 
some degree, to be sure, by competitiveness, but who also are eager to make a 
difference in the field they care about. Contributors are allowed to submit 
potential “prior art”—that is, earlier publications or patents that would make 
the current claim insufficiently novel, or too obvious, to be granted a patent. 
Others may then annotate and comment on whether the proposed prior art in 
fact provides good grounds for objecting to the patent, and vote on which are 
the most likely instances of prior art to effectively limit or entirely invalidate 
the patent application. The examiner then reviews the top proposed pieces 
of prior art. My point is not to assert that this system is the best example of 
harnessing all the design levers to optimize levels of cooperation. Rather, the 
PTO site provides an example of isolating a particularly sticky regulatory prob-
lem and restructuring it in a way that takes advantage of volunteers from the 
most relevantly affected community to work, together with the government, on 
implementing a solution.
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The more general point is that government agencies must begin to consider 
engaging citizens in cooperative systems as one potential way to improve aspects 
of the regulatory process, and also to improve the delivery of services. Today, 
government lags behind in its capacity to harness social volunteerism to achieve 
public goods. Compared to the free and open-source software community, which 
is harnessing volunteer efforts to produce some of the world’s most important 
software, or to civil-society organizations, such as the Sunlight Foundation, 
which is harnessing volunteer efforts to sift through government accountability–
related data to analyze it for evidence of corruption of public officials, govern-
ment processes have not focused on using their professional staff and public 
funding to support volunteer efforts that could improve their processes. Agencies 
need to develop the capabilities, and to offer funding models, that will facilitate 
the provision of public goods—from skills training in schools and adult educa-
tional facilities to the analysis of government corruption—by partnering with 
market and nonmarket organizations that specialize in harnessing and structuring 
volunteer efforts, both online and offline.
2. Include in the evaluation of proposed market or command mechanisms 
expected impact on social provisioning that exists, or that could be constructed 
as an alternative
It is an unusual characteristic of American society, compared to other major 
industrial social democracies, that we continue to rely to a much extent greater 
than they do on volunteer organizations, both religious and secular, to provide 
social services. In the past, when the market and the state were considered the only 
possible providers of public goods, our reliance on volunteerism was criticized 
by some as constituting a partial abdication by the modern social-democratic 
state of its responsibilities. The contemporary emergence of social production 
in the networked economy, and the increasing understanding of the possible 
benefits of sustained social action to provision public goods, places the United 
States, perhaps paradoxically, at a surprising advantage in making the transition 
to a new system that would permit greater leeway for social institutions to play 
a substantial role in serving governmental agencies’ purposes. 
There is a substantial literature suggesting that government services can 
sometimes crowd out private volunteerism. The mechanism is not as yet entirely 
clear: it may be that when a government agency takes over a particular social 
service, people cease to see providing it as a shared social responsibility—it 
becomes something we “get from the government”; it may be that there is a loss 
of the “social-capital value” of contributing, once the contribution is no longer 
strictly necessary, and volunteering ceases to enhance people’s social status; or it 
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may be that when a government agency takes over some social service, volun-
teers cease to feel motivated, independent, and needed. Whatever the reasons, 
government action can sometimes undermine social provisioning. Government 
actions aimed at providing public goods should therefore take into consider-
ation the existing system of providing services, and assess: (a) the presence or 
absence of a well-functioning social provisioning system for the desired good; 
(b) the likely effect of the proposed action on that social provisioning; and (c) 
potential adjustments to the proposed policy that would mitigate the negative 
effects, if any, on social provisioning. Preferably, government should partner with 
and support existing social providers. 
This principle is, of course, not a hard constraint. There may be other con-
siderations, such as the value placed on the availability of public, nonsectarian 
sources of provisioning a public good where the only source is sectarian—say, 
special education or soup kitchens. But the broad principle is clear. Just as 
in the past proposed government regulations were analyzed to anticipate their 
interactions with existing and potential market mechanisms, and redesigned 
to minimize any negative regulatory impact and to take advantage of market 
mechanisms, so too now, with the newly emerging recognition of the role of 
social action, government must also consider its effects on the social provisioning 
of desired public goods, and redesign its programs accordingly. 
3. Use network technologies to reconstruct government decision processes  
to enable effective participation by citizens and affected populations on  
a continuous basis, including implementation
People tend to follow regulations that they choose themselves more willingly 
and more observantly than rules set down by a remote other. Improving the 
actual and perceived level of participation in government regulatory processes 
will encourage citizens to view new regulations as legitimate, and should also 
make citizens more likely to view regulations as intrinsically binding. That is, 
when people participate in making the rules, they are more likely to think that 
obeying them is the right thing to do, and not something they do merely to 
avoid censure. A substantial literature already exists on opening up regulatory 
processes to citizen participation, including sensitive studies of stakeholder 
participation, on which regulators can now draw. Efforts to reach beyond stake-
holders to the citizenry at large have, in the past, been largely treated under the 
rubric of “eGovernment” and have relied on relatively passive Web 1.0 tech-
nologies that allow people with Internet access to read and add comments to 
Web pages. Such an approach lacks structure, and offers little potential for 
aggregation of comments and debate among citizens in ways that could render 
their contributions more salient and politically meaningful.
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The next generation of regulators needs to learn from the work on partici-
patory government generally, and adopt processes that will offer the broadest 
range of citizens a much greater degree of freedom to participate effectively, 
by submitting comments and commenting on the comments of others, and by 
collecting and analyzing citizens’ preferences to determine their preferences. 
The Environmental Protection Agency has begun to take steps in this direction; 
Change.gov began, during the Obama transition, to experiment with ways of 
increasing citizen’s direct participation, such as its house-party discussions of 
healthcare reform. Beyond these examples, this approach needs to be understood 
as a new principle of regulation: government must provide the means, both 
online and offline, for effective, widespread participation by citizens in the reg-
ulatory process, from its inception to its conclusion and subsequent oversight.
4. Implement transparency through highly accessible visual interfaces,  
with capabilities for social observation and commentary on official behavior
Transparency, and the widespread perception that processes are transparent, 
is essential to cooperation. In earlier times, transparency depended largely on 
professional auditors and observers—internal government auditors, such as 
comptrollers, or external independent actors, such as an independent press. 
Freedom of Information legislation supported this transparency by requiring 
government agencies to provide information upon request to individuals and 
nongovernmental organizations. While these elements of transparency are crit-
ical, and need to be preserved, current regulatory systems must embrace more 
radical transparency and more open data communications processes to harness 
peer production and online social action to the task of assuring that govern-
ment always operates under the public gaze, that regulatory processes are not 
hidden from view, and that all the materials involved are available for everyone 
to examine and analyze. The data that government agencies collect, and records 
of what they do and how they spend their allocated funds, must be collected 
and kept up to date; government databases need to be made available for public 
search and comment; and data needs to be made available in standard formats 
that will allow civil-society organizations and online unstructured collaborative 
groups to develop their own open interfaces to it. Only in this way can we 
harness innovation throughout the network to design ever better platforms for 
monitoring regulators and holding them accountable. 
5. Assess fairness as an integral part of effectiveness
A core finding of the study of cooperation is that people care deeply about fair-
ness, and that their perceptions of the fairness of their interactions have a direct, 
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significant impact on their motivation to participate productively. Fairness should 
not be mere window dressing for regulations that have efficiency as their main 
goal. Rather, fairness is essential to stimulate effective, productive engagement 
by the citizenry in any regulatory process. Fairness is not an ideal, universal state; 
it is a culturally embedded idea that people in a given society, at a given time, 
hold about the rewards for their common actions, as well as the intentions and 
processes involved in determining the distribution of those rewards. Government 
agencies should develop explicit metrics to assess the impact of their policies. 
Initially, the focus should be on the distribution of wealth and welfare. The 
distribution of these social goods should be fully described and measured 
against a culturally meaningful scale of fair distribution—individually equal (one 
common measure of fairness in a market-integrated society), progressively redis-
tributive, proportionate to contributions, or based on an articulated theory of 
desert. These outcomes should be included in the formal analysis of an agency’s 
proposed regulations, and published as part of the regulatory process. Alongside 
current practices of producing cost-benefit analyses and environmental impact 
statements, agencies should develop and publicize outcomes-fairness analyses 
of proposed regulations. 
Conclusion
The 1970s, ’80s and ’90s saw the exquisite refinement of rational-actor theory 
and used it to justify an ever increasing emphasis on market-based models of 
regulation and mechanism design. In regulatory practice, this approach became 
dominant in the Reagan and Thatcher period, and extended its reach with the 
increasing scope of a European Commission empowered to focus on building an 
integrated market in what was then called the European Economic Community. 
The commission therefore emphasized competition and efficiency, and supported 
institutions of the global trade and monetary system that relied on market-
based mechanisms as a matter or principle. Throughout this period a counter-
vailing trend among some scholars advocated more participatory structures, but 
the global financial crisis of 2008 has brought into the sharpest relief the severe 
limitations of market-based regulatory approaches. Or at least, the crisis has 
undermined the nearly absolute dominance that market fundamentalism has had 
in determining the regulation—or absence of regulation—in financial services.
At the same time, an increasing body of work in the social sciences and 
particularly in the management and sociology of organizations, as well as on 
the study of online social practices, has provided substantial new evidence that 
refines our understanding of the conditions that can sustain forms of social 
cooperation that are not based on either market mechanisms or command and 
control. While it is too early to embrace cooperation and collaborative practices 
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as the solution to all our regulatory problems, we certainly have enough infor-
mation and insight to begin to implement regulatory practices that will likely 
enhance cooperation and the social provision of public goods. 
The principles proposed in this essay are intended to orient regulators 
toward thinking about whether and how they can harness social cooperation to 
achieve some of the goals that, in the past, they have sought through command 
and control or through market mechanisms; how their expected actions will 
affect existing social cooperation, and how core drivers of cooperation in society 
can be harnessed by focusing on improved participation in, and transparency 
and fairness of, regulatory processes and outcomes.
Notes
1 See, e.g., Anabel Quan-Haase and Barry Wellman, “Hyperconnected Net Work: Com-
puter Mediated Community in a High-Tech Organization,” in Heckscher and Adler 
2007 (describing communications flows in collaborative segments of a firm). 
2 See, e.g., “Wikipedia:Barnstars” in Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia: 
Barnstars; or the team-competition contributions in Yochai Benkler, “‘Sharing Nicely’: 
On Shareable Goods and the Emergence of Sharing as a Modality of Economic 
Production,” The Yale Law Journal 114 (2004): 273. 
3 See, e.g., Maurice Godelier, The Enigma of the Gift (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1999).
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chapter 4
Government as Risk Manager1 
Tom Baker and David Moss
On Friday, July 11, 2008, after a run on IndyMac Bancorp in which people 
lined up outside the bank’s branches and withdrew $100 million per day, the 
U.S. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation seized IndyMac. The next Monday, 
July 14, IndyMac reopened its branches for business under FDIC supervision. 
The lines were gone. IndyMac employees largely remained in place. Depositors 
had immediate access to their funds up to the federally insured amount—$100,000 
per person in ordinary accounts and $250,000 per person in retirement accounts—
and the FDIC began the slow process of winding up the bank. The deposit 
insurance system had worked to protect depositors and maintain confidence in 
the banking system, preventing the type of mass banking panic that crippled 
the American financial system in the early 1930s.
While there are many parallels between the current financial crisis and the 
onset of the Great Depression, deposit insurance has made this fundamental 
difference. There are other differences as well. We have unemployment insurance, 
along with Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, and state insurance guaranty 
funds. People who lose their jobs will receive income replacement benefits for 
at least some period, and the infrastructure is in place to extend those benefits 
if necessary. The elderly and the disabled will have a basic income, good health 
insurance, and basic long-term-care insurance, regardless of what happens to 
their private retirement plans or other investments. In addition, the state insur-
ance guaranty funds provide protection for insurance products similar to that 
provided by the FDIC for bank deposits. None of these programs existed in 
1930. They will not eliminate the dislocation from the bursting of the housing 
bubble, the credit freeze, the contraction of consumer demand, or the resulting 
lost jobs. But they will make a difference.
In this chapter we fit these government insurance success stories into a larger 
framework of government risk management. Although not always recognized, 
risk management represents one of the most powerful tools that government 
has—and one with a long and successful history in the United States. The gov-
ernment has a vital role in managing risk because private markets for risk do 
not always work optimally on their own. Indeed, this is why programs such 
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as Social Security, Medicare, and federal deposit insurance are among the most 
successful—and most popular—policies ever adopted in this country.
In the pages that follow, we explain the four basic ways to manage risk: 
prevention, risk shifting, risk spreading, and loss control. We set out five princi-
ples of effective government risk management gleaned from extensive historical 
study: (1) link responsibility and control, (2) manage moral hazard, (3) pool 
risk in sound institutions, (4) adopt market conforming approaches to the 
extent possible, and (5) structure markets to promote safe products. Finally, we 
describe some promising new government risk management ideas that incor-
porate these principles.
Risk Management 101
There are four basic ways to manage risk: prevention, risk shifting, risk spreading, 
and loss control. Prevention (or risk reduction) attempts to reduce the frequency 
and severity of bad things that can happen. Much health and safety regulation 
falls into this category. Risk shifting transfers the responsibility for bad out-
comes, often from the person who suffers the initial loss to the person or entity 
that caused it (or, in some cases, the person or entity best able to absorb and 
manage the risk). Liability rules fall into this category. Risk spreading distributes 
the costs of particular bad outcomes across a large pool of people. Insurance is 
the standard loss-spreading institution, and many government programs are 
forms of insurance. Loss control manages or mitigates the consequences after the 
bad outcome has occurred. Much of the work of fire departments and emer-
gency management agencies, and some of the work of public health and welfare 
agencies, falls into this category. The sections that follow describe each of these 
four ways to manage risk, setting the backdrop for our explication of the core 
principles for government risk management.
Prevention
Prevention, or risk reduction, is a crucial form of risk management. Much gov-
ernment regulation—from speed limits to workplace safety rules—aims directly 
at loss prevention, and numerous risk reduction strategies are detailed through-
out this book. Our main goal in this chapter is to highlight other public policy 
approaches to risk management and the impact that these other approaches 
can have on private incentives to reduce risk. For this reason we leave most of 
the details of prevention to the field specialists in such areas as public health, 
environmental protection, food and drugs, and occupational safety. Here we 
focus on ways that risk shifting and risk spreading can promote, or at the very 
least not undercut, prevention, and on the need to pay attention to loss control.
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Risk Shifting
Risk shifting assigns responsibility for a potential future loss to someone other 
than the person on whom it would initially fall. Risks can be shifted by law, as 
illustrated by state workers compensation laws, which make employers respon-
sible for many of the financial consequences of occupational injuries. Risks also 
can be shifted by contract. For example, contracts among owners, builders, and 
architects specify who will be responsible for which kinds of losses that may 
occur in the course of designing and building a structure. These contracts operate 
within a set of background liability rules that leave some losses with the person 
who directly suffers them and that shift other losses to the person who caused 
them or who for some other reason is legally responsible. Making these back-
ground liability rules is one of the most important risk management activities 
of government.
Much government risk shifting occurs through liability creating rules (such 
as medical malpractice law), but some very important risk shifting also occurs 
through liability limiting rules (such as limited liability or bankruptcy law). 
For example, bankruptcy limits people’s liability for repaying debts in certain 
circumstances, providing them with the opportunity to get a fresh start, either 
as a business or individual. Similarly, there is a federal law that limits consumers’ 
responsibility for unauthorized charges on their credit card accounts. This law 
facilitated the growth of the credit card market by reducing consumers’ fear of 
credit card fraud. Likewise, corporate law limits the liability of shareholders to 
the value of their shares, allowing people to invest in businesses without exposing 
their entire personal net worth. All three of these liability-limiting laws shift 
risk from borrowers to creditors.
Shifting risk can change people’s incentives to prevent loss. Being responsible 
for a bad outcome increases the incentive to prevent it. Conversely, the ability 
to shift the risk of that bad outcome to someone else reduces the incentive 
to prevent it. These incentive effects are an obvious feature of liability-creating 
rules. But they are an equally important feature of liability-limiting rules. 
Limiting consumer liability for credit card fraud shifts risk onto credit card 
companies and, as a result, creates an incentive for those companies to reduce 
fraud. Credit card companies actively look for unusual transactions using 
sophisticated computer programs, and they call cardholders for confirmation 
when a question arises. The limitation on liability provided by bankruptcy 
law creates an incentive for lenders to monitor borrowers and prevent them 
from taking on too much debt. And limited liability for shareholders creates an 
incentive for lenders to examine carefully the operations of corporate borrowers. 
At the same time, however, those individuals whose liability is limited face 
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a reduced incentive to avoid fraud or excessive risk taking—a problem often 
referred to as “moral hazard.”
Risk shifting can be a flexible, low-cost, and effective government risk man-
agement tool, especially in a global economy in which many risks lie beyond 
the direct reach of the U.S. government. But it is essential that policymakers 
manage the incentive effects of risk shifting rules in an effective manner. For 
this reason, several of our risk management principles provide guidance on 
harnessing these incentives.
Risk Spreading
Risk spreading is a special type of risk shifting, so everything that we have to 
say about the incentive effects of risk shifting applies to risk spreading as well. 
Risk spreading differs from other kinds of risk shifting, however, in that the 
risk of loss shifts to an organization that in turn distributes it broadly, typically 
by collecting premiums from a large number of people to cover the financial 
costs of the losses that occur. Insurance is the paradigmatic risk-spreading insti-
tution and the primary focus of our analysis here.
There are four main kinds of government insurance: social insurance, financial 
soundness insurance, catastrophe insurance, and a residual category that we call 
“market enhancement insurance.”
Social insurance protects a population against fundamental risks of life, as 
a society defines them. Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, unemployment 
insurance, workers compensation, and the mandatory minimum amount of auto-
mobile insurance are all examples of social insurance in the U.S. Among these, 
workers compensation and automobile insurance are notable in being provided 
by private insurance companies in most instances. Health insurance more 
generally is in the process of being recognized as a form of social insurance in 
the U.S., and it too is provided largely by private companies.
Financial soundness insurance protects people from the insolvency of impor-
tant financial institutions such as banks, pension plans, and insurance com-
panies. Typically provided by the government, financial soundness insurance 
offers customers an additional level of security while generally leaving the 
provision of the services themselves to the private market. Financial soundness 
insurance can be explicit, meaning that the government protection is created 
by law and specified in advance, or implicit, meaning that people expect that 
the government will provide the protection even though that protection is not 
specified by law in advance. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the 
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, and the various state insurance guaranty 
associations provide explicit financial soundness insurance.
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Organizations widely believed to be protected by implicit federal govern-
ment financial soundness insurance include private financial institutions that 
are “too big to fail” because of the systemic financial risk that could result from 
their failure. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the federally chartered corporations 
active in the secondary mortgage market, were widely believed to be protected 
by implicit financial soundness insurance, a belief that was confirmed when the 
federal government took them over in 2008. Like many other policy analysts, 
we strongly prefer explicit insurance to implicit insurance, because implicit 
insurance generally violates one or more of our risk management principles.
Government catastrophe insurance protects people from some of the conse-
quences of catastrophic events that private insurance companies are unable 
or unwilling to insure. Flood, terrorism, and nuclear accident insurance are the 
leading examples of federally provided catastrophe insurance in the U.S. Some 
states also support earthquake and windstorm insurance programs. Like financial 
soundness insurance, catastrophe insurance can also be explicit or implicit. The 
National Flood Insurance Program is an example of explicit insurance. After-
the-fact disaster relief is an example of implicit insurance.
Market enhancement insurance is our name for the final category of government 
insurance. As the name suggests, this category includes a variety of insurance 
programs that facilitate the operation of a market. These programs can support 
private insurance markets, as illustrated by the residual market mechanisms that 
exist in many states to facilitate the provision of autoworkers compensation, 
and property insurance to high-risk individuals or businesses. These programs 
can also foster other markets, as illustrated by the export-import insurance that 
the federal government provides to stimulate international trade.
Loss Control
Bad things do happen, sometimes in spite of all that we do to prevent them, 
at other times precisely because we have not done enough. In either case, being 
prepared to deal with a loss after it happens can be as important to limiting 
overall risk—and, in some cases, to maintaining the social fabric—as working 
to prevent the loss itself. The ongoing effort to recover from Hurricane Katrina 
is a case in point. Arguably more could have been done to prevent the loss (for 
example through better maintenance of the levee system), but it was inevitable 
that a hurricane would eventually hit New Orleans and, therefore, that after-
the-fact loss-control efforts would be needed someday. Although a substantial 
amount had been done to get ready, the loss-control effort stumbled, and the 
social costs multiplied because the people charged with putting the plans into 
effect were not sufficiently prepared.2
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As the Hurricane Katrina case illustrates, loss control is a special kind of 
prevention directed at managing bad outcomes that do occur. People in the 
insurance industry discuss losses in terms of frequency and severity and recognize 
that prevention efforts can be directed at reducing both. Loss control is directed 
at severity. We distinguish, on the one hand, between severity-reduction efforts 
such as sprinkler systems, storm shutters, and other efforts to protect vulnerable 
property and, on the other, efforts to reduce severity by actively managing the 
overall impact of an adverse event after it occurs, such as emergency response. 
For us, protection efforts falls into the broader prevention category, while actively 
managing a loss falls into the narrower loss-control category. In any event, 
drawing a precise conceptual boundary is much less important than under-
standing the importance of loss control.
Five Principles of Effective Government Risk Management
We have distilled the relevant research on the topic into five core principles of 
effective government risk management. The first two principles—link responsi-
bility with control and manage moral hazard—apply to every government risk man-
agement program. The third principle—pool risk in sound organizations—applies 
to risk-spreading programs. The final two principles—prefer market-conforming 
approaches and structure markets to promote safe products—reflect a preference for 
market-based solutions and a prescription for helping them succeed.
We do not claim that these five principles are the beginning and end of 
government risk management. We do claim, however, that policymakers who 
ignore these principles—especially the first three—will be disappointed with 
the results and may even do more harm than good. In what follows, we explain 
the principles and provide some concrete examples of government risk manage-
ment programs that successfully apply them.
1. Link Responsibility with Control
We present this principle first to emphasize its importance. Sound risk man-
agement requires placing responsibility on people in a position to do something 
about the risk. Concerned about product safety? Then place responsibility for 
product injuries on the people who make the products. Concerned about pol-
lution? Then place responsibility for pollution on the polluters. Concerned about 
borrowers overextending their credit card debt? Then place responsibility on 
those pushing the credit as well as the borrowers who are “consuming” it.
In many cases, ideas have evolved over time about who is best positioned to 
control a particular risk. Nineteenth-century accident law, for example, placed 
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most of the responsibility for workplace accidents on workers, not employers, 
on the grounds that the workers knew about the potential risks of their work 
and often were the most immediate cause of workplace accidents. Modern work-
ers compensation, by contrast, recognizes that employers have substantial control 
over the workplace, especially workplace design, and therefore makes employers 
partly responsible for workplace accidents. Making employers responsible does 
not eliminate worker responsibility; it simply shifts some of the financial impact 
from workers to their employers.
As workplace accidents illustrate, control is a relative concept. Rarely does 
anyone have complete control, at least with respect to a loss that would be 
significant enough that we would think about getting the government involved. 
Instead, people have more or less control. Consider product safety. Consumers 
have some control over whether a product is used properly, while manufacturers 
have control over how safe the product is if used properly (and, perhaps, how 
likely it is that the product will be used improperly). Retailers and wholesalers 
have no direct control over how the product is used or made, but they do have 
control over what products they offer for sale and, compared to consumers, 
better information about the products and greater ability to influence manufac-
turers. For this reason, product liability law assigns responsibility for injuries from 
defective products not only to manufacturers, but also to retailers and wholesal-
ers. Product liability law also assigns some responsibility to consumers through 
legal rules that limit liability in cases involving product misuse. As a result, 
product liability law represents a good attempt to meet the risk management 
principle of linking responsibility and control, even if it does not always succeed.
2. Manage Moral Hazard 
Moral hazard is the term for a threat that arises when responsibility is uncoupled 
from control. People in control of a loss do not have the same incentive to 
prevent it when they know that others will be held financially responsible. All 
forms of insurance and some other forms of risk shifting present this moral 
hazard problem. For that reason, managing moral hazard is a central concern in 
the private insurance industry and the primary occupation of many who work 
in that industry. Here, government should take its cue from the private sector. 
Moral hazard matters.
There are three well-known and time-tested tools for managing moral hazard: 
making sure that enough of the loss continues to fall on the insured person 
to maintain the prevention incentive (for example, insurance deductibles and 
co-pays); conditioning insurance coverage on a commitment to engage in specific 
loss-prevention efforts; and insisting that some control over the loss be shifted 
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along with the risk. In shorthand, we refer to these tools as: leaving some loss 
with the insured, contracting on care, and taking control. To a very substantial degree, 
the success and failure of government risk management programs turns on how 
well it uses these tools.
Federal bank deposit insurance and the “too big to fail” doctrine are both 
forms of insurance that have the potential to create moral hazard. Deposit 
insurance explicitly protects depositors from bank failure, and the “too big to 
fail” concept provides a form of implicit insurance to other bank creditors. 
These forms of insurance generate moral hazard by reducing the incentives of 
depositors and other bank creditors to monitor bank solvency and to do busi-
ness only with the healthiest banks.
Well into the 1970s, the deposit insurance and bank regulation system set 
up during the New Deal did a good job of managing that moral hazard, using 
the tools just described. First, the government did not provide full protection. 
Only the first $100,000 in deposits per person was insured by the FDIC, 
leaving an incentive to monitor solvency with the very largest depositors (who 
were likely in a better position than small depositors to do so). Moreover, 
the application of the “too big to fail” doctrine was sufficiently uncertain that 
creditors could not be sure that they would be fully protected, especially for 
credit provided to smaller banks. Second, the government coupled the deposit 
insurance program with regulations that obligated banks to keep capital 
reserves and engage in other practices that reduced the risk of failure. This is 
conceptually similar to the contracting on care that happens in the private 
insurance context. Finally, the government took some control over prevention 
from banks—through the bank-supervision process, which authorizes regula-
tors to manage risk by, for example, conducting examinations, prohibiting unsafe 
practices, and evaluating major transactions. 
The definitive history of what happened to banking regulation since the 
1970s has yet to be written, but one thing is clear. More and more of what 
financial institutions did fell outside the reach of the regulators, even as public 
guarantees—both implicit and explicit—were progressively expanded. Increasing 
the amount of government insurance while decreasing the government’s ability 
to manage the associated moral hazard had an inevitable outcome: more insured 
losses. That is exactly what happened in the years leading up the savings and 
loan failures of the late 1980s and early 1990s, and again—at least in part—in 
the years leading up to the financial crisis of 2007 to 2009. Whenever public 
insurance exists, adequate public monitoring (via effective regulation) is absolutely 
essential to control the inevitable moral hazard.
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3. Pool Risks in Sound Organizations
This third risk management principle is so obvious that it almost did not make 
our list. Yet policymakers violate this principle sufficiently often that we had 
to include it. The idea is simple to state (but not always simple to implement): 
organizations that serve as risk pools must have the financial and other capacity 
needed to handle the risks that they take on. For insurance regulators this prin-
ciple dominates all others. 
Here are several examples of government risk management that violates 
this principle.
The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
The PBGC insures participants in traditional, defined-benefit pension plans from 
losing their pension benefits if their employers are unable to pay. Unfortunately, 
the PBGC does not operate on a financially sound basis. The premiums 
charged to employers for this protection are too low in relation to the risk. 
In addition, employers have discretion that allows them to “game the system.” 
For example, there is a variety of rules that allow an employer to report that a 
pension plan is much better funded than it really is.3 Although the PBGC is 
supposed to be entirely funded by employer premiums, and it does not have a 
formal government guarantee, many people expect that the federal government 
will bail out the PBGC if it gets into trouble. As a result, even employers oper-
ating sound pension plans, and workers in those firms, have little incentive to 
advocate that the PBGC operate on a financially sound basis.
State-Based Catastrophe Risk Pools
A number of states have created insurance mechanisms to protect their citizens 
from natural catastrophe risks that are not covered by private insurance policies. 
The Florida state-based hurricane risk pool, Citizens Property Insurance Corpor-
ation (CPIC), is a prominent example. State-based pools are almost always under-
funded, for two main reasons. First, most states are too small to fund enough 
reserves in the early years of a natural-catastrophe risk pool. Second, states 
often lack the political will to impose adequate risk-based premiums on people 
who build near a coast, river, or fault line. As a result, there is not enough money 
on reserve to pay claims when a major disaster hits, particularly during the early 
years. For example, as researchers from the Wharton School have shown, Florida’s 
CPIC does not charge an adequate premium to property owners living close to 
the coast and it does not have enough reserves to pay claims from a major hur-
ricane.4 When the next big hurricane hits Florida, the state’s CPIC will have to 
find more money, most likely from a combination of state government bonds, 
assessments from private insurers, and possibly even federal support.
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Employer-Funded Health Care
U.S. health care policy from at least the 1950s has promoted employment-
based health care as the main approach to health insurance for working-age 
Americans and their children. From a risk-pooling perspective, there are two 
problems with employment-based health care. First, there is a fundamental 
mismatch between employees’ risk-pooling needs and employers’ risk-pooling 
promise. Employers’ promises last only as long as the employment relationship, 
but employees’ health-care risk exposure lasts at least until they reach retirement 
age and become eligible for Medicare. Second, employers too often are not 
sound risk-pooling organizations. When an employer goes bankrupt, workers 
lose both their jobs and their health-care benefits. Moreover, the health-care 
cost overhang of an aging workforce in a declining industry makes it even 
harder for companies to survive, as we see in the auto industry today, increasing 
the likelihood that people will be forced out of the workplace before reaching 
retirement age. Employment-based health care could operate on a financially 
sound basis, but perhaps only with some public mechanism for protecting 
employees from losing their health care when they lose their jobs and for 
managing the health-care costs of industries with aging workforces. 
Exempting Over-the-Counter Credit Default Swaps from Regulation
In the years leading up to the financial crisis of 2007 to 2009, the market for 
credit default swaps (CDS) grew enormously, providing a form of insurance 
against losses on credit instruments (from traditional corporate bonds to collat-
eralized debt obligations, or CDOs). One problem with this market is that highly 
rated financial institutions such as AIG were able to write huge numbers of 
CDS contracts without putting down any collateral or holding any meaningful 
reserves. From a risk-pooling perspective, this turned out to be a major mistake. 
When the downturn came and the riskiness of virtually all credit instruments 
increased, AIG found itself unable to meet its CDS obligations, and federal 
policymakers decided they had no choice but to spend more than $100 billion 
to rescue AIG, or face a financial catastrophe of the first order. Had the govern-
ment regulated the safety and soundness of AIG’s CDS activities, AIG could 
not have taken on so much risk and would not have needed such an expensive 
government bailout.
4. Prefer Market-Conforming Approaches to Public Risk Management
This fourth principle reflects the American preference for free enterprise. It 
suggests, first, that market enhancement should be preferred to market replace-
ment, where possible. Once the government provides a market-replacing risk 
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management service, it can be hard to change that service and harder to eliminate 
it, even when there is good evidence that the private market is ready to take 
over some or all of the risk. By contrast, market competition forces companies 
to adapt their products over time without the need for centralized decision 
making. For this reason, market-enhancement programs not only are consistent 
with core American values, they also increase the odds that risk management 
services can adapt to meet people’s needs over time.
Nevertheless, this principle does not mean that the government should 
never provide a risk management service. Indeed, some of the most visible and 
successful federal government risk management programs in the U.S. are market-
replacement insurance programs: Social Security, unemployment insurance, 
deposit insurance, and Medicare. In each of these cases, there was and is wide-
spread consensus that the private market could not effectively manage the risks 
that these government programs took on.
In such cases this market-conforming principle means that the government 
should preserve the beneficial incentives that the market provides to the greatest 
extent possible. When a government provides insurance, for example, it should 
charge a price for that insurance, as it does in each of the programs we just 
mentioned. Paying a price for government insurance leads people to consider 
the cost of the insurance, and a risk-based price gives people an incentive to 
lower their risk, which helps prevent loss.
There are many government insurance programs, even social insurance pro-
grams, that are market-enhancement, rather than market-replacement, programs. 
For example, state governments play a market-enhancing role for workers com-
pensation, automobile insurance, and homeowners’ insurance, by creating residual 
market mechanisms that allow high-risk people and businesses to get insurance.
Whether the government should replace or enhance the market for private 
health insurance is among the leading public policy issues of the day. Medicare 
was created as a market-replacement health insurance program, but there was 
no real market for health insurance for the elderly when Medicare was enacted 
in 1965. By contrast, we have an active employment-based private health insur-
ance market today. There are legitimate concerns about the high administrative 
costs of that insurance, however. Moreover, almost no one believes that the 
private market alone can provide enough affordable insurance for high-risk 
individuals or for those with very low incomes. In thinking about how best to 
address the gaps in the private health insurance market, key questions include, 
first, whether market-enhancement programs will be enough and, second, whether 
the administrative cost savings offered by a market-replacement program are big 
enough to justify giving up on the dynamism of the competitive market. Either 
way, the ultimate policy solution should be market conforming to the extent 
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possible. For example, although Americans with pre-existing conditions should 
not pay higher (risk-based) premiums, smokers probably should.
The market-conforming principle also applies to prevention and risk shifting. 
Rules that shift the risk of loss to those with the greatest control over the risk 
can represent a market-enhancement approach to prevention. Risk shifting gives 
people an incentive to reduce loss without dictating how they are supposed 
to do that. For this reason, liability rules, properly created and applied, represent 
a free-market, bottom-up alternative to command-and-control–style health and 
safety regulation. 
Government-quality regulation often represents another market-conforming 
approach to public risk management. Ordinary consumers, for example, are not 
always well positioned to evaluate the safety or quality of many of the goods 
and services that they use on a daily basis. Medicine, foods subject to undetect-
able contamination or spoilage, and many financial products are all examples of 
products that we have to trust in order to consume. Absent quality regulation, 
markets in these kinds of trust-based goods might not develop at all, or they 
will be less robust than consumers would want, because consumers don’t have 
enough information to make informed choices. Government quality regulation 
of goods and services that depend on trust and that cannot be assessed adequately 
by consumers themselves represents an important mechanism for building and 
supporting private markets. It has been said, for example, that the modern 
pharmaceutical market would not exist without the FDA and that the modern 
mutual fund industry would not have developed without the Investment Com-
pany Act of 1940, which set basic standards for mutual funds.
5. Structure Markets to Promote Safe Products
This last principle generalizes from the example of trust-based goods just 
described. The idea here is to structure markets so that sellers compete in ways 
that promote safety and other risk management objectives. We do not suggest 
that the government should pursue safety at any cost, simply that policymakers 
should be attuned to their ability to structure markets to promote safe products.
In particular, policymakers should be on the watch for, and distinguish 
between, two kinds of situations: first, when consumers cannot easily tell the 
difference between the quality of different products and, second, when consumers 
will not adequately consider the risks posed by different products or will not 
reliably make reasonable judgments based on those risks. The behavioral economic 
tools described in chapter 2 of this book provide some promising strategies for 
identifying these situations.
Both kinds of situations call for quality regulation, but the kind of quality 
regulation they require is different. If consumers cannot distinguish among the 
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qualities of different products, the government can improve consumer welfare 
simply by defining and enforcing different grades of quality or mandating the 
provision of relevant information about the risk. Government grades of beef 
are one example; energy efficiency ratings are another. If consumers cannot be 
counted on to adequately consider risks or to make reasonable judgments based 
on those risks, however, the government may need to do more, for example, by 
adopting liability rules, taking the riskiest products off the market, or taxing 
risky products so that the price the consumer pays takes the risks into account. 
Product liability law is a good example of the liability approach; the Consumer 
Product Safety Commission is a good example of a government agency that 
takes unsafe products off the market; and cigarette taxes are a good example of 
using tax policy to discourage overuse of a risk-creating product.
This last, market-structuring principle applies with special force to risk man-
agement products and services. Research and experience show that consumers 
often have trouble adequately evaluating the quality of insurance and many 
other risk management products. Insurance advertising provides good evidence 
of this point. “Like a good neighbor, State Farm is there.” “You’re in good hands 
with Allstate.” “Nationwide is on your side.” These slogans represent efforts to 
encourage consumers to trust insurance companies, but like most insurance 
advertising, they do not convey meaningful information about the quality of the 
products advertised.
This is not a criticism of insurance advertising. Insurance companies know 
that people need to trust insurance companies or else they won’t buy insurance, 
so the companies do what they can to convey images of trustworthiness and 
stability. The companies cannot do very much to sell on the basis of quality, 
because the quality of most insurance products is not observable by ordinary 
consumers. Most consumers hope never to make a claim and, when they do, they 
have little or no basis for comparing the quality of the service that they receive. 
Even health insurance—which many consumers use on a regular basis—is not 
fundamentally different, because very few people are repeat users of the really 
big-ticket items. Indeed, one of the best arguments for keeping employment-
based health insurance is that employers may be better situated than individuals 
to evaluate the quality of competing health insurance providers.
What all this means is that there is an important governmental role for 
regulating the quality of many products, including financial services products 
and, especially, insurance products. One of the risk management tools that we 
describe in the next section has the potential to improve the quality of insur-
ance products by providing a way for consumers to compare the quality of the 
insurance products offered by different companies.
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Applications: New Tools for Managing Major Risks
In a short chapter in a short book, we cannot explain all of the permutations 
of these risk management approaches and principles. Instead, we would like to 
show how they could be used in practice. This final section briefly describes new 
tools for managing major risks: import safety, natural catastrophes, health care 
for the temporarily unemployed, student loans, and systemic financial risk.
Import Safety: Bonded Warranties and Subsidized Testing5
Import safety is a hot-button issue. The U.S. imports massive amounts food, 
medicine, toys, children’s clothing, and other products from countries that 
do not have the same health and safety regulations that we have. Think of the 
contaminated heparin, the toy trains with lead paint, the melanin-laced candy, 
and the adulterated pet food that have come from China in recent years. U.S. 
and European health and safety regulators are working on ways to improve 
inspections and other procedures in developing countries, but those efforts are 
not enough by themselves.
One promising policy option could be an import safety warranty program 
that would supplement these important efforts to improve regulation and testing 
in developing countries. The program might have four parts. First, importers 
and sellers of imported products would warrant that the products meet estab-
lished U.S. safety and health regulations. Second, the importers would back up 
that warranty by obtaining insurance or posting a bond. Third, consumers would 
have the option to assign their warranty rights to warranty rights enforcement 
organizations, preferably with assignment being the default (meaning that the 
rights would be assigned unless the consumer actively chooses otherwise).   Finally, 
there would be subsidies available for concerned consumers and small retailers 
who want to send products out for testing, leading to a decentralized testing 
environment that would supplement government testing and make it harder for 
importers to evade detection.
To ease enforcement, the warranty would operate in a simple fashion. The 
warranty would obligate the seller or importer to pay statutory damages based 
on three factors: the retail price of the product, the seriousness of the risk, 
and the success of the importer in recalling the unsafe products and providing 
refunds to consumers. The statute would direct an appropriate government 
agency to create guidelines that would make these factors easy for a court 
to apply. The statutory damages would allow the warranty claims of many 
consumers to be brought in a single enforcement action, led by the warranty 
rights enforcement organization. Otherwise the importers or sellers could avoid 
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res ponsibility by making each consumer bring an individual claim and prove 
their individual damages—an impossible task in too many cases.
The testing subsidy part of the import safety program would allow consum-
ers and small retailers to send product samples for testing at an affordable cost. 
The federal government would provide coupons that could be used at approved 
testing labs to obtain a discounted price on approved tests. The testing labs would 
market their services and provide consumer access to the coupons, most likely 
on the Internet. Consumers and retailers would pay part of the testing costs 
themselves, to discourage excessive or unwarranted use of the testing system.
This new idea takes a risk-shifting approach that satisfies our risk manage-
ment principles. It shifts more of the risk of unsafe products to importers and 
sellers, who are better positioned than consumers to evaluate risk. (Although 
sellers and importers do not make or grow the products, they have much better 
information and greater ability to invest in risk assessment expertise than con-
sumers.) The program requires the consumer to bear some of the cost of the 
testing, managing the moral hazard that could result if the government bore the 
entire cost. Because of the insurance or bonding requirement, the program pools 
risks in financially sound organizations. Finally, it is a market-enhancement pro-
gram that gives safe products a leg up in the competition for consumer dollars.
Natural Catastrophes: Reinsurance for All-Risk Property Insurance6
As Hurricane Katrina reminded us, the private insurance market does not handle 
natural catastrophe risks on its own. We have a hodgepodge of state and federal 
government programs that provide coverage for earthquake and flood risks and, 
in some highly exposed regions, windstorm risk. One promising policy option 
is replacing this hodgepodge with a federal reinsurance program that would allow 
ordinary insurance companies to sell “all-risk” property insurance policies to pro-
tect homeowners and other property holders.
Reinsurance is insurance for insurance companies. Government reinsurance 
for natural catastrophes would insure insurance companies against natural-
catastrophe losses. Private insurance companies would pay risk-based premiums 
in return for the federal government’s commitment to reimburse the insurers 
for a percentage of the payments that they make for losses arising out of the 
covered natural-catastrophe risk. The reinsurance approach would improve on the 
current hodgepodge of government-run direct insurance programs by allowing 
consumers to buy one insurance policy that covers all of their property risks. This 
would relieve consumers from battles with their insurance companies about 
the causes of damage to their homes—wind, which is covered by ordinary 
homeowners insurance, or flood, which is not—as we saw in the aftermath of 
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Hurricane Katrina. In addition, it would create a national risk pool for natural 
catastrophes that would be better able to operate on a financially sound basis than 
state-based pools. Finally, the reinsurance approach would allow private insurers, 
if they chose, to experiment with absorbing more natural-catastrophe risk by 
reducing the amount of the reinsurance that they purchase from the government.
This program also meets our risk management principles. It shifts the risk 
of insurance coverage gaps from consumers, who are in a poor position to know 
what coverage they need from whom and what losses are covered by which 
policy, to insurers and the federal government, which have greater ability to 
assess the natural-catastrophe risk in any area and control the drafting of con-
tracts in a way that prevents coverage gaps. Because the reinsurance would be 
priced on the basis of risk, the program would better manage the moral hazard 
created by natural-catastrophe insurance than the existing government programs 
(which may encourage people to build homes in disaster-prone areas). A federal 
reinsurance program is a more sound risk-pooling organization than the state-
based windstorm and earthquake pools that it would replace, primarily because 
of the greater geographic reach of a national pool. Finally, a risk-based reinsur-
ance approach enhances the private insurance market, rather than replacing it 
with government-run retail insurance.
Unemployment: Insuring the Health-Care Risk
Providing universal access to health care is a bigger problem than we can tackle 
in this chapter. Nevertheless there is one piece of that problem that could be 
addressed with a relatively simple risk management tool: adding a new health 
insurance premium payment feature to unemployment benefits. Existing law 
(COBRA) gives laid-off workers the right to continue in their employers’ health 
care plan as long as they pay the full cost of the plan—both the part of the 
insurance premium that they paid while working and the employers’ share (which 
typically is much larger than the employee’s share). With some justification, this 
has been called a “let them eat cake” approach to unemployment health-care 
benefits, because laid-off workers are hardly in a position to pay dramatically 
more for health insurance than they did when they were working. Including 
a health-care premium payment benefit in unemployment insurance would 
provide the “bread” that unemployed workers need to preserve health benefits 
for their families. This new benefit would increase the price of unemployment 
insurance, but the social-welfare benefits would almost certainly exceed the cost.
Moreover, this modest but important step would meet our risk management 
principles. First, it would place more of the risk of involuntary unemployment 
on employers, who have more control over that risk, and less of the risk on 
workers and their dependents, who have less control. Second, because it would 
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not provide an additional cash benefit to workers, it would probably not represent 
a major source of moral hazard. Moreover, unemployment insurance already 
contains moral-hazard control features: unemployment income benefits replace 
less than all of a worker’s income, the benefits are time limited, and recipients 
are required to actively look for work and accept reasonable offers (though this 
last requirement is often difficult to enforce). Third, the government has the 
authority to make sure that the new benefit does not impair the financial 
soundness of state unemployment insurance pools. Indeed, because of the stress 
created by the current financial crisis, the state unemployment risk pools already 
are going to need federal financial assistance. The new health-care benefit could 
be incorporated in that process. Finally, including this premium payment bene-
fit in unemployment insurance would enhance the market for private health 
insurance by keeping more people more consistently in the health-care risk-
spreading pool, and it would enhance the market for health-care services by 
allowing more people to maintain their existing relationships with doctors 
and other health-care providers. In this regard the premium payment benefit 
would be superior to the current proposal to provide Medicaid benefits to the 
unemployed, because many health-care providers do not accept patients who 
are on Medicaid.
Unsafe Financial Products: The Insurance Transparency Project
Many insurance products differ from other financial products in one fundamen-
tal respect: the consumer only has access to insurance money when something 
bad happens and the insurance company has tremendous discretion over the 
claims process. For example, with auto insurance, the consumer can only file 
a claim after an accident; with homeowners insurance, only after a fire, flood, 
or other unwanted event. This means that the quality of traditional insurance 
products consists not only in the explicit terms of the insurance contract, but 
also in the insurance company’s approach to paying claims. With banks and 
mutual funds, by contrast, consumers don’t need to worry about the companies’ 
approach to paying claims. With a bank account or mutual fund consumers can 
take out their money whenever they want.
Today it is impossible for a consumer to reliably evaluate an insurance com-
pany’s approach to paying claims. Consumers Union conducts some consumer 
satisfaction surveys and publishes the results in Consumer Reports magazine, but 
we cannot assess the validity of those surveys by comparing them to objective 
evaluations of companies’ claims-paying history, because there are no such eval-
uations. Of course, people can talk to their friends and neighbors, and state 
insurance departments maintain records of consumers’ complaints. But none 
of these information sources provide any basis to distinguish among insurance 
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products and companies in any way that is even remotely comparable to what is 
possible for cars and appliances, for example.
Given advances in information technology, it would be possible for a trusted 
third party to obtain claims information in electronic form from insurance com-
panies that would allow them to be rated on a scale similar to the credit scores 
that financial service companies use to rate consumers.7 This could be done by 
the Treasury Department, by a new federal insurance regulator, or even by the 
National Association of Insurance Commissioners, the coordinating body for 
the existing state-based insurance regulatory system.
This new idea satisfies our risk management principles. Such a system would 
place responsibility for good claims behavior on the entities in control of that 
behavior—insurance companies. It would manage the moral hazard that results 
when insurance companies are able to sell products that promise to pay claims 
but are then free to delay or shirk when it comes time to pay. It would encourage 
consumers to buy insurance from companies with a good track record, thereby 
pooling more risk in sound organizations. It would enhance the insurance 
market. And it would structure that market to help good companies with good 
insurance products win the competition for consumers’ insurance dollars.
Income-Contingent Student Loans8
Economists have long recognized the need for a government role in student 
lending—because the student loan market does not work like the ordinary credit 
market. When businesses borrow to buy new machines or individuals borrow to 
buy a house or car, they can use the machine, the house, or the car as collateral. 
But when a student borrows for college, there’s no tangible asset to collateralize. 
If the student does not repay the loan, there is nothing for the creditor to seize. 
Fortunately, we gave up debtors’ prisons long ago.
The economist Milton Friedman identified this problem as early as 1955, 
noting that a working market for student loans hardly existed at that time. A 
decade later federal policymakers began guaranteeing student loans to help 
build this market. Although private lending to students rose sharply as a result, 
the system remains far from perfect. Students who borrow to cover tuition and 
living expenses put themselves at risk. Awash in debt after graduating, they not 
only face financial pressure to avoid worthwhile but low-paying jobs (teaching, 
for example), but they also have to hope for no delays in finding a job, and no 
significant interruptions once their careers have commenced. Their debt-service 
payments will remain fixed, whether they have a high-paying job or not.
Fortunately, we could ease this burden by changing the way we finance 
higher education. Instead of guaranteeing lenders against bad loans (as we 
currently do), we could protect students from losses on their educational 
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investments. Specifically, we could ensure that every single American could pay 
for college or graduate school (or job training) on the basis of a federal income-
contingent loan. The loan could extend up to thirty years (like a mortgage) and 
would reduce or eliminate annual payments if the recipient’s household income 
fell below a predetermined trigger.
In addition to expanding access to higher education, this loan program 
would also reduce costs. Under the current approach, the federal government 
guarantees roughly three-quarters of all loans for postsecondary education. 
Private lenders benefit when the loans are repaid, and the federal government is 
stuck with the losses when students default. The federal government also pays 
for private collection services, which are often provided by the very lenders 
whose “losses” were covered by federal guarantees in the first place. Under the 
new program, collection would be undertaken by the IRS, through regular tax 
withholding. Repayment would thus occur almost automatically, reducing delin-
quency rates and allowing for a lower interest rate on the loans.
This idea satisfies our risk management principles far better than the current 
approach, which decouples responsibility from control. Under the existing 
system, private lenders have a strong incentive to make loans, even to less-than-
creditworthy borrowers, since the federal government assumes all of the risk 
through its guarantees. In fact, the appeal of private gains without the risk 
of loss has been so great that many lenders cut corners (ethical and perhaps 
even legal) in a drive for market share. Under the new program, the federal 
government would assume both the risk and the responsibility for making col-
lections. Most important of all, students would see their risk drop (since they 
would not have to repay their loans if their income faltered), and this would 
almost inevitably expand participation in higher education—a big benefit both 
for the students themselves and for American society as a whole.
Some might say that the program violates our fourth principle (prefer market-
conforming approaches), since the new government program would displace 
private lenders. But in fact the existing system is in no real sense private, since 
the federal government already bears all of the risk. The new approach would 
strengthen incentives and put the federal guarantee where it belongs—behind 
students, rather than behind the banks that lend to them.
Managing Systemic Risk in the Financial System9
In 2008, terms such as systemic risk and too big to fail took on new meaning in 
the face of a powerful financial storm. Financial contagion had been a recurring 
problem for much of American history, with major crises striking just about 
every fifteen to twenty years from 1792 to 1933. After that, however, the nation 
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enjoyed more than fifty years of relative financial stability following the intro-
duction of federal deposit insurance and other New Deal financial reforms. In 
time, many Americans probably came to take this favorable state of affairs for 
granted. The S&L debacle of the mid- to late 1980s temporarily disrupted the 
calm, but even so it was hardly a major crisis by historical standards. By contrast, 
the financial crisis of 2007 to 2009 has threatened many of the central pillars 
of the American financial system, from investment banking and insurance 
companies to money market funds and the commercial-paper market.
In addressing the crisis, federal officials have attempted to calm markets and 
rescue ailing institutions by spreading financial resources, especially in the form 
of guarantees, in virtually every direction—more than $10 trillion in potential 
commitments by the end of 2008, according to the Congressional Budget Office. 
Large-scale risk absorption by the federal government quickly became the strat-
egy of choice, though unfortunately with few of the necessary safeguards against 
moral hazard. Perhaps there was no other choice, given the pace and magnitude 
of the crisis. Looking forward, however, it is imperative that policymakers take 
control of the situation, reducing or eliminating the dangerous incentives that 
they have created along the way.
Of particular concern are the implicit federal guarantees that now swaddle 
every financial institution that appears “too big to fail.” Federal rescues of lead-
ing financial firms—from Bear Stearns, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac to AIG 
and Citigroup—have sent a clear signal that such large and strategic firms 
cannot be allowed to collapse, since the systemic consequences of failure could 
prove catastrophic, setting off an avalanche of losses. The willingness of federal 
officials to allow Lehman Brothers to declare bankruptcy under Chapter 11—and 
the severe market turmoil that followed—made this the exception that proved 
the rule. The main downside of this too-big-to-fail strategy is moral hazard, 
since creditors, counterparties, and shareholders of major financial firms will 
inevitably let down their guard, hopeful that the federal government will come 
to the rescue, particularly in cases of systemic turmoil. In the absence of careful 
management, such moral hazard will almost certainly invite excessive risk taking 
and greater financial losses in the future.
One solution would be to identify and regulate—and potentially even 
insure—“systemically significant” financial institutions in normal times, rather 
than simply waiting for a crisis to strike. At the present time, federal officials 
wait until a financial firm is on the verge of failure to decide if it is systemically 
significant—that is, if its failure would be likely to provoke broader financial 
turmoil and cascading losses. By that time, however, the situation is already 
critical. Instead, officials should decide which institutions are systemically sig-
nificant on an ongoing basis (that is, in normal times), and institutions found to 
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be “systemically significant” should be regulated more stringently than others to 
guard against moral hazard and make failure less likely.
In particular, systemically significant institutions should face stricter lever-
age and liquidity ratios, reducing the likelihood that they would get into trouble 
in the first place or contribute to a downward spiral by having to dump already 
falling assets in a downturn. Systemically significant institutions might also be 
required to buy federal capital insurance, which would collect premiums in nor-
mal times and offer prespecified capital infusions to all systemically significant 
institutions (not just ailing ones) in times of crisis. In this way, the current 
open-ended implicit guarantees would be made explicit—and explicitly limited. 
Finally, systemically significant institutions that reach insolvency in any case 
(despite the tougher regulation and federal capital insurance) should be put 
through an FDIC-style receivership process, rather than being allowed to enter 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy, which is ill-suited to handle the failure of major financial 
institutions. This would ensure that no firm can ever grow too big to fail, further 
reducing the moral hazard stemming from the recent federal rescues.
An important advantage of the proposed system is that it would discourage 
financial institutions from becoming systemically significant in the first place. 
This is just the opposite of the situation that obtains now, in which financial 
firms have good reason to become too big to fail, so as to garner a free implicit 
guarantee from the federal government. This troubling incentive can be corrected 
by being clear about the systemic significance of financial institutions and regu-
lating (and potentially insuring) them in normal times, rather than waiting to 
act until a crisis arises. Such an approach would put a premium on prevention 
(as opposed to just crisis management) and importantly would meet all of our 
principles, including in particular our second principle regarding the need to 
manage moral hazard.
Conclusion
Policymakers from across the political spectrum agree that governments are, 
inevitably, in the risk management business. As the current financial crisis 
demonstrates, government is the risk manager of last resort. Properly designed 
public risk management programs are among the most powerful government 
tools and the most popular and successful government programs.
We have set out a set of simple but important principles of effective govern-
ment risk management drawn from extensive historical study. When managing 
risk, the government should link responsibility and control, manage moral 
hazard, pool risk in sound organizations, adopt market-conforming approaches 
to the greatest extent possible, and structure markets to promote safe products.
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To illustrate how these principles work in practice, and also to provide some 
new ideas for policymakers to consider, we have sketched out six new risk 
management programs: bonded import safety warranties, natural catastrophe 
reinsurance, health-care continuation benefits for the unemployed, an insurance 
transparency project, income-contingent student loans, and systemic risk 
management for the financial system. Not all of these programs are ready for 
immediate adoption, but together they suggest the possibility of a new era in 
government risk management.
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chapter 5
Toward a Culture of Persistent 
Regulatory Experimentation  
and Evaluation1 
Michael Greenstone
The country needs and, unless I mistake its temper, the country demands bold, 
persistent experimentation. It is common sense to take a method and try it: If it 
fails, admit it frankly and try another. But above all, try something.
—Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Address at Oglethorpe University, May 22, 1932
The question we ask today is not whether our government is too big or too small, 
but whether it works—whether it helps families find jobs at a decent wage, care 
they can afford, a retirement that is dignified. Where the answer is yes, we intend 
to move forward. Where the answer is no, programs will end.
—Barack Obama, Inaugural Address, January 20, 2009
 
American government, at every level, regulates a dizzyingly broad swath of 
social and economic life. Regulatory policy determines the drugs we can buy, 
the pollutants in the air we breathe, the quality of the water we drink, the speed 
at which we can drive, the materials we use to construct our homes, the cars we 
buy, the rules that govern our employment contracts, the loans we can take out, 
the investments we make, and so much more. In making decisions about regu-
lations, public officials must choose which areas of our lives merit government 
rules, as well as how stringent those rules should be. The essence of regulation 
is that it requires the regulated to take actions that they would not otherwise 
take, actions that often increase their costs, reduce their utility, or in some other 
way harm them. When faced with this incredible array of complex and often 
uncertain trade-offs, what is a well-intentioned government to do?
The current system for making these choices is broken. It is largely based 
on faith, rather than evidence. The efficacy of many regulations is never assessed. 
Many others are only evaluated before they are implemented—the point when 
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we know the least about them. The result is that our regulatory system all too 
frequently takes shots in the dark and we all too infrequently fail to find out if 
we have hit anything—or even worse, we only find out when things have gone 
horribly wrong.
But it doesn’t have to be this way. We already have an example of scientifi-
cally based regulation in our approach to determining which foods and drugs are 
safe via the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). The FDA-led double-blind 
testing of pharmaceutical drugs has led to a revolution in medicine, and drugs 
are now safer than they have ever been before. The basis of the FDA’s system 
is the recognition that it is impossible to know whether a drug is beneficial in 
advance of its use.
Why should we choose the regulations that govern our society less carefully 
than the foods we eat and drugs we ingest?
I. A New Era in Regulatory Reform
This essay is a call to move toward a culture of persistent regulatory experimen-
tation and evaluation. Our goal should be to rigorously evaluate every regulation 
in order to expand upon the ones that work and weed out the ones that fail to 
improve our well-being (or worse, harm it). At the heart of such reform is the 
recognition that we cannot know a regulation’s benefits and costs until it has 
been tested. The rewards for such testing are better regulations, which can 
improve our lives, our children’s lives, and those of our children’s children.
In many respects, a culture of regulatory experimentation and evaluation is 
the logical next phase of the American regulatory project. We have now followed 
two paths and found both to be lacking. The first push for regulation came out 
of the New Deal and the Great Society and simply emphasized doing something 
to correct abuses and other social ills. In many instances, the mere act of trying 
to do something seemed to be the goal, and evaluation and follow-up were 
not emphasized. 
Eventually, this age of regulation was supplanted by a second era, which 
emphasized the failures of the first. This second phase, which was broadly asso-
ciated with the Reagan years, introduced a faith in the free market to produce 
desired societal outcomes. 
A culture of persistent regulatory experimentation and evaluation would build 
upon both of these great ages and propel us into a third era of regulatory reform. 
This culture would meld together the wish to establish national policies that 
enhance the well-being of our citizens and the insistence that this be done credi-
bly and cost-effectively, given fiscal constraints. The tools of experimentation 
necessary to achieve this goal are available and are already being used in a variety 
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of other contexts. Used widely, they will lead us to a new era of effective 
regulatory policy.
II. Credible Cost-Benefit Analysis
The only humane approach to regulation is to require that every rule and policy 
be subject to a credible cost-benefit analysis. The most important task in the 
reforming of our system of regulation is to determine which regulations work 
and which do not. Cost-benefit analysis provides a rational, quantitative method 
for determining how well individual regulations are working. All regulations have 
expected benefits (for example, lives saved, illnesses prevented) and expected 
costs (investments required to scrub smokestacks, expenditures on monitoring 
pollution emissions). Government’s task is to identify and implement regulations 
whose benefits exceed their costs; cost-benefit analysis is the tool that makes 
this possible.
Cost-benefit analysis requires that all of the disparate costs and benefits of 
a particular regulation be converted to a common unit, nearly always money. 
By converting all costs and benefits to the same unit, government can avoid 
irrational combinations of policies that fail to maximize our well-being. The 
costs and benefits for one person under one policy are treated no differently 
than the costs and benefits for another person under another policy. 
The current regulatory problem is not a lack of cost-benefit analysis.2 Some 
form of cost-benefit analysis already underlies most regulatory decisions. Rather, 
the problem is the poor quality of the evidence underlying many applications. 
Indeed, critics of cost-benefit analysis have argued that it can be twisted to 
produce desired results. One major reason for these criticisms is that most cost-
benefit analyses are not performed in a credible manner.
The single greatest problem with the current system is that most regulations 
are subject to a cost-benefit analysis only in advance of their implementation. 
This is the point when the least is known and any analysis must rest on many 
unverifiable and potentially controversial assumptions. There is a place for such 
prospective analyses in providing a first pass at assessing regulations. Even 
if regulators are well intentioned, however, the problem remains that it is not 
possible to know the causal impact of a policy in advance.
How can regulators determine the true effect of policies? The first step is to 
admit that it is generally impossible to assess regulations prospectively. Under 
the current system, regulations are typically evaluated before they are implemented 
and rarely examined again once they have been put in place. Since the regulations 
have not yet been enforced, these prospective evaluations involve an unhealthy 
dose of blind faith. Whatever its origins, it is an approach to choosing effective 
regulations that involves the government tying at least one hand behind its back.
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Indeed, it is nearly impossible to imagine this approach being used in other 
contexts where people’s lives are on the line. For example, I am confident that 
there would be a deafening uproar of protest if the FDA announced that it 
would approve drugs without testing them in advance. Yet, this is largely what 
we do with regulations that affect our health and well-being.
The second step is to adopt a culture of regulatory experimentation and evalu-
ation. I will outline below a specific plan to introduce such a system. However, 
at its core, this reform is simple. It involves rigorously testing all regulations 
and then expanding upon the regulations that work and dropping the ones 
that do not.
The FDA’s drug approval process is a good example of a system of experi-
mentation and evaluation. Each new drug is subjected to four phases of testing, 
slowly ramping up from small randomized trials of fifteen to thirty people 
to widespread use. After clinical trials are completed, all of the evaluations are 
reviewed by the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER). The CDER 
employs doctors, pharmacologists, chemists, statisticians, and other relevant 
professionals. In the review process, these professionals scrutinize each aspect 
of the new drug’s application. If the burden of evidence has been met that the 
drug is safe and effective, it can be distributed to the public. Such a system 
could easily be adapted for regulation.
III. The Case for Credible Estimates of Costs and Benefits
A. Too Much Money Spent Saving Too Few Lives
We should experiment more in regulation, because the body of evidence regarding 
the costs and benefits of regulation is sparse. The paucity of evidence is partly 
explained by the impossibility of knowing beforehand whether a regulation will 
pass a cost-benefit test. Proponents of a new regulation inevitably argue that its 
benefits are substantial, while opponents inevitably argue that the costs are too 
high. The difficulty is that the evidence needed to assess such claims is almost 
always unavailable.
The result is that all too often regulatory decisions are based on rhetoric. 
This means that we almost surely devote too many resources to regulations that 
have small net benefits and not enough to regulations with big net benefits.
For example, there is a wide range of cost-effectiveness even under already 
established rules. One study (Morrall 2003) collected estimates of the cost per 
statistical life saved from agency Regulatory Impact Analyses (RIAs), and found 
significant variation in the efficiency of regulations. Restrictions that lighters be 
manufactured so that they are childproof saves lives for about $100,000 per life, 
as do OSHA’s respiratory protection rules. On the other hand, so few lives are 
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saved relative to the cost of the EPA’s Solid Waste Disposal Facility Criteria 
that every statistical life saved costs an estimated $100 billion.
If these numbers are taken literally, they imply that the amount of money 
required to save one life with the Solid Waste Disposal regulation would save 
one million lives with the respiratory protection rules. Although the estimates 
in the Morrall study are unlikely to be credible, since they are derived from 
prospective RIAs, the point is that our current regulatory regime causes us to 
pass up opportunities to save lives without incurring any extra costs. This is not 
a humane approach to regulation.
Another example of regulatory decision making based on poor evidence is 
the debate that surrounded the catalytic converter (McCarthy 2007). In the 
1970s, automobiles were the target of a wide variety of new pollution standards 
in the United States. In particularly, new fuel emissions standards meant that 
the installation of catalytic converters was required on automobiles for the first 
time. These converters use chemical reactions to reduce the amounts of pollut-
ants released in automobile exhaust. The car industry and its interest groups 
lobbied strongly against these regulations, leading the public to believe that 
requiring converters would lead to all sorts of dire consequences. At the time, it 
was common to claim that the direct cost of the converters would be as much 
as $300 per car, when it in fact turned out to be closer to $165 per car. Similarly, 
the Big Three automakers said that fuel economy would fall by as much as 20 
percent after installing converters and switching to unleaded gasoline. However, 
the first model of car to have the required converter had a 13.5 percent higher 
fuel economy, on average, than the previous model. Finally, it was thought that 
catalytic converters would have to be replaced every 25,000 miles, when in fact 
they still ran at a reasonable level of efficiency after even 50,000 miles. Esti-
mates before regulations are actually undertaken can be distorted by interested 
parties—or just plain wrong.
These examples illustrate that the inefficiencies in the current regulatory sys-
tem mean that we are passing up opportunities to save lives and money. This 
is not a humane situation, yet it arises over and over again in our broken 
regulatory system. The introduction of a culture of experimentation into our 
regulatory system is the only humane solution.
B. The Evaluation Problem
The development of reliable estimates of the costs and benefits of regulations 
begins with the specification of a causal hypothesis or hypotheses. The key fea-
tures of a causal hypothesis are that it contains a manipulable treatment that 
can be applied to a subject and an outcome that may or may not respond to the 
treatment. For example, we may hypothesize that a regulation aiming to reduce 
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air pollution in a city will reduce mortality rates among residents. For a causal 
hypothesis to have any practical relevance, we must be able to subject it to a 
meaningful test. Such a test requires that all other determinants of the outcome 
be held constant so that the effect of the treatment can be isolated.
Ideally it would be feasible to observe simultaneously the same subjects in 
two different states: one in which the regulation is applied, and one in which it 
is not. This would guarantee that all other factors are held constant. Of course, 
it is impossible to observe both states simultaneously. For example, the regulation 
to reduce air pollution cannot simultaneously be administered to and withheld 
from the same city. This impossibility is labeled the fundamental problem of 
causal inference.
This problem is relevant for cost-benefit analysis in at least two different 
ways. First, many regulations are implemented for an entire population, which 
makes it impossible to develop a valid counterfactual case for what would have 
happened in the absence of a regulation’s implementation. In the absence of a 
counterfactual, it is impossible to know the policy’s causal impacts.
The second problem occurs when a regulation is applied to some people or 
places and not to others, while these two differ in important ways. This is called 
selection bias and it occurs when there is a control group, but the regulated or 
treatment group differs from the control group. For example, suppose we want 
to evaluate the effects of a job-training program. One way to structure the 
analysis would be to compare people who sign up for the program with others 
who are similar, according to observable characteristics. The problem is that the 
people who sign up may differ from those who do not in an unobserved 
way. The result is that a comparison of the two sets of people will confound the 
impact of the program with these pre-existing differences. Indeed, Ashenfelter 
(1978) and Ashenfelter and Card (1985) demonstrate that this is a real problem 
in the context of a job-training program. 
The point is that credible cost-benefit analysis requires the identification of 
a solution to the fundamental problem of causal inference. 
C. Experiments and Quasi Experiments Solve the Evaluation Problem
The gold standard for estimating the causal impact of a regulation is the ran-
domized trial. This approach starts with a population of people, businesses, or 
places that could potentially be subject to the regulation. Among this population, 
some are randomly assigned to the treatment group and the regulation is applied 
to them. The others are randomly assigned to the control group and receive no 
regulation. Because of this random assignment, the treatment and control groups 
should be statistically identical in all dimensions except exposure to the regula-
tion; thus, any differences in outcomes can be ascribed to the regulation. Put 
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another way, with a randomized experiment, it is valid to assume that a com-
parison of outcomes among the treatment and control groups yields an estimate 
of the causal effect of the regulation.
The use of randomized experiments outside medicine is growing rapidly, so 
there is a precedent for the application of this strategy to testing government 
regulations. Randomized trials have been used to assess the impacts of job-
training programs, policies to reduce student-teacher ratios in elementary schools, 
the impacts of indoor air pollution on human health in developing countries, 
and even the impacts of maternal smoking on infant health (some mothers in 
the trial were given additional encouragement to quit smoking). It is becoming 
evident that this approach can be applied successfully in a wider variety of 
settings than has previously been thought.
It is worth noting that some consider randomized experiments unethical, 
because they relegate a significant number of people to the control group when 
there are nonexperimental reasons to believe that the treatment or regulation 
will prove beneficial. In many regulatory contexts, however, some people or 
places will not receive the treatment because of cost or budgetary concerns. In 
this case, I argue that the most ethical assignment rule is to assign the regulations 
randomly, because this approach is transparent and free of political consider-
ations. Further, in most cases a regulation’s benefits are truly unknown in 
advance and would remain so without a credible evaluation. Thus, the experiences 
of the few in the control and treatment groups can be used to benefit society as 
a whole.
The second potentially credible form of evaluation is the quasi experiment. 
In a quasi experiment, the causal effect is also given by the difference in out-
comes between a treatment group and a control group. However, in quasi 
experiments the assignment of individual subjects to the treatment or control 
group is determined by nature, politics, an accident, or some other factor. Despite 
the nonrandom assignment of treatment status, it may still be possible to draw 
valid inferences from the differences in outcomes between the treatment and 
control groups. The validity of the inference rests on the assumption that assign-
ment to the treatment and control groups is not related to other determinants 
of the outcomes.
An example of a quasi experiment comes from a recent paper that aims to 
estimate the impact of Superfund sponsored cleanups of hazardous waste sites 
on nearby property values (Greenstone and Gallagher 2008). The difficulty for 
causal inference is to understand what would have happened to property values 
in the absence of the cleanup. 
The paper’s quasi-experimental solution is based on knowledge of the selec-
tion rule that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) used to develop the 
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first set of sites to be cleaned up after Superfund became law in 1980. The EPA 
was only allocated enough money to conduct four hundred cleanups. After 
cutting the list of candidate sites from 15,000 to 690, the EPA invented and 
implemented the Hazardous Ranking System (HRS) that assigned each site 
a score from 0 to 100 based on the risk it posed, with 100 being the most dan-
gerous. The four hundred sites with the highest HRS scores (those exceeding 
28.5) were placed on the initial list of sites eligible for Superfund remedial 
cleanups. The paper then compares the evolution of housing market outcomes 
between 1980 and 2000 in areas near sites that had initial HRS scores above 
and below the 28.5 threshold. It also compares sites that nearly missed eligibility 
with sites that just qualified for the cleanups. 
Both randomized trial experiments and quasi experiments can be used 
to solve the fundamental problem of causal inference. The missing step is 
their implementation.
IV. Regulatory Reform in Four Simple Steps
The key to reforming the regulatory system is to instill a culture of experimentation 
and evaluation. This can be established in four simple steps. 
A. Experiment, Experiment, Experiment!
1. Structure Regulations so that Evaluations are Feasible
The first step toward a culture of regulatory experimentation and evaluation is 
to write the statutes governing regulatory programs so that the regulations are 
implemented in ways that they lend themselves to experimental or quasi exper-
imental evaluation. This can be achieved in at least two different ways.
If possible, regulations should be launched on a small scale before being 
applied to a large population. This approach has several advantages. First, it 
allow for experimentation. Small-scale implementation leaves the space to create 
randomly assigned treatment and control groups. Second, it allows different 
forms of the regulation to be tested. Third, it limits the damage if the regulation 
is found to fail a cost-benefit test.
The second way to experiment is to allow states to implement different reg-
ulations. In particular, the American federal system provides an opportunity to 
implement regulations on a small scale before expanding them to a larger scale. 
States can try out regulations (for example, Massachusetts’s health care program 
or California’s history of stringent environmental regulations) on a small scale, 
and if they succeed, it is frequently possible to scale them up to the federal level. 
Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis is often quoted as saying that states are 
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the laboratories of democracy. Certainly states can become quite literally labo-
ratories for regulatory experiments.
In cases where a true randomized experiment is infeasible, it is still possible 
to structure regulations that are amenable to evaluation. This can be done by 
using quasi-experimental assignment techniques. One technique that has proven 
quite effective is to assign the treatment to places or people based on an objec-
tive score or criterion. Indeed, this is the basis for the quasi experiment used to 
evaluate the impact of Superfund cleanups of hazardous waste sites that I have 
described above.
The key point, though, is that new regulations should be implemented so 
that evaluations of their impacts are possible. If this easy step is not taken, then 
it will never be possible to know any regulation’s true costs and benefits.
2. Fund Evaluations, Collect Data, and Publicly Release the Data
Clearly, it is not sufficient merely to devise regulations in such a way that they 
are intrinsically testable; we have to fund the evaluations of new regulations 
also. An easy way to achieve this would be for the president to sign an executive 
order mandating that all new regulations must include provisions for collecting 
data that allow for evaluations of their effectiveness.
The funds devoted to such research should be used for evaluations by inde-
pendent research groups (for example, academics or private companies) and 
should adhere to the highest standards in research design and data analysis. 
Although high-quality evaluations can be costly, the costs usually pale in com-
parison to the costs imposed by regulations that have small benefits.
Further, the public’s confidence in government can be increased by releasing 
de-identified data generated in these evaluations on government Web sites.3 This 
will enhance the credibility of the evaluations by making them transparent. If 
the official evaluators reach conclusions that the data contradict, the public will 
be able to highlight this. Indeed, the potential for replication and exposing 
mistakes will serve as an incentive for those performing the analyses to get it 
correct the first time.
B. Create a Regulatory Review Board
Washington is filled with reports and evaluations. Indeed, many agencies 
already provide evaluations of the regulations that they oversee and administer. 
However, history is not kind to organizations that only engage in self-evaluation. 
It is very difficult for people and organizations to conclude that despite their 
best efforts their policies or programs are ineffective. Moreover, those who are 
deeply involved in the implementation of a particular regulation are likely to 
see the benefits of such a project far more clearly than the costs.
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A solution to this problem is to create an independent regulatory review 
board that has the authority to assess the effectiveness of regulations. The board 
would review all available studies and could fund additional studies. They would 
then use the available evidence to assess whether a regulation passes a cost-
benefit analysis. 
Based on these assessments, this board must have the power to repeal regu-
lations that are deemed ineffective. This may sound radical, but similar powers 
are granted to bureaucracies in other contexts. For example, the FDA has the 
right to prevent drugs from being sold on the open market. Ideally, this power 
to repeal a regulation would be explicit in the wording of the regulation itself. 
Of course, Congress and the president would have the right to overrule such 
a review board, but the default procedure should to permit the review board’s 
rulings stand.
Furthermore, the regulatory review board should consist of well-respected 
professionals and academics who have the technical ability to review evalua-
tions critically and do not have a stake in whether a regulation remains on the 
books. The appointment of top-notch, impartial people is crucial because it will 
help to insulate the regulatory review board from claims of bias. The key is to 
make the board nonideological and technocratic. 
While a regulatory review board may seem like a big departure from cur-
rent policies, there are plenty of precedents for providing review boards with 
power. The FDA is an obvious example. Additionally, funding organizations 
such as the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and the National Science 
Foundation (NSF) use independent review boards to determine which grant 
proposals should be funded. These boards consist of as few as three and as many 
as thirty members. Typically at least one member of the board is a full-time 
employee of the organization and the remaining members are drawn from the 
academic community. A few members of the board are selected to read each 
proposal and present it to the board with a rating for its scientific merit. This 
sort of board structure would also work well in regulation. After an evaluation 
of a regulation has been conducted, a board could convene that would study the 
evaluation and reach a conclusion.
It is noteworthy that there already exists a part of the executive branch that 
aims to undertake some of the functions that I have outlined for a regulatory 
review board. The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) is a 
subdivision of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in the White 
House. The executive order that determines OIRA’s role specifically calls for 
centralized review and cost-benefit analysis of all regulations, as advocated here.
However, OIRA lacks a few of the key elements discussed above. First, 
there is no requirement that cost-benefit analyses be credible in the ways that 
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I have proposed. Second, most reviews of regulations are prospective instead of 
retrospective. Without actual evidence for what regulations have done, rather 
than theoretical estimates of what they might do, the resulting estimates of 
costs and benefits are unlikely to be credible. Again, it is preposterous to imagine 
the FDA using this type of evaluation technique. Third, OIRA can review reg-
ulations directly, but it is not an independent review board. It is headed by polit-
ical appointees and is subject to the constraints that such organizations have.
The idea of the regulatory review board is to take some of the functions of 
OIRA and transfer them to an independent, bipartisan commission created 
for this purpose. This commission would identify opportunities for evaluating 
regulation, find and assign evaluators to these cases, and convene independent 
review boards to consider evaluations and pass final judgment on them. As much 
as possible, these functions should be removed from political control and placed 
in independent hands.
C. Automatic Sunset and Expansion Provisions
The third step in reforming our regulatory system is to require that all regula-
tions contain rules specifying the date by which the regulatory review board has 
to assess their costs and benefits. If the regulatory review board fails to meet 
one of these deadlines, then the regulation should be repealed by default. The 
purpose of this sunset provision is to ensure that all regulations are evaluated 
carefully and do not stay on the books just because they have been on the books 
in the past.
Of at least equal importance is that regulations that are shown to pass a 
cost-benefit test should become part of our regulatory portfolio and potentially 
expanded. Indeed, every regulation should detail how it may be expanded if it is 
shown to be effective. For example, if a given regulation was originally enacted 
only in a small-scale trial form, its scope should be widened to include all rele-
vant actors. Thus, a judgment by the regulatory review board that a regulation is 
effective should automatically lead to its expansion to any parts of the economy 
where it does not yet apply.
Of course, there will be situations in which political goals will be more 
important. In these cases, lawmakers have the power to exempt a regulation 
from this process. However, the purpose of the automatic sunset and expansion 
provisions is to ensure that the default procedure should be for credible evidence 
on regulations’ effectiveness to translate into action. 
D. Develop and Apply a Code of Ethics 
People frequently have a visceral reaction against experiments that involve humans, 
even though the FDA and other organizations use them out of necessity. At 
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least some of this reaction is due to such drastic breaches of medical ethics as 
the horrific and immoral Tuskegee syphilis and Nazi medical experiments. These 
experiments were unethical because they failed to treat people with a disease and 
exposed people to life-threatening and unnecessary interventions, respectively. 
By contrast, experimentation with regulation is concerned with testing solu-
tions to problems, not with observing the problems themselves. Much like FDA 
testing of new medicines, it is safer and more humane to test new regulations 
on small groups of people before extending their scope.
Nevertheless, an important component of a culture of persistent regulatory 
experimentation and evaluation involves the creation of a code of research eth-
ics that ensures the safety of humans and the appointment of a board to ensure 
that regulatory experiments are ethical. The Nuremberg Code was adopted in 
medicine after the Nazi medical experiments and it may provide a good start-
ing point for a code of ethics that governs regulatory experimentation. One 
model for the development of boards to prevent ethical violations comes from 
university institutional review boards, which ensure that experiments by their 
faculty are conducted in an ethical manner.
V. Getting There from Here
The implementation of the call for reform of the regulatory system that I have 
detailed here would require many changes to the current system. Several of 
these changes would require the passage of new legislation. However, it is 
possible almost immediately to begin laying the foundation for a full-scale 
adoption of a culture of experimentation and evaluation.
A useful first step would be to instill a culture of experimentation at OIRA 
itself. OIRA’s guidance regarding the use of cost-benefit analysis in the construc-
tion and evaluation of regulation is encapsulated in its Circular A-4. Although 
this document emphasizes the importance of cost-benefit analysis, it provides 
little guidance on how to determine whether evidence is credible. It would be 
straightforward for OIRA to release a supplement to Circular A-4 detailing 
the virtues of experimental and quasi-experiment evaluations and setting out 
guidelines for the implementation of such evaluations.
Such a supplement could part ways from current guidance in a few respects. 
First, it could make clear that cost-benefit evaluations (especially prospective 
ones) are not enough to guarantee approval of a regulation. Rather, there must 
be a credible analysis following a trial period of small-scale implementation, or 
the promise of a credible future analysis, for approval to be granted. Second, the 
supplement could require that regulations be evaluated retrospectively, as well 
as prospectively. Third, it could encourage regulatory agencies to structure new 
regulations to allow for experimental or quasi-experimental evaluations. 
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VI. Will Experimentation and Evaluation  
Solve All Regulatory Problems?
Of course, the answer to this question is no. My proposal is best suited to 
addressing environmental, health, labor market, and safety regulations. However, 
the approach I have described is applicable in other areas as well. For example, 
Greenstone, Oyer, and Vissing-Jorgensen (2006) assess the benefits of manda-
tory disclosure regulations in financial markets. Similarly, Doidge, Karolyi, and 
Stulz (2008) provide evidence on the effects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which 
regulates firms selling shares in the United States.
This proposal does not directly tackle issues of regulatory omission. However, 
it may have an indirect effect in this area. A system of regulatory experimentation 
and evaluation should provide lawmakers with enough confidence to try a wider 
range of potential regulations. With the assurance that ineffective regulations 
will be repealed, rather than lingering on the books for decades, lawmakers 
should feel more confident about experimenting. 
Further, an occasional complaint about cost-benefit analysis is that the 
methodology is flawed. In particular, some critics argue that analysts have too 
much discretion in the calculations. I agree that the current approach offers 
too many opportunities for abuse. Experimentation will go a long way toward 
addressing this problem. With credible evaluations, it would be much more 
difficult to adjust cost-benefit analyses to fit ideological parameters. 
VII. Conclusions
The current system of evaluating regulations prospectively means that we evaluate 
them when we know the least about their effectiveness. Real reform of regula-
tion means introducing a culture of regulatory experimentation and evaluation. 
This essay has outlined a method to reform our system of regulation. It involves 
the four following simple steps.
1. Experiment,	Experiment,	Experiment! The key to a system of regulatory 
experimentation and evaluation is a process that accumulates credible 
evidence on regulations’ costs and benefits. Such a system demands that 
regulations be structured at the outset so that they can be evaluated and 
that evaluations be fully funded.
2. Create	a	Regulatory	Review	Board. The board’s task would be to assess 
the effectiveness of regulations and to repeal the ineffective ones.
3. Automatic	Sunset	and	Expansion	Provisions.	The purpose of these 
provisions is to ensure that ineffective regulations are removed and that 
society fully benefits from the effective ones. 
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4. Develop	and	Apply	a	Code	of	Ethics. It is crucial to develop a code 
of ethics for regulatory experiments involving humans that ensures the 
subject’s safety. Further, the federal government should create a board to 
ensure that all regulatory experiments are conducted ethically.
These four reforms have the potential to fundamentally alter the operation 
of our regulatory system. Just as we rely on the FDA to ensure that our foods 
and drugs pose no dangers, we should implement a regulatory system that 
yields safe and effective regulations.
We are entering a period where many of government’s functions are being 
reconsidered. Such opportunities have appeared infrequently in American 
history. We must seize this opportunity to reform our regulatory system. In 
the process, we can improve our lives, our children’s lives, and those of our chil-
dren’s children.
Notes
1 I thank James Block, Severin Borenstein, Jonathan Cedarbaum, John Cisternino, 
Ted Gayer, Sendhil Mullainathan, David Moss, Katherine Ozment, Mitchell Weiss, 
and the other authors of this volume for a series of insightful comments. Henry Swift 
provided outstanding research assistance.
2 There are several standard criticisms of cost-benefit analysis. They include the objections 
that it immorally commodifies objects (such as human life) that are beyond valuation, 
gives a false sense of scientific certainty, and unfairly benefits the rich. Several com-
mentators, including Revesz and Livermore (2008) and Sunstein (2004), provide 
powerful responses to these criticisms. A rehashing of these arguments is beyond the 
scope of this paper, the primary argument of which is not that we should use cost-
benefit analysis but that we should do it better and then follow its implications. For 
an excellent argument in favor of cost-benefit analysis, see Arrow et al (1996); this 
article includes eight principles on the appropriate use of benefit-cost analysis.
3 The term de-identified data refers to data from which all identifying information of 
subjects has been removed. It is crucial to protect the confidentiality of those who are 
selected to participate in any studies of regulatory effectiveness.
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chapter 6
The Promise and Pitfalls of 
Co-Regulation: How Governments 
Can Draw on Private Governance 
for Public Purpose
Edward J. Balleisen and Marc Eisner
Our purpose in this chapter is to examine the potential role of nongovernmental 
actors, and especially those with close connections to the business community, 
in fostering positive regulatory outcomes. Such an effort might well strike some 
readers as quixotic, in light of several recent regulatory fiascos. Consider the 
following tales of crisis born of regulatory failure, one from the world of fin-
ance, the other from the domain of environmental protection. Both occurred in 
2008. Each involves a regulatory program that almost all Americans, and indeed 
quite possibly most members of Congress, had never heard of, at least before 
these spectacular demonstrations of insufficient regulatory oversight. Each also 
powerfully underscores the potential dangers associated with placing primary 
responsibility for regulating business in the hands of the business community 
itself—a strategy long known as “self-regulation.”
The financial story concerns the collapse of three of America’s largest invest-
ment banks, developments that sent shockwaves through the global financial 
system. Bear Stearns and Merrill Lynch were acquired at fire-sale prices by 
J. P. Morgan Chase and Bank of America, respectively, while Lehman Brothers 
entered bankruptcy. The downfalls of these pillars of Wall Street had numerous 
causes, but a particularly important one was their remarkable reliance on lever-
age, which in each case came to exceed thirty dollars of financial obligations 
to one dollar of capital, far beyond the ratios that bankers and regulators 
would have deemed prudent thirty years ago. Bank executives, and regulators at 
the Securities and Exchange Commission, assumed that such heightened debt 
exposure would prove perfectly safe, partly because of a new initiative, the 
Consolidated Supervised Entities (CSE) Program. The CSE delegated regulatory 
risk assessment to the investment banks themselves. The banks’ risk managers, 
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using their own highly sophisticated internal computer models, would continu-
ously assess the risk associated with the bank’s overall investment portfolio 
and debt obligations, and then require adjustments in capital whenever the risk 
assessment warranted. In late September of this year, after an intensive SEC 
autopsy of what had gone wrong at Bear Stearns, the chairman of the SEC, 
Christopher Cox, proclaimed that the CSE was “fundamentally flawed,” and 
ordered its termination. Bear Stearns, it turns out, did regular risk assessments, 
but somehow never assessed the biggest risk faced by the firm—the impact that 
a sharp downturn in housing prices could have on its massive investments in 
mortgage-backed securities.1
The environmental story comes from eastern Tennessee. On December 22, 
after a series of heavy storms, an earthen dam gave way outside the small city of 
Kingston, releasing more than a billion gallons of toxic coal ash with dangerous 
concentrations of heavy metals. The Tennessee Valley Authority’s nearby coal-
fired power plant had sequestered the ash in the lagoon behind the dam. After 
the dam’s collapse, a toxic stew containing 5.4 million cubic yards of coal ash 
inundated a portion of Roane County and contaminated a river coursing 
through a far larger region of Appalachia. Roughly eight years previously, the 
Environmental Protection Agency had been on the verge of issuing tough new 
rules about the handling and disposal of coal ash, because of growing scientific 
evidence that it poses serious threats to the quality of surrounding groundwater, 
and thus to human health. But confronted with intense opposition from elec-
tricity producers, including both privately owned utilities and publicly owned 
ones such as the TVA, the EPA backed off from adopting regulations that 
would have required much more costly measures to keep coal ash from leeching 
or cascading into the wider environment. During the Bush Administration, the 
EPA even shied away from issuing recommendations for state regulation of 
coal ash. Instead, it deferred to an “Action Plan” devised by the Utilities Solid 
Wastes Activity Group (USWAG), an organization of utilities that produce 
electricity from coal, and so must confront the vexing question of what to do 
with coal ash. The USWAG plan, which utilities could adopt voluntarily, called 
for a restricted set of standards for groundwater safety, occasional testing, and 
not much else. It completely skirted more expensive precautions such as linings 
for storage basins and reinforced dams. In early 2008, USWAG’s executive 
director assured critics that “the utility companies want to do the right thing. 
They want to manage their ash so it won’t have an adverse affect on human health 
and the environment.” Such guarantees likely ring hollow to east Tennesseans 
whose houses now lie submerged under coal ash, or whose watersheds now 
have concentrations of arsenic that have increased more than a hundredfold.2
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What lessons should legislators and regulators draw from such events? One 
of the authors of an essay in this volume, the economist Joseph Stiglitz, has not 
minced words in rendering his verdict on the CSE. “Self-regulation,” he insists 
in a January 2009 reflection on the causes of the financial crisis, “is prepos-
terous.”3 If we equate “self-regulation” with the sort of vaguely defined, poorly 
designed, feebly monitored, largely sanctionless, and voluntary institutions 
represented by the CSE program and the USWAG Action Plan, Stiglitz’s judg-
ment is surely correct.
But there are circumstances in which the state has delegated regulatory 
responsibilities to corporations, or to organizations affiliated with trade associa-
tions, with beneficial results. The problem often is not self-regulation per se, 
but the failure to integrate structures of private governance effectively within a 
larger institutional setting—to embed those structures within a broader frame-
work of public oversight. In this chapter, we self-consciously use the term 
“co-regulation” to speak to the importance of integration and institutional design.
Governments across the globe have relied on private mechanisms of regula-
tory governance for decades, in a wide array of regulatory contexts. Such reliance 
almost always occurs at least partly as a means of reducing the public costs of 
regulation, and sometimes reflects rigid antagonism to the use of state power. 
But it can also emerge as a result of genuine concern for effective regulatory 
governance, and in some contexts, has actually furthered the common good. 
A burgeoning social-science literature has identified the key prerequisites for 
businesses and business-linked organizations to play constructive regulatory 
roles.4 Private regulatory actors must possess genuine commitment to regula-
tory purposes, have a sufficient degree of institutional autonomy, and receive 
adequate resources to do their jobs properly. Equally important, they must be 
directed and constrained by a larger framework of “co-regulation.” The state 
must furnish regulators with clear missions, and then maintain a close watch 
over those quasi-public or private regulators. To make such oversight efficacious, 
public regulators must receive accurate information about the activities of their 
private counterparts, and have sufficient expertise and capacity to assess the per-
formance of nongovernmental regulators; and those nongovernmental regulators 
must face a credible threat that their public overseers will assume regulatory 
jurisdiction if they do not meet their obligations. It also helps if there is consid-
erable transparency about the actions of quasi-public or private regulators that 
third parties can assist in the evaluation of regulatory performance. The key, 
in short, is to make sure that the private regulatory tail does not wag the 
commonweal’s dog.
After briefly laying our conceptual and definitional groundwork, we expli-
cate the most important principles of effective nongovernmental regulation. Since 
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American environmental regulation has generated several instructive experi-
ments with private regulatory governance over the last generation, we then 
explore that history in some detail. Finally, we offer some suggestions for how 
our principles might guide regulatory policy with regard to the environment 
and oversight of the financial system. We choose these two regulatory contexts 
because private regulatory governance has long been a key feature of public policy 
in these arenas, and because their complexities makes them prime candidates 
for some delegation of regulatory authority, albeit as part of a larger system of 
co-regulation.
The Guises of Nongovernmental Regulation
Since the rise of the modern bureaucratic state, two distinct forms of private 
regulatory governance have arisen as adjuncts to public regulatory regimes. The 
first type vests the power to make and/or enforce regulatory rules in a nonprofit 
organization, usually allied to an industry trade association. Policymakers and 
academics frequently refer to these entities as “self-regulatory organizations,” 
or SROs. Prominent American examples include the Joint Committee on the 
Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations, which certifies that medical pro-
viders qualify for government reimbursement programs, the Financial Industry 
Regulatory Authority, which oversees securities exchanges and licenses stock-
brokers, and the Institute of Nuclear Power Operators, which sets safety 
standards for nuclear power plants and plays a key role in their inspection.
The second type, which among social scientists often goes by the name of 
“management regulation,” involves analogous regulatory action within large-
scale corporations, usually through the creation of internal regulatory departments, 
which have the responsibility of setting regulatory goals and overseeing their 
implementation. Amid all of the deregulation in the last two generations, this 
regulatory strategy has been embraced by such varied regulatory agencies as the 
Food and Drug Administration, the California Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration, and the Environmental Protection Agency. Many global cor por-
ations taking this path have done so at least in part to gain certification from 
the International Standards Organization (ISO), such that, with regard to a given 
aspect of their business (environmental stewardship, worker and product safety), 
they follow an identifiable set of socially advantageous managerial practices.
Regardless of whether private regulation is carried out by an SRO or a unit 
within a business firm, it can involve a range of regulatory functions and reflect 
a spectrum of coercive authority. Some nongovernmental regulators merely set 
standards; others primarily monitor regulatory compliance; still others enforce 
compliance; and yet still others perform all of these roles. In many instances, 
private governance has a wholly voluntary character, with firms possessing the 
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choice of whether or not to commit themselves to regulatory rules and over-
sight. In other contexts, the state has conferred quasi-public status on SROs, 
requiring business participation. SROs with statutorily mandated authority 
often have the capacity to fine violators of regulatory rules or bar them from 
further activity in the marketplace. By contrast, voluntary SROs have far weaker 
enforcement powers, since American antitrust law prohibits such vigorous 
enforcement actions by trade associations. They can only wield the power of 
publicity, “naming and shaming” the violators of voluntary standards, or expel-
ling them from participation in the industry group.
The Principles of Effective Co-Regulation
From the earliest years of the modern regulatory state, the call for private regu-
lation has frequently served as a crucial tactic in the politics of deflection. 
Whenever some corner of the business community faces a groundswell of 
popular support for regulations that will impinge on its commercial practices, 
the odds are good that its leaders will champion some form of industry-wide 
regulatory self-governance as a means to forestall more onerous rule making 
and enforcement by the state. As cases like the CSE Program and the USWAG 
Action Plan reveal, private regulation can reflect little more than such efforts to 
keep the state at bay, with highly regrettable consequences for the wider society. 
But sometimes, enduring fear of intrusive state action, especially when accom-
panied by substantive public oversight and an ongoing desire to improve a firm’s 
or industry’s public standing, has prompted considerably more substantive 
responses from business. The effectiveness of private regulation in a particular 
context—or, more precisely, the potential for credible co-regulation—depends 
on the following five factors: (1) the depth of concern for their reputation 
among regulated businesses; (2) the relevance of flexibility in regulatory detail; 
(3) the existence of sufficient bureaucratic capacity and autonomy on the part 
of nongovernmental regulators; (4) the degree of transparency in regulatory 
process; and (5) the seriousness of accountability. Before legislators or regula-
tory agencies choose to delegate regulatory authority to industry organizations 
or corporations, they should assess the regulatory lay of the land with respect to 
each of these issues.
Identifying the Depth of Reputational Concern
One crucial factor in effective co-regulation is how much business leaders actu-
ally care about achieving regulatory objectives. Corporate executives, of course, 
have a fiduciary responsibility to look out for the interests of their shareholders. 
That responsibility frequently requires negotiation of a highly complex environ-
ment occupied by regulators, economic stakeholders such as customers, suppliers, 
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insurers, and financiers, and social interests such as environmental groups and 
community organizations.5 On some occasions, the search for profitability actu-
ally encourages a corporate embrace of regulatory goals, such as the reduction 
of environmental degradation or the diminution of negative impacts on health 
and safety. Although many businesses seek such ends primarily as a means of 
preventing regulatory fines and liabilities, others do so in the hopes of enhancing 
their reputation among key stakeholders. As an analysis of the adoption of 
environmental management systems by S&P 500 firms concluded that “while 
the potentially high costs of compliance with existing and anticipated regulations, 
as well as the threat of liabilities, are inducing firms to be more proactive about 
managing their environmental impacts, the direct effects of these pressures are 
not as strong as those of nonregulatory pressures from consumers, investors and 
communities.”6 Given the infrequency of regulatory inspections and fines, the 
emphasis placed on the larger set of actors in a corporation’s organizational 
environment should come as no surprise. Yet, we must recognize that there is a 
wide range of activities in which firms may engage as they try to manage their 
reputations. At one end of the continuum, they may simply invest in public-
relations efforts to create the appearance of social responsibility. At the other 
end of the continuum, they may make significant investments in redesigning 
products and processes, or they may even introduce internal management 
systems subject to external auditing, thereby going beyond regulatory require-
ments. The efficacy of co-regulation will depend on the extent to which it induces 
firms to move toward the maximal end of this continuum.
In recent decades, several trade associations have developed standards or 
model management systems for members, often in response to crises that 
threatened their collective reputations and raised the specter of impending 
regulation. Such activities can serve important functions: they can reduce the 
costs incurred by firms, create a context for industry actors to share informa-
tion, and contribute to the development of an “industrial morality.”7 Moreover, 
if government and associations cooperate in the design of these systems, they 
can be integrated with regulation so that associations can serve, in effect, as 
surrogate regulators. But the existence of association codes or programs says 
little about their efficacy. If association programs are weak—that is, if they do 
not establish stringent expectations, require external auditing and information 
disclosure, and expel firms for noncompliance—they may invite problems of 
adverse selection. Firms with weak records may gravitate toward undemanding 
programs to enhance their reputations without changing their practices. This 
may create a Gresham’s Law of self-regulation: weak participants drive out firms 
seeking to make credible efforts. Thus, the chemical industry’s Responsible Care 
Program, which failed to eject members for noncompliance, tended to attract 
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firms with worse-than-average pollution records (although there is evidence of 
improvement as of late). In contrast, the American Forest and Paper Association’s 
Sustainable Forestry Initiative, which mandated external auditing and expelled 
members for noncompliance, attracted firms with stronger performance records.8
Reputational concerns that result from a particular crisis, of course, may lessen 
as media attention fades. The manufacturing firm that responds to negative 
publicity about its environmental impact with a high-powered public relations 
initiative or contributions to the Nature Conservancy may well soon turn its 
focus to the next advertising campaign. By contrast, if firms make the invest-
ments to gain ISO certification for their environmental management systems, 
or to meet demanding requirements imposed by a trade association, regulatory 
practices may take on a greater permanence. The creation of highly trained 
staffs and complex information management systems can generate internal 
momentum for regulatory action, which can be magnified by the need of com-
panies to demonstrate certified compliance with standards or association codes to 
gain access to the supply chains and bid-lists of other organizations. Optimally, 
reputational concern triggers far-reaching transformation of how corporations 
design their products, processes, and facilities, and in the commercial relation-
ships that they forge with a broad array of public and private stakeholders.
Regulatory policymakers, then, should be more willing to delegate regulatory 
authority to the business community when they see deep-seated concern about 
corporate standing with the public, manifested by the willingness to make con-
siderable investments in internal regulatory capacity. And they should pay close 
attention to whether structures of countervailing economic power stand ready 
to help police regulatory behavior.
Ascertaining the Importance of Flexibility 
Public regulators frequently confront daunting problems of information scarcity 
and complexity, even as they must cope with serious resource constraints. Ponder 
for a moment the dilemmas of the environmental or the safety regulator. If all 
regulated entities employed the same technologies, production processes, and 
inputs, environmental and safety agencies would have little difficulty in designing 
effective technology-based regulations. If this homogeneity is absent—as it com-
monly is—regulators might be able to employ performance-based regulations, 
assuming that they possessed the capacity to assess outputs. But sometimes 
low levels of homogeneity accompany a limited capacity to assess outcomes. In 
such instances, there is a strong case for management-based regulation, “which 
requires firms to engage in their own planning and internal rulemaking efforts 
that are supposed to aim toward the achievement of specific public goals.”9 By 
delegating authority to firms, the administrative state vests responsibility in the 
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actors who possess the best information, thereby reducing the analytical and 
resource demands placed on regulators. In order to work, such approaches 
require that firms possess considerable flexibility, so that they can tailor internal 
regulatory systems to reflect the specific features of their firms and production 
processes. If successful, delegation can allow firms to go beyond what would be 
possible under traditional forms of regulation.
The delegation that is intrinsic to co-regulation creates a pair of related 
challenges for policymakers. First, as Cary Coglianese and David Lazer note, 
“the challenge for the regulator is . . . to find an optimal level of specificity that 
points firms in the right direction and enables inspectors to assess whether a 
firm has a good management system in place, but that also is not [so] specific 
that private managers no longer have the flexibility to adapt their practices 
to the individual conditions of their organizations.”10 Second, the architects 
of regulatory institutions must build in sufficient structures of accountability 
without simultaneously eliminating the incentives for participation. Delegation 
creates openings for miscommunication, shirking, and opportunistic behavior, 
vulnerabilities that grow under conditions of information scarcity and complexity. 
Regulatory design can limit such weaknesses by fostering increased transparency 
and accountability (this point will be developed in greater detail below). But 
regulatory policymakers should remain mindful of an unavoidable trade-off 
here. If these efforts dramatically increase regulatory transaction costs, they may 
create disincentives for potential participants.
Assessing the Prospects for Bureaucratic Capacity and Autonomy
In public policy, street-level bureaucrats are vitally important. To the extent that 
they fail to exercise their discretionary authority in a manner that reinforces the 
larger goals of policy, policy invariably fails. This observation holds as well for 
the private or quasi-public bureaucrats charged with critical responsibilities 
under strategies of co-regulation. A key question is whether corporations have 
the bureaucratic capacity, resources, and ethos necessary to implement regulatory 
schemes. Although large firms typically can call on sufficient administrative 
resources, the same cannot necessarily be said of small and medium-size enter-
prises (SMEs). To be effective participants in a system of co-regulation, corpo-
rations must be able to draw on personnel who grasp regulatory goals and who 
understand how their companies can achieve them. Business enterprises must 
have the flexibility to redesign products and processes, as well as the resources 
to implement the changes. They must have management systems in place to 
monitor performance, identify failures, and make necessary reforms. All of this 
can be difficult or impossible for SMEs. One study of enforced self-regulation 
of food safety, for example, concluded that SMEs routinely failed to develop 
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dynamic management systems, were incapable of assessing their own compliance, 
and lacked knowledge of legal requirements. “Organizationally incompetent,” 
these small-scale players in the food industry proved incapable of meeting 
their obligations.11
The difficulties noted above may not be simply a consequence of scale. Social 
scientists interested in corporate social responsibility have now demonstrated 
that firms engaging in socially responsible production are more profitable than 
firms that do not, but there is considerable uncertainty regarding the causes of 
this phenomenon.12 In many instances, profitable firms may simply be the ones 
with sufficient resources to develop the kinds of management systems and 
routines that allow them to go beyond regulatory requirements in managing 
their environmental, safety, and health impacts. Thus the capacity for partici-
pation in co-regulation may often be contingent on corporate profitability and 
therefore vulnerable to the larger business cycle. Large firms operating on narrow 
profit margins may not be willing or able to make the investments that are 
essential for effective co-regulation.
The implications for policymakers are twofold. First, rather than viewing 
co-regulation as a universal solution, legislators and administrative officials 
must design processes and institutions that can differentiate among firms and 
industry associations, based on their organizational capacities and exhibited 
records of regulatory compliance. Policymakers must accordingly retain more 
traditional forms of regulation for firms or economic sectors that do not measure 
up to the prerequisites of self-governance. Secondly, if the ultimate goal is 
to extend some form of co-regulation to a broader subset of firms, it may be 
necessary to promote organizational change to create both the capacity for 
private governance and enduring commitment to regulatory aspirations.13 The 
EPA has used various forms of outreach to educate corporate managers about 
how corporations have used environment management systems, design for 
environment, and green accounting to promote higher levels of environmental 
stewardship. Various trade associations have similarly employed peer auditing 
teams to convey effective strategies to association members seeking to build a 
capacity for internal regulatory governance. Such forms of support could prove 
critical to SMEs that lack the financial and analytical resources to achieve 
higher levels of regulatory compliance.
Ensuring Genuine Transparency
Like regulation carried out solely by governmental agencies, regulatory policy 
conceived and implemented by business organizations has to be visible to be 
effective. This principle has several dimensions. If regulatory goals are not 
defined with sufficient precision, we can hardly expect any regulatory agent, 
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whether public or private, to attain them. The same point holds for regulatory 
objectives that lack at least roughly measurable benchmarks. Even with plainly 
articulated aims and consistently defined metrics, though, private regulatory 
efforts will likely devolve into public-relations exercises unless their outcomes 
consistently reach the light of day. At a minimum, the results of inspections and 
other forms of monitoring must flow up the regulatory chain, from inspectors 
to corporate compliance officers and/or the heads of enforcement at SROs, 
and from those self-regulatory institutions to public oversight bodies. And the 
resulting reports must come in a sufficiently standardized form, and reach 
sufficiently well-trained and well-resourced oversight personnel, that industry 
regulators and the government can actually assess regulatory consequences. 
Additionally, this information should be available to commercial counterparties 
like banks and insurance companies, and all interested nongovernmental orga-
nizations, in order to magnify the reputational and economic ramifications of 
poor performance.
Poor reporting standards and practices invariably translate into shoddy 
regulation—an unsurprising pattern exemplified by the implementation of the 
CSE program for investment banks. According the SEC’s Inspector General’s 
September 2008 report on the collapse at Bear Stearns, the firm’s risk manage-
ment team ignored numerous reporting requirements, but avoided even the most 
minor slap on the wrist for these transgressions.14 Self-regulation, however, 
does not necessarily involve such regulatory malfeasance. In the wake of the 
near meltdown at Three Mile Island, for example, the Institute of Nuclear 
Power Operators (INPO) quickly developed a culture of information sharing, 
from individual plants to INPO, from INPO to the Nuclear Regulatory Com-
mission, and from INPO back to individual plants. INPO’s efforts included not 
only intensive dissemination of information about safety strategies that worked 
well, but also an annual meeting of plant executives in which the organization 
disclosed annual safety rankings for nuclear facilities, from top to bottom. This 
ritual at once reinforced industry-wide social norms about the centrality of 
safety and galvanized managers’ competitive drive, alongside their perhaps even 
stronger desire to avoid losing face among their peers.15
Independent auditing of self-regulatory activities by third parties offers a 
further means of ensuring the trustworthiness and accuracy of data about regu-
latory outcomes. This strategy has proved especially valuable when the regulated 
entities are multinational corporations whose business endeavors (logging in 
rain forests, reliance on global supply chains) span a multitude of jurisdictional 
boundaries. Regardless of the geographic reach of an industry’s businesses, trans-
parent monitoring is an essential element of any strategy to create institutions 
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of private governance that can actually attain society’s regulatory objectives. 
Such monitoring, though, matters most when coupled with genuine oversight 
and enforcement.
Furnishing Mechanisms of Accountability
If SROs or schemes of management regulation are going to have more impact 
than simply forestalling more substantial action by the state, they must hold the 
economic actors in their jurisdiction to account, and simultaneously answer 
to governmental watchdogs that actually pay attention, and punish poor per-
formance. SROs with statutory authority, such as the Financial Industry 
Regulatory Authority (formally the National Association of Securities Dealers), 
must have not just the power to levy fines or to take away the licenses of 
regulated firms that violate the rules, but also vigorous enforcement programs. 
Internal corporate regulators must possess authority that other departments 
within the enterprise are actually bound to respect.
It is at least equally important that public regulators keep a close eye on those 
charged with the responsibilities associated with regulatory self-governance, lest 
delegation degenerate into abdication. Governmental officials must regularly 
monitor self-regulatory activities, assess their performance, and, where appro-
priate, step in with more intrusive regulatory regimes, with their own rules and 
penalties. In some contexts, regulatory agencies might consider the creation of 
dual-track regulatory frameworks. Such two-tiered regulatory initiatives set 
performance floors, and then offer exemption from traditional regulatory 
inspections and enforcement regimes for firms that demonstrate the capacity to 
meet substantially higher standards through their own governance structures. 
Under such conditions, provisions for co-regulation are integrated into the regu-
latory structure and parties in the top tier have a clear sense that regulatory offi-
cials of the state stand ready, willing, and able to impose a traditional regulatory 
regime, if self-regulation fails to achieve public purposes.
Both the CSE Program and the USWAG initiative on the disposal of coal 
ash fell far short of these essential requirements. At Bear Stearns, for example, 
the risk management team was woefully understaffed, and lacked the authority 
to shape the day-to-day strategies of the traders with whom they worked side 
by side. For the CSE Program as a whole, the Trading and Markets Division 
had a mere seven inspectors to oversee the activities of investment banks that 
collectively controlled more than $4 trillion in assets. Despite these limitations, 
and the spotty record of reporting by the investment banks, the SEC’s Division 
of Trading and Markets nonetheless had inklings of significant problems with 
internal regulatory structures at the investment banks. Yet instead of viewing 
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themselves as obliged to step in to safeguard the public’s interest, SEC officials 
consistently shied away from pressing the firm’s executives or its risk managers 
to respond to these problems.16 If anything, the USWAG approach to coal ash 
impoundment leaves even more to be desired. Industry’s preferences here 
involve remarkably tepid standards, minimal private monitoring, a complete 
lack of tangible sanctions for utilities that do not live up to their professed 
responsibilities, and essentially no oversight role for the EPA or state environ-
mental agencies.17 Such forms of unmonitored or barely overseen self-regulation 
can only end in failure; regulatory policymakers should accordingly shun them.
Co-Regulation in Action: Environmental  
Policy Under Clinton and Bush
Environmental protection has proven to be an area ripe for co-regulation over 
the past generation, largely because of some significant limitations on key regula-
tory agencies. First, environmental statutes tend to be highly detailed, delegating 
minimal discretionary authority to the EPA. Given the sharp partisan conflicts 
of recent decades, there has been no substantial new environmental legislation 
since the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. Second, the EPA has functioned 
under extraordinary resource constraints. Its budget, adjusted for inflation, has 
not grown in the past three decades despite a more than doubling of the size of 
the U.S. economy. Third, from high-production-volume chemicals to emerging 
issues such as nanotechnology, the EPA is forced to manage levels of scientific 
complexity and uncertainty that are literally unparalleled in other regulatory 
arenas. Lacking the bureaucratic capacity and resources to develop the scientific 
and analytical foundations for new policy, the EPA frequently occupies an 
unenviable position. All of these constraints encouraged the delegation of con-
siderable regulatory authority to private companies. The results reinforce key 
dimensions of our analysis.
In the 1990s, the Clinton administration responded to the constraints on 
environmental regulators by trying to “reinvent regulation,” with the hope of 
promoting collaboration and fostering reliance on private-sector resources. 
Partners for the Environment, a collection of reinvention projects and partner-
ships, involved collaboration between the EPA and some eleven thousand 
organizations, including state and local regulators, corporations, trade and 
professional associations, and research institutions. Project XL (for “eXcellence 
and Leadership”) emerged as the most important of the reinvention initiatives 
and made important steps toward meaningful co-regulation. Under Project XL, 
regulated entities were invited to submit proposals for innovative performance-
based management systems. According to the EPA:
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Participants are given the flexibility to develop common-sense, cost-effective strate-
gies that will replace or modify specific regulatory requirements, on the condition 
that they produce greater environmental benefits. Based on the premise that these 
participants know better than the federal government how to reduce their pollution, 
Project XL reduces the regulatory burdens and promotes economic growth while 
achieving better environmental and public health protection.18
The EPA solicited proposals in the hope of initiating fifty pilot programs 
that could yield results broadly applicable to other regulated entities. Its review 
process was rigorous. The agency only considered applicants if they had a clean 
record of regulatory compliance, a detailed presentation of how their proposals 
would generate the expected results, and some guarantee that the outcomes 
would be superior to what would have been available under standard regulation. 
Once chosen, participants were required to submit voluminous documentation 
and evaluations, all of which were disseminated via the Internet.
On the face of things, Project XL appeared to incorporate all the key 
features of effective co-regulation: it delegated authority to firms with sufficient 
capacity, provided flexibility, and maintained high levels of accountability and 
transparency. And the program generated some impressive results, as indicated 
by the experience of Intel. Under Project XL, Intel set emissions targets for its 
Maricopa County facility relative to baseline levels permissible under the Clean 
Air Act. In some cases, these targets were quite ambitious (for example, 80 
percent of the baseline for volatile organic compounds, 45 percent of the base-
line for carbon monoxide, 8 percent of the baseline for particulate matter, and 
5 percent of the baseline for sulfur dioxide). The chip maker remained well 
below the nine emissions targets, each of which was well below what would 
be acceptable under existing laws. Several other participants, such as Merck 
Pharmaceuticals, demonstrated comparable improvements in environmental 
performance. A report on Project XL by the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development concluded that “Intel Corporation and Merck 
Pharmaceuticals both have exceeded by wide margin their initial targets for air 
emissions set out in their Project XL agreements.”19 Unfortunately, the applica-
tion process was bedeviled by lengthy delays and high regulatory-transaction 
costs. The negotiations involving Intel spanned seventeen months and cost the 
firm some $588,000. While some companies were willing to accept the costs 
and delays, others withdrew otherwise promising applications.20 Moreover, 
many business leaders worried that Project XL did not provide sufficient latitude 
for innovation, even as many regulators found the program difficult to reconcile 
with the EPA’s bureaucratic culture.21
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The Bush administration retained numerous Clinton-era regulatory part-
nerships and created many new ones. In a few cases, these efforts have clearly 
borne fruit. For instance, the HPV (High Production Volume) Chemical 
Challenge Program enlisted corporations to collect toxicological data on 
chemicals, thereby supplementing the EPA’s database without having to work 
through the cumbersome provisions of the Toxic Substances Control Act.22 But 
in most of the Bush-era partnerships, members simply pledged that they would 
cooperate in the promotion of environmentally friendly practices. Some corpo-
rations went so far as to submit estimates of their accomplishments, but because 
these programs were not integrated into the regulatory structure and the results 
were unaudited, it is difficult to evaluate whether they in fact contributed to 
gains in environmental quality. These efforts certainly did not constitute examples 
of co-regulation.
In contrast to these partnerships, the National Environmental Performance 
Track (or NEPT) appears to hold greater promise. NEPT is an environmental 
green track, or alternative regulatory framework, based on the experiences 
gained from state-level green tracks and experiments in EPA Region 1 (New 
England). The EPA admits organizations to NEPT if they employ a high-quality 
environmental management system (EMS) assessed by third-party auditors 
using the EPA’s assessment protocol, have a demonstrated commitment to con-
tinuous improvement, and have a strong record of compliance. The benefits of 
participation include: greater flexibility in compliance, streamlined permitting 
and reporting requirements, a lower inspection priority, and public recognition.23 
It is important to note that with NEPT, the EPA introduced co-regulation as a 
supplement to traditional forms of regulation that remained in place for firms 
not admitted to the green track. By the end of 2008, NEPT claimed 547 
members, including such major corporations as 3M, Andersen Corporation, 
Bristol-Meyers Squibb, Coca-Cola, Hewlett-Packard, Intel, Johnson & Johnson, 
Monsanto, and Xerox, as well as large-scale public entities such as military 
bases. According to the EPA, NEPT members have reduced water use by 3.66 
billion gallons, reduced greenhouse gas emissions by over 300,000 metric tons 
of carbon dioxide equivalents, reduced hazardous wastes by more than 52,000 
tons, and realized impressive increase in the use of recycled materials.24 The 
ultimate impact of NEPT, of course, might seem to be subject to significant con-
straints. It extends co-regulation to a relatively limited universe of organizations 
(both private and public sector) that have a demonstrated commitment to, 
and capacity for, genuine internal regulatory governance. But this is what 
we would expect: co-regulation is not a universal response to circumscribed 
regulatory capacity.
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Future Directions for Policy—Co-Regulation and the Environment
The record of private regulatory initiatives in environmental policy suggests 
several potential avenues for the nation’s regulatory agenda. Most obviously, we 
must recognize that the proliferation of partnerships at the EPA and the lack 
of institutional integration in the agency have been products, in part, of the 
difficulties of negotiating the cumbersome requirements of key statutes that 
simultaneously limit bureaucratic discretion and fail to provide regulators with 
the tools they need to execute their duties. Consider the Toxic Substances 
Control Act.25 Under section 6 of TSCA, the EPA is authorized to regulate the 
manufacture, processing, distribution, use, or disposal of existing chemicals if 
it has determined that they pose an “unreasonable” risk to human health or the 
environment. It can also ban existing chemicals, but it bears the burden of 
proving that chemicals will present an unreasonable risk, that the agency has 
adopted the least burdensome regulatory response, and that the benefits of a 
ban outweigh the costs. Since the passage of this legislation in 1976, the EPA’s 
regulatory efforts have been hamstrung by the failure of Congress to explicitly 
define what constitutes “unreasonable” risk. Moreover, the agency has encoun-
tered profound difficulties in accessing sufficient information to substantiate 
the determination of risk, the efficacy of substitutes, and the economic impacts 
of the regulatory response. Accordingly, it should come as no surprise that the 
majority of existing chemicals have not undergone basic toxicological testing.26 
TSCA section 4 authorizes the EPA to promulgate rules requiring testing 
for environmental and health effects for new and existing chemicals. Yet, in a 
regulatory catch-22, such rules must be justified with findings regarding pro-
duction, exposure, and potentially unreasonable levels of risk that are difficult to 
substantiate without the very data that the rules would generate. Without the 
statutory authority to mandate information disclosure, the EPA has been forced 
to rely on partnerships and corporate voluntarism. Congress should accordingly 
revise TSCA and other key statutes to give the EPA the basic tools it needs to 
execute its regulatory duties.
The revision of key environmental statutes, of course, can be a difficult and 
time-consuming task. But there are less contentious reforms that could strengthen 
the incentives for sensible environmental co-regulation, such as participation 
in NEPT. First, and most importantly, new legislation should mandate the dis-
closure of audited environmental data for all firms, using standard metrics. At 
present, many firms have the leeway to gild their reputations for environmental 
stewardship through astute public relations because stakeholders rarely have 
access to high-quality information about environmental performance. In those 
instances in which corporations furnish data about that performance, they 
too often present it with a bewildering array of metrics and baselines that make 
142 Balleisen and Eisner
meaningful comparisons difficult. Mandatory disclosure of standardized infor-
mation about environmental impacts, akin to the publication of financial data 
that the Securities and Exchange Commission requires of public companies, 
would force a higher level of corporate accountability, particularly if combined 
with summary statistics for the top quartile of firms in a given industry. Such 
disclosure would create far stronger incentives for firms and trade associations to 
adopt credible management systems designed to reduce environmental impacts. 
The influence of the Toxic Release Inventory on corporate behavior provides clear 
evidence that what gets measured gets managed, so long as the public has ready 
access to the relevant data.27
Second, NEPT has proven itself to be an important innovation at EPA, jus-
tifying efforts to strengthen it and expand its reach. At present, NEPT requires 
that participants have a high-quality environmental management system (EMS), 
but the EPA has failed to require certification under ISO 14001—the global 
EMS standard—as a requirement for entry. This reticence is peculiar on several 
counts. EPA was intimately involved with the development of ISO 14001 (an 
EPA official co-chaired the Technical Committee responsible for developing this 
code). Moreover, ISO 14001 certification has become an increasingly important 
prerequisite for accessing global supply chains, and several studies have found 
that such certification correlates with the positive environmental performance. 
In the past decade, some trade associations have strengthened their own EMS 
codes to bring them into compliance with ISO 14001 (for example, the American 
Chemistry Council took this step in 2002, through changes in Responsible 
Care). Integrating ISO 14001 into NEPT would reinforce these trends, while 
reducing the regulatory transaction costs associated with entry, insofar as each 
EMS would not have to be examined de novo.
Third, and finally, the incentives for participation in NEPT and certification 
under ISO 14001 could be enhanced through government procurement practices. 
A series of executive orders beginning with EO 12873 (1993) and culminating 
in EO 13424 (2007) have promoted environmentally preferable purchasing. 
President Bush’s EO 13424, for example, instructed the head of each agency 
to “require in agency acquisitions of goods and services (i) use of sustainable 
environmental practices, including acquisition of bio-based, environmentally 
preferable, energy-efficient, water-efficient, and recycled-content products, and 
(ii) use of paper of at least 30 percent post-consumer fiber content” (section 2). 
A new executive order could reinforce co-regulation by explicitly requiring that 
the government accord procurement preferences to businesses that participate 
in NEPT and/or are certified under ISO 14001. Since the United States gov-
ernment is the world’s single largest consumer of goods and services, this simple 
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change in procurement practices—if rigorously enforced—could have a trans-
formative effect on association codes, corporate environmental management, 
and participation in the EPA’s National Environmental Performance Track. 
It would likely also trigger similar shifts in procurement requirements by many 
states and municipalities.
Insofar as these changes create greater incentives for credible co-regulation, 
they will contribute to gains in environmental quality by engaging a broader 
field of forces, including markets, supply chains, and government procurement. 
By reducing the demands placed on regulators, such reforms can free up scarce 
resources that can be focused more effectively on helping firms build a capacity 
for internal regulatory governance, as well as identifying and sanctioning recal-
citrant businesses that currently believe (and not without reason) that the low 
probability of inspection allows them to pollute with few consequences.
Future Directions for Policy— 
Co-Regulation and the Financial System
Over the next few years, Congress and the regulatory agencies with authority 
over the financial sector are exceedingly likely to embark on far-reaching reforms. 
Prevailing proposals range from adoption of new substantive constraints on 
financial companies, such as tougher limits on leverage and firm size, tighter rules 
on executive compensation, and requirements that bond rating be insulated 
from conflicts of interest, to requirements that financial firms trade complex 
derivatives in standardized forms on public exchanges, much tighter enforcement 
of existing and new regulations through beefed-up budgets for administrative 
agencies, and fundamental structural reorganization of the regulatory agencies 
charged with ongoing rule-making and enforcement. Within this large and 
complex agenda for change, policymakers will have to come terms with the roles 
that industry self-policing will play in the new regulatory architecture. 
In light of the profound failure of schemes such as the CSE program, there 
will be a strong temptation to look askance at any regulatory role for financial 
firms or nongovernmental organizations. But we would argue that the question 
ought not to be whether the American state should defer to self-regulation—
that path leads at best to unmet public goals, and at worst to crisis and disaster. 
Rather, policymakers should ask whether they ought, in at least some areas, to 
strengthen institutions of co-regulation. Even with substantial increases in 
regulatory budgets, the American state is unlikely to fill every regulatory niche 
required by America’s exceedingly complex financial system.
Three areas especially call out for attention here. One involves the parts of 
the securities markets where private governance already plays a central role—
the stock and futures exchanges, FINRA’s regulation of stockbrokerages, and 
144 Balleisen and Eisner
the Financial Accounting Standards Board’s formulation of guidance for cor-
porate accounting. The SEC and Congressional oversight committees should 
undertake a fresh examination of FINRA’s and FASB’s regulatory performance, 
considering whether current arrangements sufficiently meet the requirements 
of meaningful co-regulation. The Bernard Madoff scandal certainly raises 
troubling questions about the degree to which FINRA, and before it NASD, 
was fulfilling its obligations to oversee the activities of broker-dealers during 
the past two decades. NASD officials inspected Madoff ’s firm periodically over 
that time frame, yet at no point uncovered the practices that eventually grew 
into a multibillion-dollar Ponzi scheme. The disastrous consequences resulting 
from such apparently kid-glove treatment of a prominent NASD leader suggests 
one obvious point of departure for reassessing the functioning of the financial 
sector’s quasi-public and private regulators. Whether such reassessment comes 
from the SEC, or through the auspices of congressional hearings, investigators 
should surely ask whether these regulators continued to manifest a genuine 
concern for the financial markets’ reputation for probity, a concern quite evident 
in the two generations following the Great Depression and the New Deal; 
whether they have been meeting the requirements of meaningful transparency; 
and to what extent their focus on accountability gave way before the rampant 
cronyism of the last decade.
A second area concerns some key financial intermediaries—mortgage bro-
kers, investment advisers, and hedge funds—whose behavior contributed to the 
current financial crisis. Mortgage brokers directed hundreds of thousands of 
Americans into dangerous loans, often in order to maximize their own com-
missions; investment advisers steered tens of thousands of investors into risky 
securities like collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) without sufficient atten-
tion to the attendant risks; hedge funds plowed money into CDOs and other 
even more exotic financial instruments such as credit default swaps, oblivious 
to the implications for systemic financial stability. There is a growing consensus 
in favor of heightened federal regulation over all of these economic players. A 
strategy of co-regulation might especially make sense in the case of mortgage 
brokers and investment advisers, given the structural parallels between them and 
stockbrokerages. Dispersed throughout the entire country, and reflecting great 
diversity in scale and forms of business organization, these intermediaries might 
lend themselves to at least partial oversight by newly created SROs, in line with 
the advantages of regulatory flexibility. The alternative of traditional admin-
istrative regulation will surely confront daunting problems of monitoring and 
regulatory coverage.
Finally, policymakers might wish to think through the advantages and dis-
advantages of creating a quasi-public, nongovernmental institution to oversee 
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the process of bond rating, which appears to have been thoroughly corrupted 
by conflicts of interest. The staffing and funding of such an institution would, no 
doubt, pose great challenges of regulatory design, as would the creation of oppor-
tunities for public input into setting standards and devising mechanisms of over-
sight by the relevant regulatory agencies. But this approach would seem to offer 
one way to avoid endemic conflicts of interest, while keeping the government 
out of the business of ranking the relative risk associated with various securities.
The financial scandals of the past several years, along with heightened public 
support for stricter regulation of the financial markets, improves the chances 
for crafting strategies of co-regulation that make a difference. The historical 
record, both within and outside the realm of finance, suggests that industries 
beset by crisis, especially crisis that has sullied their standing with the public, 
frequently prove more committed to building regulatory institutions that actually 
achieve their goals. That same record makes clear that to be effective, private 
regulatory governance must confront the scrutiny of an engaged and properly 
resourced regulatory state.28 With attention to the right principles of design, 
targeted co-regulation might help American policymakers recreate the basic 
culture of trust so crucial to modern financial markets.
Co-Regulation As Policy Tool
We began this essay with two brief vignettes about regulatory failure. The 
victims of the credit crisis and the environmental disaster in eastern Tennessee 
now look to Washington policymakers for solutions. One could certainly 
forgive those policymakers for looking at a broken dam and a crippled financial 
system and concluding that self-regulation necessarily translates into no regula-
tion at all. To be sure, proponents of private regulatory structures all too often 
design them in a haphazard and cavalier fashion, or embrace them as part of a 
larger political agenda that rejects a positive role for regulation. Corporations 
have a powerful incentive to maximize profits and, absent the constraints imposed 
by regulatory policy, many firms will, sooner or later, impose large and tragic 
costs on society. Given the stakes, reliance of any kind on private regulation 
might seem just too risky.
Yet there is powerful evidence that in the right circumstances, and with the 
right execution, strategies that incorporate private governance can extend the 
reach of regulation to areas that are simply beyond the analytical and budgetary 
capabilities of public regulators. Legislators and administrative agencies should 
view nongovernmental regulation as a policy instrument that can make sense 
in many, if by no means all, regulatory contexts. The key challenge is to design 
systems that provide the benefits of self-governance without sacrificing the 
high levels of accountability that one expects from public regulation.
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We have argued that the substantial advantages of regulatory delegation, 
either to SROs or individual corporations, can result if and only if such delegation 
occurs within a larger system of co-regulation. The government must design 
regulatory institutions to ensure that the flexibility for internal regulation is 
extended only to organizations with the requisite capacity and expertise; it must 
simultaneously take great care to maximize transparency and accountability. 
If implemented with care, a regime of co-regulation can extend the capacity 
of public regulators to promote the public interest. It can harness reputational 
concerns, market and supply-chain forces, and the capabilities of trade and 
standards-setting organizations to achieve goals that are currently beyond the 
reach of public regulators. Co-regulation, if it represents ingenuity in policy 
design and dedication to sustained oversight, can mean smarter regulation, and 
better government.
Obviously, our conclusions give rise to many more specific questions, in 
each of the thematic areas that we have examined. How should we go about 
distinguishing genuine regulatory concern from a politically savvy charade? 
What degree of heterogeneity among regulated entities should trigger the 
search for regulatory delegation to nonstate actors? What kinds of management 
systems and corporate compliance departments are necessary to assure that an 
SRO or a corporation has the capacity, and the dedication, to participate in 
co-regulation? What quantity, and quality, of information disclosure will meet 
the demands of transparency? How should public regulators devise metrics or 
baselines for such corporate reporting, so as to ensure comparability of results? 
When, precisely, does monitoring and enforcement by private regulatory actors, 
or the oversight of those actors by public officials, attain a sufficient standard 
of accountability? The answers to these questions will inevitably vary across 
regulatory domains. Prerequisites for effective co-regulation in food safety, for 
example, will surely differ considerably from what is required in environmental 
management or finance. As such, they deserve careful consideration from schol-
ars in every relevant social science discipline, as well as from the representatives 
of trade associations and public interest groups, and from analysts within reg-
ulatory agencies, the Office of Management and Budget, and congressional 
committees responsible for regulatory oversight.
What we propose here, then, is neither a blueprint nor a formula. Instead, 
we offer a analytical framework—some broad principles and key questions—
that should help legislators and regulatory officials sensibly choose when to give 
representatives of business some measure of regulatory authority, and think 
more systematically about the need to integrate these efforts into a system of 
co-regulation. Policymakers must approach any potential reliance on nongov-
ernmental regulatory structures with open eyes and an appreciation for the 
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challenges of making them work. Legislators and bureaucrats cannot take cor-
porate commitment to regulatory purposes for granted, even as they should 
not presume that any profession of such commitment is necessarily a mere 
smokescreen. They cannot approach co-regulation in the hope of discovering 
a cost-free solution—governments cannot create meaningful disclosure, much 
less meaningful accountability, without significant expenditure of resources. 
They further cannot assume that a given framework of co-regulation, once 
sensibly created, will achieve its goals without serious, consistent oversight. 
There is simply no regulatory free lunch.
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chapter 7
The Principles of Embedded 
Liberalism: Social Legitimacy  
and Global Capitalism
Rawi Abdelal and John G. Ruggie
In this essay we revisit the principles of “embedded liberalism” and argue 
for their relevance to the contemporary global economy. The most essential 
principle is the need for markets to enjoy social legitimacy, because their politi-
cal sustainability ultimately depends on it. From this principle we analyze three 
current sets of practices and institutions in which ongoing crises of legitimacy 
demonstrate the need for a renewal of embedded liberalism and a revitalization 
of global governance. They are: the activities of transnational corporations, 
particularly with regard to core standards in labor and human rights; the orga-
nization of the international financial architecture; and the formal rules and 
informal norms of international organizations. 
Learning the Lessons of Embedded Liberalism
The post-1945 world economy embodied a social bargain. In the aftermath of 
the political and economic chaos of 1920s, the Great Depression of the 1930s, 
and the Second World War—all of which together shattered the world order 
within the span of a single generation—policymakers sought to reorganize and 
rebuild the world economy by restoring open markets, promising to mitigate 
their adverse social consequences and thereby preempting societal demands, 
from both left and right, to replace markets altogether. The failure to strike such 
a compromise earlier had undermined international cooperation in trade and 
macroeconomic policy during the 1920s and 1930s, just as it had caused the 
collapse of the first era of globalization, circa 1870 to 1914.
Influential scholars and policymakers began to make sense of how that first 
era of globalization had lost its way. In his 1944 book, The Great Transformation, 
Karl Polanyi distinguished “embedded” from “disembedded” economic orders. 
On Polanyi’s reading of history, economic orders had always reflected the prin-
ciples and values of the societies in which they were situated. Only in the middle 
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of the nineteenth century was the idea of an economy that was somehow 
separate from society, a collection of markets with its own inexorable principles 
and logic, invented and then cultivated. This idea, which informed classical lib-
eralism, was not only new but revolutionary. Whereas previous economic orders 
had always been “embedded” in social and political relations, this new liberal-
ism succeeded in “disembedding” first national markets and, soon thereafter, 
cross-border markets, and ultimately global markets as well. Several policy 
practices were essential to this process of disembedding markets, above all the 
free movement of goods, services, and capital among nations.
The outbreak of war in 1914 led the combatant governments to suspend the 
convertibility of their currencies into gold and, often, into other currencies also. 
Fixed exchange rates, international commerce, and cross-border investment 
collapsed. In the early 1920s, European governments sought in vain to reestab-
lish on the old principles of classical liberalism the prewar system in political 
circumstances that were much changed. Europe’s continental empires had dis-
integrated into successor states whose governments often carefully guarded 
their economic autonomy. The working classes, long disenfranchised, empowered 
the left and politicized macroeconomic policymaking for the first time. Factories 
had been destroyed, public finances ruined, and currencies debauched throughout 
the continent. Germany struggled to make a success of the Weimar Republic’s 
fragile democracy, but soon veered to the far right. The United States declined 
the opportunity of world leadership and withdrew instead into isolation. 
Russia was preoccupied by its Bolshevik Revolution, and Japan soon turned 
to militarism.
When U.S. and European policymakers, among them the great British 
economist John Maynard Keynes, began to debate the rules by which the inter-
national economy ought to be reconstructed, they agreed with the basic insight 
articulated by Polanyi: the disembedding of markets had been politically 
unsustainable. Simply put, national societies rejected laissez-faire; across widely 
varying political spectra, the first era of globalization had come to be seen as 
illegitimate by all segments of society, save possibly the bankers. Thus this most 
important lesson was drawn: markets that societies do not recognize as legiti-
mate cannot last. So, policymakers set out to make sure that, this time around, 
cross-border markets would be more acceptable to the people who worked (and 
lived) within them and voted for the politicians who would regulate them. Markets 
would be reconciled with the values of social community and domestic welfare.
The formulation in a 1982 article by one of the authors of the present essay, 
John G. Ruggie, has become the dominant interpretation of the postwar inter-
national economy: a reconciliation of market and society termed the compromise 
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of embedded liberalism. “Unlike the economic nationalism of the thirties, it would 
be multilateral in character; unlike the liberalism of the gold standard and free 
trade, its multilateralism would be predicated upon domestic interventionism.” 
The practices of domestic interventionism would tame the socially disruptive 
effects of markets without, however, eliminating the welfare and efficiency gains 
derived from cross-country trade. National societies shared the risks through 
varieties of safeguards and insurance schemes that composed, in part, the 
European welfare states or, in the ever-exceptional United States, the New Deal 
state. Sophisticated modeling has demonstrated that embedded liberalism gen-
erated both better long-term economic performance and social protection than 
its laissez-faire predecessor.
In that same article, Ruggie conjectures that “the resurgent ethos of liberal 
capitalism”—what later became known as neoliberalism—threatened to undo 
the compromise of embedded liberalism as the world had known it. In the 
event, it wasn’t merely embedded liberalism’s specific policy tools that became 
discredited; its paradigm of political economy was itself attacked and under-
mined. An analysis of the specifics of this shift in thought is not essential to 
our learning the lessons of the era of embedded liberalism, circa 1945 to 1985. 
What is important is recognizing that our current era of globalization and its 
neoliberal paradigm have reached the point themselves of suffering from a 
profound crisis of legitimacy. If that crisis is not resolved by deft policymaking 
in the United States and around the world, globalization is likely to be undone 
by national policy reactions driven by societies that have grown increasingly 
skeptical of newly disembedded global markets. Policymakers must recognize, 
moreover, that this crisis of legitimacy for globalization has been unfolding 
since the end of the 1990s. The crash of 2008 did not cause this crisis, but has 
surely made it worse.
We therefore propose that policymakers revisit the principles of embedded 
liberalism in the hopes of embedding, and thereby legitimating, the practices of 
transnational corporations, the governance of financial markets, and the rules of 
international organizations. The core principle of embedded liberalism is the 
need to legitimize international markets by reconciling them to social values 
and shared institutional practices. This principle implies the need to bridge gaps 
in the governance of firms that produce, buy, and sell around the world, firms 
whose rights have in effect in the recent era of globalization outstripped the 
global frameworks that should regulate them. This principle further implies the 
need to balance, both domestically and internationally, the benefits of interna-
tionalized financial markets with their substantial risks; to share the rewards 
and costs of the disruptions created by internationalized markets across national 
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societies; and to ensure that global governance is based on multilateral delibera-
tion among countries whose leaders believe that the influence of their voices 
reflects their place in a multipolar—or at least “nonpolar”—world. 
Embedding the Activities of Transnational Corporations
The most visible institutional expression of globalization today is the transna-
tional corporation (TNC). TNCs number approximately 77,000, with 800,000 
subsidiaries and millions of suppliers. Critics in the industrialized countries 
blame TNCs for exporting jobs to poorer countries with lower labor costs and 
weaker protective regimes for labor, and for driving down the wages of workers 
whose jobs are not exported. In the developing world, TNCs are frequently 
seen as engaging in social and environmental practices they could never get away 
with back home, because they are too powerful for capital-poor governments to 
challenge. While containing elements of truth, both views are stereotypes. Of 
course, even flawed perceptions can drive policy—in the case of TNCs typically 
in a populist/economic nationalist direction.
Yet the fundamental challenge for the social legitimacy of TNCs is rooted 
not in these shifting perceptions, but in an underlying institutional reality. 
While the legal rights enabling TNCs to operate globally have expanded 
significantly over the past generation, their activities are not adequately encom-
passed by global regulatory frameworks. This results in growing governance 
gaps—between the scope and impact of their activities, and the capacity of 
societies to manage their adverse consequences.
The more than 2,500 bilateral investment treaties currently in effect are a 
case in point, the vast majority of which were adopted in the 1990s. While pro-
viding legitimate protection to foreign investors, these treaties also permit those 
investors to take host states to binding international arbitration, not only for 
expropriation but also for a variety of alleged damages resulting from the 
implementation of legislation to improve domestic social and environmental 
standards—even when the legislation applies uniformly to all businesses, foreign 
and domestic. And the grounds for such claims appear to be expanding. For 
example, a European mining company operating in South Africa is challenging 
that country’s black economic empowerment laws, seeking compensation from 
the government for being required to recruit a certain number of blacks for 
their workforce and board. Such cases can have a chilling effect on a developing 
country’s attempts to improve its social and environmental performance without 
fear of being sued by foreign investors and having to pay them compensation 
for the privilege of meeting its obligations to its own people.
In turn, the legal framework that regulates TNCs operates much as it 
did long before the recent wave of globalization. A parent company and its 
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subsidiaries continue to be construed as distinct legal entities. Therefore, the 
parent company is generally not held liable for wrongs committed by a subsid-
iary, even where it is the sole shareholder, unless the subsidiary is under such 
close operational control by the parent that it can be seen as its mere agent. 
Furthermore, despite the transformative changes in the global economic land-
scape generated by far-flung networks of offshore sourcing, purchasing goods 
and services even from sole suppliers is still considered a transaction between 
unrelated parties. Factors such as these make it exceedingly difficult to hold an 
extended enterprise accountable for social and environmental harms inflicted 
by one of its units.
Of course, each legally distinct corporate entity is subject to the laws of the 
countries in which it is based and operates. But in most industries it has ready 
exit strategies. Moreover, states, particularly some developing countries, may 
lack the institutional capacity to enforce national laws and regulations against 
transnational firms doing business in their territory even when the government 
of the day has the necessary political will, or they may feel constrained from 
doing so by having to compete internationally for investment. In turn, the 
home states of TNCs may be reluctant to regulate against overseas harm by these 
firms because the permissible scope of national regulation with extraterritorial 
effect remains unclear in international law, or because the states’ governments 
fear that those firms might lose investment opportunities abroad or relocate 
their headquarters.
Finally, this dynamic is not limited to TNCs. To attract investments and 
promote exports, capital-poor countries may exempt national firms from 
certain legal and regulatory requirements or fail to adopt such standards in the 
first place.
Recognizing the mounting challenge to their legitimacy, many of the world’s 
leading TNCs have adopted their own private systems to manage various social 
aspects of their global operations, such as labor standards in their supply chains, 
or community engagement strategies in big-footprint natural-resource-extractive 
projects. Such voluntary initiatives are a positive development and help pro-
mote social standards. And they have important roles to play even in societies 
with well-functioning rule-of-law institutions and regulatory policies. But vol-
untary initiatives also have significant limits that need to be addressed and 
redressed. To state the obvious first, the vast majority of workers and communi-
ties live well beyond their orbit. However, even within their orbit, it is not 
unusual for workers in the same supplier factory, doing the same work, to be 
covered by different regulatory systems stipulated by different global buyers. 
This incongruity seems odd, to say the least, insofar as the rights in question are 
acknowledged to be universal.
156 Abdelal and Ruggie
These company-based systems are also highly variable. They may, but more 
often do not, meet internationally recognized standards even when those are 
explicitly invoked: in one case of what we might charitably term creative 
hermeneutics, freedom of association and collective bargaining were interpreted 
as “engaging in dialogue with employees about issues of mutual interest.” 
Moreover, such voluntary systems vary in transparency, in what they reveal 
publicly about their inner workings and outcomes. Moreover, they vary in how 
proactive they are in anticipating and seeking to prevent problems, versus being 
reactive—typically, changing only when a company is confronted with some 
scandalous revelation in the press.
In addition, the driving forces that underlie the evident variability among 
corporate self-regulation include factors that have little to do with the substan-
tive problems addressed, the specific populations involved, or the particular 
industry sector. In a recent survey of the Fortune Global 500 firms conducted 
by Ruggie, the specific rights recognized in a given company’s corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) policy, and the external stakeholders that policy acknowl-
edges, were found to be influenced decisively by the political culture of the 
company’s home base, be it the United States, Europe, Japan, or emerging 
market countries.
At a more refined level of analysis, it is clear moreover that, among compa-
nies based in the same country and operating in the same industry, each firm’s 
particular market segment strongly shapes the human-rights and broader CSR 
programs throughout its supply chains—the obvious comparison being between 
so-called premium brands, which trade on cachet, and value brands, whose 
consumers are concerned above all with price: the Nike–versus–Wal-Mart 
difference, in essence.
In sum, the existence of private corporate regulatory systems is surely a pos-
itive development. However, corporations’ freedom to define both the form and 
the content of their regulatory systems and the high degree of market seg-
mentation among such systems drastically limits their potential contribution to 
moving us toward an effective global business and human-rights regime, one 
that which would provide a sturdy social pillar to sustain the global market.
Multistakeholder initiatives and even collective business arrangements are 
typically clearer in the social standards they adopt and more transparent than 
private corporate regulatory systems. But in the end there is no substitute for 
governments doing what governments exist to do: to govern, and to govern in 
the public interest. Governments should not assume that they are helping busi-
ness by failing to provide adequate guidance for, or regulation of, the adverse 
social impacts of corporate activities. On the contrary, the less governments do, 
the more they increase the risk to the reputation of the corporations that they 
 The Principles of Embedded Liberalism  157
should legitimately regulate. Governments need to promote a corporate culture 
respectful of human rights and environmental sustainability at home and abroad. 
And they need to consider the impact on such standards when they sign trade 
and investment agreements, and when they provide export credit or investment 
guarantees for overseas projects in contexts where the risk to those standards is 
known to be high. 
Embedding the International Financial System
International capitalism has always, paradoxically, had an uneasy relationship to 
capital itself. The international financial architecture—the collection of norms 
and rules that structure the interactions between governments and international 
financial markets—has changed dramatically more than once. Capital has alter-
nately been extraordinarily free and fundamentally constrained as international 
capitalism has evolved over time. No arrangement or orthodoxy has been 
permanent, although illusions of permanence, inevitability, and inexorability 
have defined each historical moment.
The first era of globalization, circa 1870 to 1914, was built upon fundamen-
tally liberal institutional foundations embodied in the practices of the classical 
gold standard. Policymakers understood that to restrict freedom of capital 
violated the rules, albeit unwritten, of the gold standard. With restrictions 
considered to be neither normal nor legitimate, capital was as free to flow from 
one country to another as it has ever been. Bankers, managers, and investors 
thus enjoyed an age of extraordinary freedom and opportunity.
The effects of the First World War, the decade of recurrent international 
financial crises that followed, and the Great Depression destroyed that liberal 
order. Then, during the 1940s and 1950s, the rules of the international financial 
architecture were rewritten to be restrictive by design and according to an explicit 
doctrine. At that time members of the international financial community 
collectively shared a set of beliefs about the destabilizing consequences of short-
term, speculative capital flows, or “hot money,” and the need for government 
autonomy from international financial markets. Only a few decades earlier, 
these beliefs would have been considered radical and anticapitalist. At the time, 
however, capital regulation marked capitalism’s way forward.
To regulate and control capital became the prevailing orthodoxy. Policy-
makers then wrote their new consensus into the international financial archi-
tecture. The right of members of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
European Community (EC), and Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) to regulate movements of capital was protected by the 
IMF’s Articles of Agreement (1945), the EC’s Treaty of Rome (1957), and the 
OECD’s Code of Liberalization of Capital Movements (1961).
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As the rules were liberalized in the decades that followed, managers and 
investors enjoyed another era of freedom, one that spurred massive growth in 
global financial markets. Freedom of movement for capital became the new 
orthodoxy once again. Instead of the unwritten rules of the first era of global-
ization, this new era espoused formal, codified rules that explicitly defined its 
liberal principles and policy practices. The rules of the European Union (EU) 
and the OECD were rewritten to oblige members, the world’s thirty or so rich-
est countries, to allow virtually all cross-border flows of capital. The IMF began 
informally to promote capital liberalization among its membership, which 
was nearly universal, and some policymakers sought to amend the Articles of 
Agreement to oblige members to liberalize capital movements. Central bankers 
meeting in Basel at the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) endorsed this 
liberal evolution of government practices, allowing banks to measure their own 
risks using models of their own design. A shadow banking system emerged, 
largely unregulated, perhaps half as large as the formal banking system. And 
private credit rating agencies, such as Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s (S&P), 
propagated the practices of this shadow system, and rather than blowing the 
whistle on excessive risk, they helped to disguise it.
Now once again a new orthodoxy of capital mobility has been undermined, 
this time by a wave of financial crises that struck emerging markets in the 
1990s and, ultimately, by the panic of 2008—which has wiped out perhaps $30 
trillion in asset values, and necessitating nearly $1 trillion in global write-downs 
so far. The EU, OECD, and IMF have since begun a general rethinking within 
the international financial community of the risks and benefits of capital liber-
alization. This rethinking has received ever more focused attention.
The United States must rethink its approach as well. Today, capital regula-
tion once again marks capitalism’s way forward. Regulation should aim at two 
objectives that informed capital’s place in embedded liberalism: greater insulation 
of the real economy from the effects of financial crises; and greater policy 
autonomy from the short-term preferences of financial market participants.
These objectives have never been pursued for their own sake, but to permit 
and promote free trade in goods and, later, services by buffering the adverse 
effects of such freedom. Financial crises and wildly fluctuating exchange rates 
caused by perhaps excessively mobile capital and boom-and-bust cycles have in 
fact historically undermined the kinds of cross-border transactions that almost 
everyone has always believed would contribute to world growth and employment: 
simple, comparatively prosaic trade. Domestic regulations and the international 
financial architecture should be organized to privilege current-account transactions 
(and particularly trade in goods and services) over financial-account transactions.
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The compromise of embedded liberalism also privileges the judgment of 
policymakers over those of financial market participants. Governments, according 
to this way of thinking, should be relatively autonomous from market forces, 
free to pursue expansionary monetary and fiscal policies without endangering 
their exchange-rate commitments or suffering the outflow of capital in search 
of a higher rate of interest or a lower rate of inflation.
With regard to the international financial architecture, then, international 
organizations should not promote—nor should their charters legally oblige—
capital liberalization. National governments should fulfill their responsibilities 
to their citizenries and commit themselves to freer trade in goods and services, 
but requiring full capital liberalization without also creating effective regulatory 
underpinnings can undermine their capacity to do so. Such regulatory under-
pinnings can help prevent implicitly guaranteed financial institutions from 
taking excessive risks; limit the public’s exposure to the risks that are inevitably 
taken, partly as a consequence of the circumvention of rules that necessarily 
tends to follow market innovations; and restrict credit and asset bubbles as they 
are forming. International organizations and their rules have proven far more 
effective at encouraging liberalization than at cultivating domestic institution 
building. They should also promote regulatory practices that have proven to be 
most effective, and allow for constrained and temporary deviation from open-
ness when domestic needs require such a choice.
True, this implies that we will trust policymakers more than the financial 
markets, and doing so is never easy. During the 1920s and 1930s, the West 
learned to mistrust unregulated financial markets. And then we forgot. Today, 
we are relearning that lesson. Although the next generation of policymakers 
will no doubt forget it again, the need to re-embed the financial markets is, 
momentarily, crystal clear. Failing to do so will undermine the legitimacy of the 
entire enterprise of global capitalism itself.
Domestic regulatory systems, including that in the United States, should 
privilege the real economy over financial sectors. This will require real public 
oversight, rather than, as the United States has done for so long, the out-
sourcing of regulatory authority to rating agencies. More broadly, excessive 
credit creation and flawed compensation schemes drew managerial talent into 
activities that, in retrospect, have destroyed billions of dollars worth of value. 
A re-embedding of the financial system would also thereby temper a variety of 
adverse consequences of credit bubbles, which misallocate both capital and tal-
ent. We should be prepared to live with trading some extra financial innovation 
for a smaller crisis next time. 
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Reviving Multilateralism
The compromise of embedded liberalism was, lastly, based on multilateralism. 
Among the many advantages of multilateral decision making is the legitimacy 
of the deliberative process. Power usually is far more effective when exercised 
with consent rather than coercion. Multilateralism is self-interest for the 
farsighted. The convenience of unilateralism is ephemeral and ultimately self-
defeating because of the reactions that it inevitably provokes.
Recall the point of view of Thrasymachus, in the first book of Plato’s 
Republic. In a classic Socratic dialogue, Thrasymachus and his colleagues debate 
the concept of justice. Impatiently, Thrasymachus seeks to ends the debate with 
a power-politics sort of definition: justice, he says, is merely the will of the stron-
ger. The strong define right from wrong, and the weak must live with the result.
U.S. policy has been based too much, and for too long, on this notion of 
Thrasymachean justice. The momentary usefulness of unilateralism has been far 
outweighed by the growing number of countries whose policymakers now 
prefer to impede progress on important issues based on the principle of oppos-
ing—in effect, balancing against—the United States. The American approach 
to ad hoc globalization has been self-defeating. Instead, multilateralism and 
governance through international organizations need to be revived if this global 
economic order is to be saved. This can be accomplished in two ways.
First, the United States should pursue its interests through organizations 
like the IMF and UN, rather than embrace the expediency of unilateralism or 
the power asymmetries of bilateral deal making. Whenever possible, bilateral 
treaty negotiations should be abandoned in favor of multilateral solutions, which, 
though they require more compromises, are longer-lasting arrangements.
Second, the voting weights of several of the major international organiza-
tions must change in order to reflect the economic realities of the twenty-first 
century. The IMF is the place to start, for the organization’s voting weights, estab-
lished in 1944, no longer reflect a world in which the capital-rich Middle East 
and Asia must be part of any conversation about how to cultivate the multilateral 
cooperation that is so urgently needed. This means that individual European 
countries and the United States will have to see their voting weights shrink.
Why should the West voluntarily give up voting power in such organiza-
tions? The answer is simple. In the future, the United States could, for example, 
have 17 percent of the weighted votes in an irrelevant IMF, or 14 percent in an 
organization that actually matters—and 17 percent of zero is still zero. And 
irrelevance is inevitable in the absence of change, in part because systemically 
important countries ranging from Brazil to China to the United Arab Emirates 
have been forced into the role of only being able to spoil multilateral negotia-
tions that do not include them, rather than contributing to discussions that 
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reflect their needs and interests as well. Much the same is true of the UN 
Security Council, which now has two sets of permanent members: the P5, 
victors of World War II, with veto power; and a rotating bloc of “spoilers,” 
whose driving motivation is to resist or undermine the decrepit hegemony of 
the P5 unless their immediate self-interest is advanced by it.
Cooperation will be essential in this next moment of the current era of glo-
balization, and the United States is not in a position to demand or to force its 
emergence. It will have to emerge deliberately, legitimately, and multilaterally. 
The United States can maintain the ephemeral power of codified voting weights 
in dying organizations, or reinvigorate the organizations while taking roles 
better suited to the world in which we actually live. 
Conclusions
“The world,” Ernest Hemingway wrote, “is a fine place and worth the fighting 
for.” His sentiment even holds true for the world economy, which has become 
in many ways more integrated than it ever has been. Globalization has helped 
to raise the living standards of millions; it has led to unprecedented opportuni-
ties for both societies and individuals. This integrated global economy is worth 
saving. The best way to save globalized markets is, perhaps paradoxically, to 
regulate them according to principles that, until very recently, have been very 
much out of fashion. Living in an era of neoliberalism, many of our policymakers 
lost track of the lessons of embedded liberalism. The result is paradoxical, for it 
was embedded liberalism itself that made possible the recent era of globalization 
through its embedded market practices—giving people the confidence that the 
risks of market opening would be shared. Social legitimacy—not neoliberal 
ideology—made the world safe for global markets. The influence of neoliberal-
ism came late and was remarkably short-lived. The disembedding of markets 
and the asymmetrical rules governing TNCs have, more recently, undermined 
the very global project neoliberalism was meant to enhance.
Now this era of globalization must be saved, and not by the neoliberal 
ideology that led in significant part to globalization’s current crisis of legitimacy. 
Rather, policymakers should return to the intellectual and normative frame-
work that made the renaissance of global markets possible: embedded liberalism. 
The specific practices will need updating, but the core regulatory principle of 
this philosophy is essential: global markets require social legitimacy if they are 
to be sustained. That legitimacy derives from the embedding of market practices 
in the values and principles of national societies and, most broadly, in global 
civil society. In this essay, we have emphasized the relationship between social 
pillars and transnational business activity, the balance between the financial 
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markets and the real economy, and the political advantages of multilateralism. 
Many other issues fit within this framework.
The United States has, for some years, violated the regulatory principles and 
policy practices of embedded liberalism, and the result has not been satisfactory. 
Global markets have been rendered illegitimate, though the country needs 
those very markets. Skepticism is on the rise, though the United States has 
benefitted greatly from this era of globalization. The failure of neoliberalism 
presents an extraordinary opportunity for policymakers to credibly overturn one 
regulatory model in favor of another; perhaps this choice would have been 
politically impossible just a few years ago. Today the principles of embedded 
liberalism are clearly essential, and we need them more than ever.
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New PersPectives oN regulatioN
New regulation shouldn’t rely on old ideas.
“Since the 1960s, influential research on government failure helped to drive the move-
ment for deregulation and privatization. Yet even as the study of government failure 
was flourishing, some very different ideas were sprouting in the social sciences with 
profound implications for our understanding of human behavior and the role of 
government. Some of these ideas, particularly from the field of behavioral economics, 
have begun to nudge their way into discussions of regulatory purpose, design, and imple-
mentation. Yet even here, the process is far from complete; and many other exciting 
new lines of research—on everything from social cooperation to co-regulation—have 
hardly been incorporated at all. Now that many lawmakers and their constituents have 
apparently concluded that the earlier focus on government failure went too far, it is 
imperative that they be able to draw on the very latest academic work in thinking 
anew about the role of government. This, at root, is the purpose of this book: to make 
the newest and most important research accessible to a broad audience.”
                                        —From the Introduction
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